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The True History of the Civil War

By

Guy Carleton Lee, Ph.D.
Of Johns Hopkins University

With Twenty-four Illustrations and Maps

"Ego verum amo, verum volo mihi dici: mendacem odi"

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TO

GEORGE BARRIE, Sr.

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Preface

THE burden of authorship is indeed heavy, but the responsibility of title-making is insupportable. Therefore, while I bear the onus that may fall upon me because of the contents of this book, I leave to my publishers the credit—or the blame—that may come from the title which they have selected. Presumptuous, no doubt, I am to attempt to crowd within the space at my command a history of the Civil War, but, believe me, to my sins of commission cannot be added that of arrogantly assuming that this book of mine is the only "true" history of the war between the States. Indeed, so clearly do I recognize the futility of such a claim, that here, in all humility and gratitude, I express my obligations to the distinguished historians and the score and more of patient students whose researches have made my work the easier, as well as to those persons who have placed at my disposal the original sources upon which I in great part rely; and I am especially indebted to W. R. Garrett, of Nashville, Oakley P. Haines, of Baltimore, and Alfred Brittain, of Newark, not only for their kindness in reading the proof of this volume, but for the many helpful suggestions made by them.

I may say, without disparagement to the historians whose works have won deserved credit, that the word "True," which the publishers have

chosen as best describing this book, has in it something of force. It does not, as here used, mean absolutely free from error. "True," in our title, means unprejudiced and non-sectional, and in this sense I accept it as placing my book in—not outside of—the ranks of those histories which have won the respect of their readers. Perhaps, too, in following out the idea expressed by the word "True," I have succeeded in producing a book that in some degree differs from existing histories in that it is not written from the stand-point of a neutral. What is said of any section is said as a partisan of that section. I have endeavored when writing of the North to write as a Northerner, of the South as a Southerner, and in all this as an American upon whom all the States have a claim. The book attempts no balancing, no hedging, no glossing, and it seeks no "golden mean,"—for there is no true mean in passion, and the Civil War was a conflict of passion. I give, therefore, a book of extremes—of uncompromising conclusions. I present men and events as they were, not as they might have been. In this presentation I have necessarily written plainly, perhaps brutally, but in every case in strict honesty.

GUY CARLETON LEE.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

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The True History of the Civil War

I

IN THE BEGINNING

THE seeds of dissension between the North and the South were carried to Virginia in the ships commanded by Newport, and to Massachusetts in the "Mayflower." Each kind fell upon soil well adapted to nourish its characteristics. The progress of the colonization and settlement of the sections was so affected by natural laws that the germs of antagonism developed until dissensions in opinion became conflicts of force; and the union of States, the result of rebellion and compromise, was well-nigh permanently dissolved into congeries of conflicting democracies.

Elemental causes of the great conflict between the sections may be seen, for example, in the spatial separation of the people, their differing social antecedents in the old country, the industrial and social results of contrasting climatic influences, and the political consequences of differing locations and environments. In all this,

however, there is not found anything that is necessarily productive of disunion.

In the beginning of their history the people of the United States were not far from being homogeneous. It is safe to say that, under similar succeeding conditions, racial differences, as well as those resulting from social status, might have disappeared, for there was no natural barrier between North and South; indeed, the conformation of the country is as if it were designed for one people. Of this Abraham Lincoln made a point in his inaugural address:

> "We cannot separate, we cannot remove our respective sections from each other. We cannot build an impassable wall between them. A husband and a wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other, but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them."

Nevertheless, there was in the beginning an almost imperceptible rift between the people of the North and those of the South. This gradually widened until, notwithstanding the necessity for union, a separation in sentiment, thought, and custom arose. This estrangement developed until it gave to the people of the North and the South the aspect of two races, manifesting towards each other all the antipathy of rival and dissimilar nations and, in their disagreements, rendering impossible either sympathy with each other's stand-point or patient listening to each other's contention.

The direct cause of the outbreak of the war between the States was slavery; the direct object of the prosecution of the war was the preservation of the Union; but rightly to understand these patent elements of the conflict, the far-descending causes must be traced back to those influences which threw the North and the South out of sympathy with each other.

The differentiation of the American people appears to have had its beginning in the original, pre-colonial British stock from which they were derived. To the North, in the days of settlement, came the alert, democratic, middle-class townspeople, while the Southern colonists were, in large part, of the rural aristocratic type.

As two distinct classes of English society settled America, so did two distinct principles actuate and control the settlement itself,—material interests, as sought by the individual adventurer as well as by the whole colony; ideas, seeking a refuge in the wilderness from cramping intolerance at home. The former directed the original settlement of the South; the latter were, in great measure, the cause of the earliest immigrations to the North and more especially to New England.

Newport brought to Jamestown one hundred and five souls, of whom one-half were gentlemen expecting nothing other than to live as such on estates the like of which the law of primogeniture denied to them in the Old World. The "Mayflower" conveyed a company of people

who were prepared to cling desperately to any conditions in which liberty was a possible feature.

We cannot afford to overlook the influence exerted on early American social and political conceptions by the nature of the agricultural products of the different sections of the country. While, under the conditions then prevailing, the crops of the South could be cultivated profitably only upon a large scale and by some sort of system of enforced labor, those of the North, in the very nature of things, made for small farms tilled by the owners themselves. In the South, therefore, the bondage of the black race found easy and welcome acceptance. Large holdings, aristocratic institutions, and slave labor were natural to Virginia and the other Southern colonies, while in New England small holdings, democratic institutions, and free labor prevailed. The contrast is such, therefore, that divergence of habit and sentiment can alone be expected in the succeeding history. Would the results have been the same had the colonists of Virginia settled in Massachusetts Bay and those aboard the "Mayflower" disembarked on the banks of the James River?

We have, then, two peoples who, though geographically undivided, inevitably drew apart from each other because the dominant strain in each originally sprang from different classes of society and because of the results of dissimilar environment.

The social contrast between the colonists of the two sections has, however, been frequently thrust into too great prominence. We must remember that there was a strong sprinkling of Independents and Covenanters throughout the South, and not a few scions of the gentry class went to Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut. It is, nevertheless, true and vitally important that the royalist faction impressed its character on Southern social and political habits of thought and action, while its despised rival laid the foundation of New England. But in both North and South office-holding became a mark of distinction and the starting-point of an indigenous aristocracy.

A free soil for Puritanism peopled Massachusetts; a desire to better their material well-being sent colonists to Virginia. It may be open to question as to whether burning old women for witchcraft or paying one hundred and fifty pounds of tobacco for a wife were a more decided reversion to barbarism; at all events, the Puritans did not hesitate to enslave the pagan aborigines, and African domestic servitude existed in all the colonies, while an active commerce in slaves sprang up throughout the South; but in course of time the social ideals as well as the industrial conditions of the North grew more, as those of the South grew less, impatient of slavery.

Men who have been persecuted cultivate intolerance when they come into power; conse-

quently, the *laissez faire* principle was an impossibility in New England. The immoderation of the abolitionist descended to New Englanders by direct inheritance from the narrowness of the Puritan. When the descendants of the Puritans once formed the notion that a thing was wrong, no consideration of expediency, extenuating circumstance, or the necessities of the times could divert them from utterly denouncing it. It was this habit in their manner of dealing with slavery which later on so thoroughly exasperated the South. On the other hand, the Southern people took little pains to adapt themselves to the peculiarities of their Northern neighbors, for the ruling class had not been bred to regard with favor a policy of conciliation. Convinced of the justice of their cause, and even more confident of their ability to carry their point, the descendants of the Cavaliers strove against the sons of the Puritans, and this, too, with an air of superiority that caused New England to swallow hard, to gulp back, if need were, her rage.

The disproportion between the natural advantages of North and South is plain, though the worth of that difference is by no means so apparent. When the colonies had developed into States, the natural differences between the sections were more noticeable.

Despite her climatic and geographic advantages, upon which great stress has been laid by many historians, the South was behind the North in every element that made for permanent pros-

perity, and much of her advantage was unavailable. Each census marked an advance in the status of the North, and each census warned the South that, unless some action were taken to check the movement of the North or add to the progress of the South, the day might speedily come when the power of the slave-holding States would be as nothing against that of the free States with their numerical preponderance " and the ability to control the legislation of Congress, which, under the Constitution, was theirs by virtue of their resistless majority."

The differences in status and habitat did not, however, in the first years of settlement, produce a conflict of opinion upon what was to be a question that the Civil War alone could answer. The subjection of the blacks to enforced servitude was, in the beginning of the history of the United States, considered compatible with both justice and Christianity. As the industry of the South was confined to agriculture and the raising of semi-tropical products, slavery was there regarded as making for the welfare of the section. But the manufacturers and traders of the North could not avail themselves of slave labor. Nature herself excluded New England from all possibility of a wide-spread system of African bondage. This was realized more quickly than the idea of the unrighteousness of the traffic was conceived, for, in many cases, the thrifty farmers sent their blacks to the South to be sold.

Slavery was not, therefore, a source of misunderstanding. It is true that at the very first Congress petitions were received praying for its abolition. They were from Pennsylvania and New York. But there were those in the South, even among the ranks of the slave-holders, who were equally willing to have this design accomplished.

But new inventions, an extension of territory, the desire for tropical luxuries, and a demand for home markets united in crushing out the general abolition sentiment of the eighteenth century that, North and South, had been born of the French Revolution. Individuals in the South, however, continued, even down to the war between the sections, to encourage emancipation, either by voluntarily manumitting their slaves by deed or will or by allowing them to buy their time; nor was the Liberia scheme without its Southern supporters, though as to the latter, the North asserted that the South encouraged it for the sole purpose of ridding the land of the free negroes. On the other hand, there was nothing in the religious or moral ideas of the Puritan that specially predisposed him to view the institution of slavery with disfavor. Believing as he did that men should be guided in their conduct by the Scriptures, not by the spirit breathed through the whole but by the precept of each individual text, he quite contentedly followed, and allowed others to follow, the example of the Patriarchs. The Puritans who removed

to the South soon became slave-holders themselves, and not a few defended the institution from the Bible, as did Southern divines at a later date.

Public opinion in the North, however, where domestic servitude was not profitable, grew more and more opposed to the institution, especially after the discovery that slavery and the tariff were irreconcilable, until at last the institution was there stigmatized as "the sum of all villanies." A corresponding determination to maintain the system manifested itself in the South, where it was looked upon as being essential to Southern economic conditions. The people of the one section condemned as a sin an act which they were under no temptation to commit; the people of the other section saw a dispensation of Providence in that which their fancied interest predisposed them to maintain. Consequently, all the latent antagonism of social organization, ideals, and pursuits which existed between the North and the South was stirred into lively activity by the efforts of the abolitionists. In the long struggle of this party of agitation to win public opinion to their cause, was evinced in wordy debate all that bitterness which was later to characterize the fratricidal war. Misunderstanding, originally arising from the causes mentioned, warped and distorted the view which the people of each section took of the aims of the other. All the virtue and honor of the South was held as naught by a large and growing party that

had eyes for nothing but the evil of African bondage, while those to whom slavery seemed an economic necessity stubbornly refused to recognize any honesty of purpose in the North.

Given the institution of slavery as the bone of contention between sections already predisposed to jealousy and misunderstanding, and ultimate conflict is almost inevitable. With the introduction of the slavery question into Congress, a new school of statesmen sprang up. In the North men looked to the future, with novel conceptions of national life and power; in the South nearly every eye reverted, almost instinctively, to the past and scanned with eagerness the forgotten Articles of Confederation with their reservations as to State sovereignty. Unfortunately, there were few, either at the North or at the South, who understood the portent of the situation. Perhaps that was too much to expect. But to the average Southern mind, "our people" and "our country" meant one thing; to the average Northern mind, quite another.

Another potential dissimilarity between the two sections is found in their prevailing ecclesiastical systems. Congregationalism in New England, with all its Hebraistic Eutopianism and Blue Laws, fostered a theocracy which was in reality a democracy. The church in the South made the parish the unit of government. The vestries presiding over these parishes were, in many cases, close and co-optative corporations, which had no small effect in accustoming the

people to leave public matters in the hands of their leaders.

Southern society contained in its constitution all those elements which tend to resist change. Urban centres were few and small, while the large areas of the States, as contrasted with those of the Northern commonwealths, was a barrier to intercommunication. Then, too, the North was progressive in its opinions, principles, and organizations, while the South was stubbornly conservative. Hence, in the discussion of every national question which involved a new departure, there arose suspicion and misunderstanding. Tory and Whig did not wish to agree.

Moreover, in the North every institution tended to excessive individualism and to the union of the various sections. The growth of town life directed towards the municipal organizations those local attachments which at the South, in the absence of urban centres, went to the States.

Everywhere were being built cities which gathered their inhabitants from all parts of the North. The different sections became bound together by canals, railroads, and telegraphs. Companies for banking and commercial purposes drew their members and capital from all directions, indifferent to State boundaries. Manufacturing and trade made strongly for disintegration. Religious and educational associations arose, which included members in cities and towns far asunder. All this militated against an

exclusive affection for the individual State, but fostered patriotism in a wider and national sense.

The inhabitants of the North have always been in a large measure a floating population and one of varying elements. Side by side with the immense influence of migration stood that of immigration. The stream of foreign immigration which emptied itself almost exclusively upon the shores of the North brought an ever-increasing body of people from Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, Scandinavia, and other European countries. These scattered in all directions; while attached to the government of the country in which they obtained citizenship, they naturally could not hold deep-rooted predilection for any one State.

Foreign immigration had little effect on the South; in fact, it was scarcely present, being excluded and rendered almost impossible by the presence of slavery. In view of these patent facts, it is no wonder that the drift towards centralization, which early gained ground at the North, was first largely a matter of indifference and later a subject of stern opposition in the South.

Notwithstanding the final ratification of the Federal Constitution by the Thirteen States, and notwithstanding the fact that there was no more opposition to its acceptance in the South (save the bitter attack led by Patrick Henry) than in the North, the exceptions taken by the delegates from Maryland to the Articles of Confederation

of 1778 express a jealousy of national prerogative which, on the part of the South, was never overcome, and which, with the other causes we have indicated, brought about the movement which culminated in that conflict which to one side was a war between the States, to the other a rebellion.

II

THE SLAVERY PROBLEM

THE blight of negro slavery infected the South in the very earliest infancy of its history. In 1619 a ship, engaged in the Dutch trade, touched at Jamestown and there sold a few negroes to the colonists. This traffic, however, did not greatly flourish at first, for in 1650—or thirty-one years after their first introduction—only three hundred negroes were to be found in Virginia. It was not until 1663 that the institution began to take a firm hold in Virginia. At that date a sharp impetus was given to the traffic by the formation, in England, of a company for the special purpose of importing slaves; a head-right or bonus being awarded the colonists who imported negroes, the traffic grew apace. The Royal African Company, at the head of which was the Duke of York, had the monopoly of this business; it increased its profits and forced slavery on the colony by the enactment of laws which cut off the supply of indentured servants. Down to a late date, however, the people of Virginia looked upon slavery as an evil which they had been compelled to accept and of which they would gladly be rid.

In South Carolina, natural conditions made slave labor more acceptable. The rice-plant was

early brought from Madagascar. For it and for indigo, also, the soil of South Carolina was found to be eminently suitable; but the cultivation of these products was attended by conditions disastrous to the health of white people, and it seemed as if there was little chance for the planters unless they could procure Africans, who were better suited to the work. In one year a slave could produce enough rice and indigo to defray his whole cost. It was impossible for the not overactive principles of humanity then existing to stand in the way of such attractive prospects of gain.

The condition of the slaves employed in this labor was one of extreme degradation. The only indication that their owners regarded them as being in the least degree removed from the nature of beasts is found in the severe laws enacted to prevent an uprising. Many of these enactments, however, were less bloody than they now seem, and were made either to terrorize the newly arrived savage Africans or to ward off the influence of the West Indian blacks—ever a source of dread in the far South. Whipping was the universal punishment for bondmen, white or black. Mutilation was the next step in severity. Death was the statutory punishment in the South for the majority of crimes committed by negroes, though deportation was greatly favored; hanging was the common form of execution, and we have record of negroes having been burned at the stake—in the North. There was no legal

recognition of any binding form of marriage among slaves, and in consequence sexual relations were extremely promiscuous. But custom was softer than the positive law, and in course of time slaves were encouraged to go through the marriage ceremony before a minister.

An endeavor was made to establish and maintain Georgia as a free colony. Oglethorpe, who founded it in 1773, was in so doing largely moved by his desire to provide the large number of debtors who languished in the London prisons an opportunity to make a new start under improved conditions. Consistency demanded that, with such an origin, the colony should contain none but free inhabitants. Its founder maintained that slavery was contrary to both the Gospel and the fundamental law of England. "We refused," said he, "as trustees, to make a law permitting such a horrid crime." Besides this, Oglethorpe clearly saw the effect that slavery would have on the poor white laborer; his purpose in founding the colony was not to provide the affluent an opportunity profitably to invest their wealth, but to give the unfortunate a chance to redeem their fortunes. But these humane provisions were not for long regarded. At the first, the planters hired slaves from the South Carolinians; and within seven years from Oglethorpe's first landing, cargoes of negroes captured in Africa were being unloaded at Savannah.

During its early history Georgia was for a time the scene of the labors of Whitefield, the great

Methodist preacher, who founded an orphan-house at Savannah. It is interesting, as illustrating how the slave traffic was viewed by the most religious men of that time in respect to its morality, to note the position which Whitefield took in the matter. In a letter written in 1751 he expresses himself as having no doubt as to the lawfulness of keeping slaves; and he states the opinion that Georgia would have been much more prosperous if the use of them had been earlier permitted. At the same time, he was careful to indicate how gain and godliness, profit and piety, might be combined:

"Though it is true they are brought in a wrong way from their own country, and it is a trade not to be approved of, yet as it will be carried on whether we will or not, I should think myself highly favored if I could purchase a good number of them in order to make their lives comfortable, and lay a foundation for breeding up their posterity in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. I had no hand in bringing them into Georgia, though my judgment was for it."

At the time of his death this famous divine owned seventy-five slaves, whom he bequeathed to a lady who was also a religious zealot of his own type.

Whitefield as a slave-owner was not exceptional among clergymen. Even Jonathan Edwards owned slaves, as a bill of sale still in existence plainly shows. In the North as well as in the South slaves were held by the clergy.

Traffic in human beings was attended by no

compunctions of the Puritan conscience. As with the South, so the records of slavery in Massachusetts begin with its earliest history. The first statute establishing slavery in America is to be found in the famous Code of Fundamentals, or Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony in New England,—the first code of laws of that colony, adopted in December, 1641. The first persons held in bondage were Indians captured in the Pequot war of 1637. But in order that these might not be a menace to their captors, the men were sold in the Bermudas, while the women were distributed as domestic servants in the towns around the bay. This treatment was in many cases attended by great sorrow to the unhappy captives. In earliest New England we find no regard for the preservation of the integrity of the slave family. In the eighteenth century even the parting, by sale, of parents and children or of husband and wife, a proceeding which was to be held in the bitterest reproach by the North when it was practised in the South in the nineteenth century, did not attract appreciable disapprobation.

The giving away of little negroes as soon as weaned was then a common civility, much as it now is for one to present a friend with a puppy. Little regard was paid to any natural affection a black mother might be supposed to cherish for her offspring. "A likely negro woman about nineteen years, and a child of about sixteen months, to be sold together or apart,"—this is an

example of the sort of advertisement frequently seen in Boston in the eighteenth century.

The destruction of home ties by the removal of slaves to new sections of the country, where they were friendless, was later to be a matter of reprobation when the antislavery agitation was on; but in this New England again led. No words can describe this practice so well as those of Edward Everett at Bloody Brook, in 1835, when he speaks of the treatment of the family of Philip, the great Pequot chief:

"And what was the fate of Philip's wife and his son? This is a tale for husbands and wives, for parents and children. Young men and women, you cannot understand it. What was the fate of Philip's wife and child? She is a woman, he is a lad. They did not surely hang them. No, that would have been mercy. The boy is the grandson, his mother the daughter-in-law, of good old Massasoit, the first and best friend the English ever had in New England. Perhaps—perhaps, now Philip is slain, and his warriors scattered to the four winds, they will allow his wife and son to go back—the widow and the orphan—to finish their days and sorrows in their native wilderness. They are sold into slavery, West Indian slavery! an Indian princess and her child, sold from the cool breezes of Mount Hope, from the wild freedom of a New England forest, to gasp under the lash, beneath the blazing sun of the tropics! 'Bitter as death;' aye, bitter as hell! Is there anything—I do not say in the range of humanity—is there anything animated that would not struggle against this?"

The enslavement of the Pequots led to the establishment of a slave-trade among the Northern colonies, and the "Desire," one of the very first vessels built in Massachusetts, was fitted out for the carrying on of that traffic. This enter-

prise was, in its first stages, a public matter. The colony was the principal in the business, and individuals received strong hints that private interests were for the present to keep out of the traffic. However, the profits promised to be so large and the demand for slaves in foreign parts so constant and increasing that private ventures began in the earliest days of New England's commerce. Ships took cargoes of colonial products across the Atlantic; and then, touching at African ports, they procured a load of slaves for the homeward run. These negroes were at first sold in the Barbadoes and other West Indian islands, but the trade finally included the American coast ports. The traffic became so popular that great attention was paid to it by the New England ship-owners, and they practically monopolized it for many years. New York, however, was not to be outdone by her Eastern rival, and her port became a centre of the slave-trade.

To the great discredit of the Puritans, it must be admitted that treacherous means were sometimes resorted to in order to maintain the supply of this kind of merchandise. It is on record that on one occasion one hundred and fifty Indians were enticed into Plymouth by a show of friendliness, and were then sold out of the country by the authorities. The women, however, were usually retained as especially acceptable prizes bestowed by a Providence having a peculiar regard for the Puritans. Captain Stoughton, who

led in the Pequot war above mentioned, wrote to Governor Winthrop:

"By this pinnace you shall receive forty-eight or fifty women and children . . . concerning which there is one I formerly mentioned, that is the fairest and largest I saw among them, to whom I gave a coat to clothe her. It is my desire to have her for a servant, if it may stand with your good liking, else not. There is a little squaw that Stewart Culacut desireth, to whom he hath given a coat. Lieut. Davenport also desireth one, to wit, a small one, that hath three strokes upon her stomach, thus:— | | | + He desireth her, if it will stand with your liking. Solomon, the Indian, desireth a young little squaw, which I know not."

The Indians were usually, however, exchanged for negroes, called by the colonists "Moors," the character of the natives being such that they were of more value elsewhere than in their own country. The above-mentioned governor received a letter from his brother-in-law, Downing, in which the latter, speaking of the Narragansetts, with which tribe the colonists were having trouble, says:

"If, upon a just war, the Lord should deliver them into our hands, we might easily have men, women, and children enough to exchange for Moors, which will be more gainful pillage for us than we can conceive, for I do not see how we can thrive until we get in a stock of slaves sufficient to do all our business; for our children's children will hardly see this great continent filled with people, so that our servants will still desire freedom to plant for themselves, and not stay but for very great wages. And I suppose you know very well how we shall maintain twenty Moors cheaper than one English servant."

But negro slavery never took a very deep hold in Massachusetts. For a century after the settlement, the number of slaves increased very slowly, and it is probable that the largest number at any time in the colony never greatly exceeded six thousand. They were used almost entirely as domestic servants. Their condition was regarded with the same apathy as in the Southern colonies. The increasing of their number by procreation was in the first years of the colony regarded with favor, and not a few persons strove to rear slaves. We have a curious record of this in Josselyn's account of two voyages to New England. He tells us that Samuel Maverick, one of the principal colonists, possessed a very superior negress who refused to be mated with any of the blacks of her owner. Maverick, however, was a stubborn man, and became possessed of the idea that the progeny of such a fine wench would be of much value to him. He therefore attempted that of which no Southern slave-owner has been accused: seeing she would not yield by persuasions to company with a young negro man he had in the house, he commanded him, willed she nilled she, to go to her bed, which was no sooner done than by a fierce struggle she ejected the intruder. Her grief was so great as to lead her to recount what she regarded as her wrongs to Josselyn, who was at the time visiting Maverick.

The breeding of slaves ceased in New England, but not because of religious or humanita-

rian scruples. It was cheaper to buy than to rear. White bondmen of almost the same status as slaves, and red and black adult slaves, were abundant and cheap. Therefore the increasing of the slave population by natural means was not looked upon with favor, for childbearing interfered with service and the rearing of children was accompanied by an expense that brought no adequate return. In 1680 Bradstreet wrote: "There are very few blacks born here, not above five or six in a year at most; none are baptized that I ever heard of." The ordinary practice was to sell a slave who was pregnant and to dispose of the offspring either before or immediately after its birth. Two advertisements are interesting in this connection; the first was published in the *Continental Journal,* March 1, 1781, and reads:

"To be Sold, an extraordinary likely Negro Wench, 17 years old, she can be warranted to be strong, healthy and good-natured, has no notion of Freedom, has been always used to a Farmer's Kitchen and dairy, and is not known to have any failing, but being with Child, which is the only cause of her being sold."

The second was printed in the *Independent Chronicle* on December 14, 21, and 28, 1780, and is a curious example of the reluctance of New Englanders to rear slaves:

"A Negro Child, *soon expected, of a good breed,* may be owned by any Person inclining to take it, and Money with it."

Active opposition to slavery originated not in the conscience of the Puritan, nor yet in that of the Cavalier, but among the Quakers whom both so cruelly persecuted. In 1688 some of the followers of William Penn, who were settled in Pennsylvania, declared that buying, selling, and holding men in slavery were inconsistent with the principles of the Christian religion.

It was not until 1766, however, that an effective movement against slavery was fairly launched. By this time, another spirit had begun to gain a foothold in the North. From 1767 until 1774, representatives in the Massachusetts Assembly, instructed by their constituents, brought in bills "for the total abolishing of slavery among us." But these measures successively failed to obtain the governor's approval. It was to the interest of England to promote the slave-trade and slavery. No clause in the Treaty of Utrecht was more jealously guarded than that which gave her the exclusive right of selling Africans in the Spanish West Indies and on the coast of America. In view of the policy which England has always consistently followed when her commercial interests have been in question, it is not surprising that her governors in these colonies should frown upon legislation so entirely derogatory to those interests, "or that the modest efforts of Massachusetts, in 1744, should be met by Hutchinson and Gage with the same spirit which in 1775 dictated the reply of the Earl of Dartmouth to the earnest

remonstrance of the agent of Jamaica against the policy of the government: 'We cannot allow the colonies to check or discourage in any manner a traffic so beneficial to the nation.'"

When, in 1776, the government of Massachusetts had been reorganized in accordance with the advice of the Continental Congress, it made, in theory, short work of the question of slavery. Some negroes had been taken in an English ship and were brought into Salem to be sold. This was prevented by the General Court, and the House passed a resolution that: "The selling and enslaving the human species is a direct violation of the natural rights alike vested in them by their Creator, and utterly inconsistent with the avowed principles on which this and the other States have carried on their struggle for liberty." But this resolution accomplished little, for the sentiment of the community was divided; the majority of the people were not as yet of the opinion that slavery was wrong. Traffic in slaves continued, and even in 1780 the newspapers of New England contained many advertisements like the following:

"To be Sold, very Cheap, for no other Reason than for want of Employ, an exceeding Active Negro boy, aged fifteen. Also, a likely Negro Girl, aged seventeen."

"To be sold a likely Negro girl, 16 years of Age, for no fault, but want of employ."

"To be Sold, a likely Negro Boy, about 13 years old, well calculated to wait on a Gentleman. Inquire of the Printer."

"To be Sold, a likely young Cow and Calf. Inquire of the Printer."

"To be Sold, for want of employment, an exceeding likely Negro Girl, aged fifteen."

"To be Sold, a likely Negro Boy, about eighteen years of Age, fit for to serve a Gentleman, to tend horses or to work in the Country."

The sentiment against slavery was, however, on the increase. The principles of liberty, which for two decades had been sedulously preached by the revolutionists, were extended by a certain portion of the community to cover the blacks in bondage. The idea of abolition began to grow. Resting solely upon a humanitarian base, it might not have endured; but sentiment was reinforced by economic conditions. It had been proved beyond question that slavery was unprofitable in New England, and, further, that free negroes were a "dead-weight" to the community and a clog to free white labor.

A section of the early antislavery party exhibited, in 1780, positive antagonism to the very presence of the blacks, and by an act of March 26, 1788, all negroes resident in Massachusetts and not citizens of some one of the United States were ordered to depart under penalty of whipping.

But, on the other hand, slavery was the source of large and constant profit to those buying, selling, or carrying negroes. These persons, backed by those to whom slavery was a patriarchal insti-

tution to be cherished, or a matter concerning the internal polity of a sister State and not to be interfered with, continued in power until the period just anterior to the Civil War, though slavery in New England practically ceased early in the century.

The antislavery party, however, secured, without opposition, in the constitution of 1780 a clause which read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights." In the following year the Supreme Court construed this as rendering the condition of slavery impossible in the Commonwealth. Yet it can be held to have done so only by implication, and in not a few cases the implication was not regarded. In fact, though actually prohibited, slavery in strict legality was not formally abolished in Massachusetts until 1866, when it was ended throughout the United States by the XIIIth Amendment. It is a curious fact that the legal termination of slavery in Massachusetts was accomplished by the votes of Georgia and South Carolina, those States towards which the abolitionists had been most bitter.

In Rhode Island emancipation took place in 1773. Slavery in New Hampshire died a natural death, all negroes born after the constitution of 1776 was adopted being considered free. Those of Connecticut were freed in 1784; that is to say, the Legislature then passed an act declaring that all persons born of slaves after the 1st of March in that year should be free at the age

of twenty-five. In 1799 New York also passed a law for the gradual emancipation of the slaves within her territory, the number of whom at that time was approximately twenty-two thousand. Vermont, by her constitution of 1793, prohibited the institution. In like manner, it soon disappeared from New Jersey and Pennsylvania, while the Ordinance of 1787 excluded it from the Northwest Territory. At the same date, however, the Federal government recognized it in the nascent State of Tennessee, and, also, it gained a foothold in Kentucky by a constitutional provision of that State. Thus did the institution cross the Alleghanies, to become, later on, a fresh bone of contention when the trans-Mississippi region was thrown open to settlers.

One of the various causes that operated to expel negro slavery from the North was the readiness with which white servants were bought and sold. These were either the so-called redemptioners, or apprentices,—" those bound for a term of years," as the Federal Constitution styled them. The former came over originally as indentured servants; the latter were either minors who wished to learn a trade, or children whose parents were dead or unable to support them. Similar classes were found in the South also, but, owing to the solidarity of the Caucasian race and the ease with which slaves could be purchased, they grew less and less frequent. In the North, in the eighteenth century, the indentured servants were not only subjected to many of

the restraints imposed by Southern owners on their black slaves, but it was no uncommon thing to find the unexpired terms of such persons advertised for sale. The *Pennsylvania Gazette* for August 21, 1755, for example, contains an advertisement of the sale of "a white lad and a negro woman;" it was added that "the man writes a good hand and is very good at accounts."

The world has never known a more powerful advocate of universal freedom than was Thomas Jefferson. The earnest effort which he put forth to have a denunciation of slavery incorporated in the Declaration of Independence is a well-known matter of history. In the first draft which he wrote of this famous document, referring to George III., he accused him of being

"determined to keep open a market where men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce. And that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished dye, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms against us, and purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them by murdering the people on whom he has obtruded them, thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another."

This ardent denunciation of a system so hateful to Mr. Jefferson's sense of justice, though it was concurred in by all the best men of Virginia, including Washington, Randolph, Madison, Henry, and Mason, was struck out from the final

draft of the Declaration, in deference to the wishes of many in the South and not a few in the North. Regarding this omission, Mr. Jefferson says:

"The clause, too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who, on the contrary, still wished to continue it. Our Northern brethren also, I believe, felt a little tender under those censures; for, though their people had very few slaves themselves, yet they had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others."

It is interesting to note, in view of later history, the arguments advanced in favor of slavery by Northern leaders when the aid of the South was needed in the Revolutionary War. For example, when, on Friday, July 12, 1776, the Congressional Committee appointed to draft the Articles of Confederation made its report, a debate followed regarding the manner of voting and the amount each State ought to contribute towards the common treasury. In the course of the discussion, John Adams remarked "that as to this matter it was of no consequence by what name you called your people, whether by that of freemen or of slaves. That in some countries the laboring poor were called freemen, in others they were called slaves; but that the difference to the State was imaginary only." Adams then went on to ask:

"What matters it whether a landlord employing ten laborers on his farm gives them annually as much money

as will buy them the necessaries of life, or gives them those necessaries at short hand? The ten laborers add as much wealth annually to the State, increase its exports as much in the one case as the other. . . . Suppose, by an extraordinary operation of nature or of law, one-half the laborers of a State could in the course of one night be transformed into slaves,—would the State be made the poorer or the less able to pay taxes?"

He added that the condition of the laboring poor in most countries—particularly the fishermen of the North—was as abject as that of slaves!

The treatment of the subject of slavery by the framers of the Constitution is a matter very pertinent to the purpose of this history. At that time (1784) Congress lacked but one vote of precluding those disputes which afterwards led to the Civil War. Jefferson proposed a clause which provided for the interdiction of slavery, after the year 1800, in all territory west of the States then existing and above the parallel of 31° north latitude. This included the territory which afterwards formed the States of Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, also all to the northwest of these. So radical an antislavery clause was lost by one vote; and when it is considered how all the great national disputes arising from the admission of Territories as slave States might have been forefended by the turning of so slight a balance, it seems wonderful that an All-wise Providence, that is supposed to watch the destinies of nations, did not intervene to ward off such a cataclysm as resulted.

In 1787 an act was passed which differed from the above in that it took effect immediately and prohibited slavery in only the Northwestern Territory. Four of the Southern States were represented in the convention which adopted this ordinance, and every one of their delegates voted for it. It is almost certain that had it not been for the adoption of this ordinance, Illinois and Indiana would later have been organized as slave States. Webster said of this measure:

> "It fixed forever the character of the population in the vast regions northwest of the Ohio, by excluding from them involuntary servitude. It impressed on the soil itself, while yet a wilderness, an incapacity to sustain any other than freemen. It laid the interdict against personal servitude, in original compact, not only deeper than all local law, but deeper also than all local constitutions."

When the great struggle came later, it gave a preponderance of power to the free States.

Curiously enough, the Articles of Confederation made no provision for the return of slaves fleeing from one State to another, although such a clause had been inserted in the articles of Union between the New England Colonies, made in the preceding century. As slavery rested on local customs, the owners of this species of property could rely, in the absence of a compact, only on the courtesy of the provinces where slavery was non-existent. This had been observed in early days, but the failure of the Articles of Confederation to enforce the right, added to the

augmenting spread of abolition principles, became a source of irritation between the Northern and Southern States.

In the Federal convention of 1787 the question was thoroughly discussed. As for the foreign slave-trade, it was almost unanimously reprobated, although the South Carolina and Georgia members declared that they would not consent to its immediate prohibition, as they had lost a vast number of negroes during the war and they wished time in which to lay in a new supply. It must be said, to the credit of the South, however, that Virginia was the first State North or South to prohibit the slave-trade, and Georgia was the first State to incorporate a prohibition of it in her constitution. Meanwhile, all the slave States insisted that, in view of the altered opinions of the North in respect of domestic servitude, some guarantee ought to be made of their right and title of ownership. It was insisted that a full recognition of this right was indispensable to this form of property and vital to the maintenance of their domestic interests. The most cursory reading of the discussions of this subject will plainly show that unless some provision had been made for the surrender of slaves fleeing to the non-slave-holding States, the South would not have entered the Union. Finally, there was considerable diversity of opinion regarding the representation in Congress. The outcome of the efforts to reconcile the opposing interests and views of the two sections was the adoption

of three great compromises. (Elliot's Debates, vol. iv. 98.)

"1. The States desiring to continue their right to import African slaves were to enjoy it, if they saw fit, for the space of twenty years, after which it was forever to cease.

"2. Owners of slaves were to have the right to recapture their property in non-slave-holding States.

"3. Three-fifths of the slaves were to be represented in Congress."

Of less importance than these three compromises was a fourth,—namely, that there was to be no duty on exports. As the South depended largely on foreign markets for her products, it was thought necessary to guard against hostile legislation; but it became necessary to concede the right on the part of the new national government to impose duties on imports,—a cause of future trouble hardly less fatal to harmony than was slavery itself. Each of the three great compacts in regard to slavery became, in turn, a prolific source of discord.

Shortly after an agreement had been reached on the compromises above mentioned, all the States had enacted laws forbidding the importation of slaves. But South Carolina subsequently repealed the law passed by her to that effect, asserting that, owing to the failure of the Federal government to render aid in the matter, it was impossible to enforce her enactment. Charleston harbor was soon filled with vessels bearing human cargoes. Smith, of South Carolina, in a speech delivered in the United States Senate

on the Missouri Compromise, estimated that during the three years that the slave-trade thus remained open more than two hundred slavers, carrying upward of forty thousand Africans, entered the port of Charleston. Only two thousand of these slaves, however, appear to have been consigned to South Carolina planters, while about eight thousand were intended for Bristol, Newport, and Providence dealers; seven hundred and fifty for Baltimore parties; and about two hundred each for Hartford, Boston, and Philadelphia persons. Facts like these, in the language of Smith, will show that "those people who most deprecate the evils of slavery and traffic in human flesh, when a profitable market can be found, can sell human flesh with as easy a conscience as they sell other articles!" He then reminded the Senate that one of the members from Rhode Island, De Wolf, had made his fortune in the slave-trade.

Meanwhile, the whole civilized world was beginning to cry out against the slave-trade, whose greatest blow was received by the declaration of the Powers at the Congress of Vienna. This was followed by an Act of Congress declaring guilty of piracy those caught taking part in the traffic. Very soon afterwards South America and the West Indies abandoned the trade. But, as might have been expected, the three-fifths clause of the Federal Constitution was a constant temptation to import African slaves. With the acquisition of Texas and the Pacific section, there was

a growing demand for a revival of the trade in order to populate new Territories and preserve the influence of the South in Congress, and, notwithstanding the vigilance of the governments of the United States and Great Britain, a brisk trade in African slaves continued to be carried on, and numbers were smuggled into this country and the West Indies, down to the outbreak of the Civil War. According to New York newspapers, there were fitted out in that port, during the years 1859 and 1860, as many as eighty-five slavers, which imported from thirty thousand to sixty thousand blacks annually. All proposals formally to reopen the commerce were silenced, however, by the storm of 1860. (See Lalor's Cyclo. of Pol. Sci., article Slavery.)

Regarding the third compromise—that which may be designated the suffrage clause—much has already been said. It may be added, however, that, as the North grew in wealth and population, it became more and more dissatisfied with an arrangement which gave to the South a larger representation than the free population warranted. This dissatisfaction reached an acute stage in the struggle over the division of the Western territory. The South claimed—and with reason—that her soldiery had won Texas and the Pacific slope; that her citizens were impelled to move westward by the same causes that influenced Northern people in their migrations; that slaves represented property, and that, in respect to the removal of property from

one part of the country to another, all citizens stood on an equal footing. The North maintained, on the other hand, that slavery was local, that it possessed a political significance, and that it should not be extended beyond its existing limits. Nor can it be gainsaid that the vast majority of Northern people, aside from the narrower and more fanatical section of abolitionists, were sincere in their declaration that it was not their intention to interfere with the "peculiar institution" where it existed. But such an ideal state of things was impossible. The day of compromise was a thing of the past.

Finally, we come to the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution. This provision is to be traced to the Confederacy, in which Massachusetts was the ruling colony. The Commissioners of the United Colonies found occasion to complain to the Dutch governor in New Netherlands, in 1646, of the fact that the Dutch agent at Hartford had harbored a fugitive Indian woman-slave, of whom they said, in their letter, "Such a servant is parte of her master's estate, and a more considerable parte than a beast." A provision for the rendition of fugitives, etc., was afterwards made by treaty between the Dutch and the English. (Plymouth Colony Records, ix. 6, 64, 190.)

As this compromise did more than anything else to widen the chasm between the rival sections, it may be well to quote it. The language is plain:

"No person held to service or labour in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due."

This provision was unanimously adopted, and every Southern member of the Constitutional Convention regarded its terms as sufficient to protect the slave-owners. One of their prime objections to entering the Union was the fear that persons residing in non-slave-holding States would declare free all runaway negroes, or otherwise interfere with this form of property, which rested on local custom. In 1772 Lord Mansfield had decided this very point in Somerset's case, and there was a tendency to follow this precedent in New England. The South said to the North:

"Our part of the country is newer than yours, and we need labor; experience has taught us that the best form of labor for us at present is negro slave labor for whose existence we are in no wise responsible. If the institution is destroyed we are wrecked. Our lands would become valueless; our commerce destroyed. Besides there would be turned loose on us a horde of black barbarians to sweep away, as they have done in the West Indian Islands, our homes, our wives, and our children. Don't talk to us about the sinfulness of slavery. You did the same thing as long as you found it profitable. But when you decided to unload on us, you face about and preach to us! You know nothing about the subject. Leave us to manage our own affairs and we will accord the same privilege to you. And unless you do give us some protection there will be no constitution, so far as we are concerned. With the abstract question of the righteousness or unrighteousness of the question we have nothing to do. Our terms are known to you. Will you accept or reject them?"

As seen above, they were accepted unanimously.

Congress did not rest here. In an Act passed in 1783, entitled "An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters," special directions were given for the recovery of runaway negroes. The owners, or their agents, of such fugitives were empowered to seize them whenever found, as in other cases of lost or stolen property, without a warrant, and to take them before any Federal circuit or district judge, or any State magistrate. Upon proof to the satisfaction of such officers, either by oral testimony or affidavit, that the claimant was entitled, under the laws of the State from which the runaways fled, to their labor or services, it was made the duty of the judge or magistrate to give a certificate to that effect to the claimant. This was made a sufficient warrant for his removal of the fugitives to the State from which they had fled. A fine of five hundred dollars was to be imposed on all persons harboring or concealing slaves after notice that they were runaways.

As the abolition movement gained headway at the North, many of the States of that section passed so-called "Personal Liberty" laws, which were designed to nullify the Constitutional and Congressional protection extended to Southern slave-holders. (See Acts of Pennsylvania, 1826, pp. 150–155.) In three leading decisions of the Supreme Courts of Northern States, however,

such legislation was pronounced unconstitutional, and a similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated Prigg case.

After this case, in which Justice Story rendered a decision in favor of the South, Northern opposition to slavery cast aside all efforts to clothe itself in legal forms.

The data thus far presented indicates that, taking into consideration the greater number of slaves in the South and the seemingly much greater need of their labor there than in the North, the feeling on the subject was by no means contradictory between the two sections in 1787. In both sections the presence of slavery was encouraged and its growth forced by English influence. The withdrawal of this pressure gave economic conditions full play, and the South came to cherish that which the North learned to abhor. But in 1787 many of the wisest men in all the States believed that slavery would speedily die out in Maryland and Virginia, as it had in the North. The majority of their Representatives in Congress were strongly inclined to antislavery views. "While public sentiment in the three most southern States lagged behind, a Representative from Georgia stated in the House, without contradiction, that not a man lived in Georgia who did not wish there were no slaves, and that everybody believed they were a curse to the country."

But after 1808—though that was the date at

which the Federal prohibition of negro importation came into force—the whole situation took on a different complexion. The invention of the cotton-gin had entirely revolutionized the production of cotton. An almost unlimited market for this commodity had come with the industrial and commercial awakening of England, which resulted in the opening up of the Gulf territory, because it was peculiarly adapted to the production of cotton. From that time the profit which was to be derived from breeding slaves to meet the ever-increasing demand in Alabama and Mississippi overcame the abolitionist sentiment which had prevailed in Virginia. Thus, while the antislavery movement grew stronger in the North, the system of involuntary negro servitude gained a corresponding hold upon the industrial and political life of the South. King Cotton had come into power, and the negro was bound to his enslavement.

In the mean time the humanitarian sentiment which gained ground in the North, causing the people there to view the bondage of the slave with deepening repugnance, was reinforced by reports of the cruel treatment to which the slaves were subjected in the Lower South. The slave-block from which fathers were sold from their children and children from their parents, with no recognition on the part of the dealers of the natural affection which might exist even in connection with a black skin; the severe punishment for misdemeanors which were excused in the

whites; the penalties for actions which are commended in the free; the stultifying of all possible and laudable ambition; the slave-gangs on the large cotton plantations, under brutal overseers who believed in no encouragement for a negro other than the sting of the lash,—these, to the harangued North, appeared so to preponderate in the life of the slave that the possibility of any extenuating circumstances was entirely overlooked.

Abolition societies grew apace. Men in the North worked themselves up to a frenzy of denunciation, until at last such hatred and misunderstanding were engendered between the two sections that a patient hearing became impossible. All this misconception and misinformation was concentrated in Mrs. Stowe's famous work. That it was an effective book none can deny; but nothing is easier than to prove that it is an utter misstatement of the situation of the slave. The lamb-like "Uncle Tom" was not a more typical example of the negro slave than was Nat Turner, who, in Virginia, in 1831, led an insurrection of slaves to the massacring of sixty-one white persons, mostly women and children. That there were "nigger-drivers" approximating the character of Legree, and that cruelties such as his may occasionally have been perpetrated, is as undoubtedly true as the startling fact that the most cruel overseers were men from the North is undeniable. As a picture of the usual condition of slavery, however, the book is

absolutely false; but even the possibility of such inhumanity is sufficient to condemn the institution in which it could originate.

Statements alleging the habitually cruel treatment of the slaves are unworthy of credence. A man does not frequently abuse to its injury a valuable piece of property. Moreover, the testimony of travellers is unanimous in stating that the physical well-being of the slave was, except in certain limited districts, the constant care of his master. Then there was the absolute devotion of the slaves to the families to which they belonged, well known in antebellum days and abundantly proved during the war, and which would not have existed—much less endured—if cruelty had been the common practice of slave-owners.

The truth of the situation is to-day plain. The sections stood as antagonists in a feud of half a century. The time of judgment had passed; the passions of North and South were aroused. The abolitionist movement found its opportunity. The frothing of fanatics stirred both sections to a frenzy with which astute politicians played. It gave to the leaders the shibboleth by which they led the United States into the turmoil of secession and the horrors of that war that forced the renewal of the partnership the South sought to dissolve.

III

PRECEDENT EVENTS

THE statement that the war was fought for and against slavery—though of common acceptance—is true, as already shown, in only a limited sense. To employ again Abraham Lincoln's homely figure,—when a husband and wife, between whom there is a decided incompatibility of temperament, at last fall out so hopelessly that they seek relief by divorce, the primal cause is found not in the particular matter over which they quarrelled, but in the incompatibility. The South fought because it would brook no interference by the Federal government in State prerogative, particularly as concerned with slavery, below Mason and Dixon's line; the North fought for its idea of the Union. From the beginning, this divergence of sentiment, arising from the various causes which we have in the preceding chapters mentioned, became manifest and took historical form in the contest between the two political parties, Democrat and Whig, which contest, as is inevitable with political parties, was a continual struggle for supremacy. When, in 1856, the new Republican party succeeded to the Whig, slavery became the vital issue. Previous to that time it had been mainly a question as to which organization should hold the balance

of power, the South being specially desirous of protecting the institution.

Moral considerations in regard to slavery were, as already pointed out, at first a small element in these sectional differences. Hence it may truly be said that, inasmuch as the war ultimately resulted from the bitterness which was engendered between the North and the South by many years of strife for dominance, it was, in point of fact, a war of politicians. In its fundamental causes it was a struggle for rule rather than a war for right. At the time of the Louisiana purchase, when and where the institution of slavery was entirely out of the discussion, George Cabot, of Massachusetts, wrote to Senator Pickering, of the same State, giving as his reason for opposing the acquisition, "that the influence of our part of the Union must be diminished by the acquisition of more weight at the other extremity." This gives the key to the controversy. It was a sustained effort to preserve the balance of power, each section endeavoring to tip the scales in its own direction,—this, and the disagreement as to the extent of State autonomy under the Constitution. After the settlement of the Missouri Compromise, Samuel A. Foote, of Connecticut, referring to it, said:

"The Missouri question did not involve the question of freedom or slavery, but merely whether slaves now in the country might be permitted to reside in the proposed new State; and whether Congress or Missouri possessed the power to decide."

So, then, the causes leading to the Civil War may thus be named in order of their progress and importance: sectional differences leading to the localization of the two great political parties respectively in the North and the South; a dissimilarity of conception as to State rights under the Constitution; the lust of both parties for power by means of increased territorial representation, the South being increasingly pushed thereto by the growing threat of abolition from the North.

In the original compact between the States, the smaller ones, apprehensive of oppressive measures on the part of the larger, insisted on an equality of senatorial representation as the condition of their agreement. The disproportionate growth of the population as between the North and the South eventually put all the States of the latter in the position occupied by Maryland, Delaware, and Rhode Island at the first. Consequently, the doctrine of State sovereignty came to be conceived of as the essential protection of the South, and her leaders were not slow to augment the separatist tendency.

The South claimed for each State an untrammelled freedom of action. It asserted that the Constitution was an agreement between sovereign States, and that the very essence of sovereignty was the liberty of a State to regulate its own internal affairs, and its external in so far as the action did not conflict with existing agreements, which, however, might be broken at will.

It pointed to the Treaty of Peace in 1783, and claimed that the citing of the several names of the States established their sovereignty. It pointed to the Articles of Confederation, by which it was undeniably stated that each of the thirteen States of the Union retained all rights of sovereignty. This view of the status of the individuals in the Union was, for half a century and more after the adoption of the Constitution, held by the majority of the people of the Northern States. But from the first there was an active separatist opposition, and the party of the Federal idea constantly gained in strength. It held that the naming of the several States in the treaty of 1783 was simply a matter of definition; that the treaty was not negotiated by the separate States, but by commissioners representing their aggregate; and that the Constitution was not a compact between States, but an agreement of all the people of the territory embraced in the United States. It pointed to the fact that the Constitution had not been ratified by State legislators, but by the people. From the beginning, the politicians of the South denied the soundness of the argument, and acted upon the assumption of State sovereignty, and year after year they became strengthened in their position and more insistent upon the claims resulting therefrom.

For the first forty-eight years of its history the Union was dominated by the South. During that time only two Northern men were elected to the Presidency; neither of them served a

second term. In 1819 the North endeavored to strike a blow at this pre-eminence of the South. In that year Missouri petitioned for admission. Heretofore new States had been admitted in pairs,—a slave and a free coincidently. Thus Kentucky came in with Vermont; Tennessee with Ohio; Louisiana with Indiana; Mississippi with Illinois. So there was a tacit agreement that the two sections should be equal in their territorial gains. But when the bill providing for the admission of Missouri came up for consideration in the House, Representative Tallmadge, of New York, offered an amendment (1819) to the effect that the introduction of slaves into the newly proposed State should be prohibited, and that all children born therein after its admission should be free at the age of twenty-five. This naturally precipitated a discussion which spread throughout the country and caused intense excitement. The arguments advanced by the North were based, naturally, on the injustice of slavery. The South insisted that the diffusion of slavery did not mean its increase, but would, rather, turn out to the betterment of the condition of the negroes. It is pretty certain that both sides were disingenuous. More territory to the South certainly did mean more slaves; and, on the other hand, though there was a growing repugnance in the North to negro servitude, it was many years before the demolition of the institution was taken up as an issue by practical politicians.

The Tallmadge amendment was carried by a vote of 87 to 76, notwithstanding the impassioned warning from the Territorial delegate of Missouri that the measure would endanger the Union. The bill, with this amendment, went to the Senate, where it was defeated by the whole Southern vote aided by six from the North, and Congress adjourned with the question still undecided. The whole country was aroused. Public meetings were held everywhere, in the North supporting, in the South condemning, the amendment; and State Legislatures, in strict accordance with their geographical position, passed resolutions exhorting Congress to one course or the other. Threats of disunion and bloodshed were in the air. North and South for the first time definitely and, so it seemed, irreconcilably confronted each other.

But when Congress reassembled, the whole question was seen to have been one of politicians, and the direction of the movement incited by them was changed by one of those manœuvres common in politics: Maine was seeking admission as a State. The Senate therefore coupled Missouri and Maine on the balance of power principle which had long been adhered to. After another amendment, prohibiting slavery in the former Territory, had been voted down, Senator Thomas, of Illinois, proposed that no restriction as to slavery be imposed on Missouri in her adoption of a State constitution, but that there should be no slavery in all the country ceded by France

north of 36° 30′, Missouri (whose southern boundary this measure of latitude is) being excepted from the scope of the restriction. This was the gist of the famous Missouri Compromise (1820). After much bitter wrangling, it was at last accepted by both Houses, with the assistance of eighteen Northern members, whom John Randolph stigmatized as "doughfaces." As Carl Schurz says, by the Missouri Compromise "the slave power obtained the present tangible object it contended for; free labor won a contingent advantage in the future."

What was it that thrust into American politics this new question as to whether the inhabitants of States about to be created should be permitted to hold slaves? No such question had been raised previously. Louisiana, Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee, not to speak of Northern States, had been admitted without a breath of such discussion. Certainly in the case of Missouri it proceeded entirely from the North, and the South—especially the slave-holders of Missouri—was taken by surprise. Doubtless the people of the North were cultivating an uncomfortable conscience in view of the inconsistency between slavery and the Declaration of Independence, not to mention the influence exerted by the concerted action taken by the European powers against the foreign slave-trade. But "beneath the moral considerations lay others of a political kind, in which were contained the convulsive force that caused, after several premo-

nitions, the social earthquake which has been witnessed in our days."

Thomas Jefferson saw this clearly. Though he had long since retired from active participation in public affairs, and was now in the late eventide of life, he had, by reason of his retirement, a more comprehensive view of the situation than had those who were participators in it. He said:

"The [Missouri] question is a mere party trick. The leaders of Federalism are taking advantage of the virtuous feeling of the people to effect a division of parties by a geographical line; they expect that this will insure them, on local principles, the majority they could never obtain on the principles of Federalism. . . . The coincidence of a marked principle, moral and political, with a geographical line once conceived," he continued, "I feared would never more be obliterated from the mind; that it would be recurring on every occasion, and renewing irritations, until it would kindle such mutual and mortal hatred as to render separation preferable to eternal discord. . . . The people of the North went blindfold into the snare, and followed their leaders for a while with a zeal truly moral and laudable, until they became sensible that they were injuring instead of aiding the real interests of the slaves—that they had been used merely as tools for electioneering purposes—and that trick of hypocrisy then fell as quickly as it had been got up."

The Missouri dispute served to band the South together in defence of slavery, and it crystallized the Southern doctrine of State rights.

The North had struck at the South, and the blow had been parried; now the opportunity came for the South to aim a stroke at the basis of Northern prosperity,—namely, her industries.

The imposition of a high protective tariff was a measure which largely originated in the South, as a political weapon. Opposed at first by the Eastern States, it nevertheless fostered their manufacturing interests, until at last the North saw that the policy was for her benefit, and each Administration witnessed the extension of the tariff. So it was with the doctrine of internal improvements, which won for the North the support of the West. The South, however, became bitterly opposed to these policies. According to Mr. Benton:

"In the colonial States the Southern were the rich portion of the colonies, and expected to do well in a state of independence. They had the exports, and felt secure of their property; not so the North, whose agricultural resources were few, and who expected privations from the loss of British favor. But in the first half-century after independence this expectation was reversed. The wealth of the North was enormously aggrandized; that of the South had declined. Northern towns had become great cities. Southern cities had decayed or become stationary. . . . The North became a money-lender to the South. And this in the face of a Southern export, since the Revolution, to the value of eight hundred millions of dollars. The Southern States attributed this result to the action of the Federal government,—its double action of levying revenue upon the industry of one section of the Union and expending it in another,—and especially to its protective tariffs. To some degree this attribution was just."

During the nullification trouble South Carolina advanced those two principles in regard to which, later on, the nation sprang into civil war. This State had few manufactures. It was there-

fore to her interest to buy commodities as cheaply as possible. Consequently, she could have no sympathy with legislation which had for its object the fostering of Northern industries at her expense. The raising of cotton needed no protection; it followed, therefore, that the high prices resulting from the tariff taxed the South for the benefit of the North, especially as the principal market for cotton was England. It was no answer to the South to say that she, too, could organize factories and take advantage of the tariff laws. In the very nature of things it was impossible to employ slaves in such industries, and there was no available white labor.

In 1828, incited by the "Bill of Abominations," as the South called the tariff law of that year, Calhoun turned a political somersault and published "The South Carolina Exposition and Protest on the Subject of the Tariff." In this the right of a State to veto Federal action is asserted. Thomas Y. Hayne also had the intrepidity to enunciate the same doctrine in the Senate, whereupon he encountered Daniel Webster and became immortalized.

Though the Massachusetts statesman convinced the rest of the Union of the futility of a State vetoing national legislation, his eloquent argument had not that effect upon South Carolina. Calhoun perfected his doctrine of nullification, which the majority of the South Carolinians adopted, though it was understood by few. A State convention was called in November, 1832,

when an ordinance based upon Calhoun's doctrine was passed; by this it was declared and ordained:

"that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, are unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and obligations, made or entered into, with purpose to secure the duties imposed by said acts, and all judicial proceedings which shall hereafter be had in affirmation thereof, are and shall be held utterly null and void. . . . And we, the people of South Carolina, do further declare that we will not submit to the application of force on the part of the Federal government to reduce this State to obedience, but that we will consider the passage by Congress of any act authorizing the employment of a military or naval force against the State of South Carolina, her constitutional authorities or citizens, . . . as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of this State will henceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States; and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do."

A rigorous test oath was exacted of all State officers, and there was also much talk of war.

Such was the spirit of South Carolina, inspired by Calhoun, in 1832. So rampant was it that medals were struck, bearing the inscription, "John C. Calhoun, first President of the Southern Confederacy." But the time for secession

CALHOUN, WEBSTER, AND CLAY

From a photograph by Brady

was not yet. Andrew Jackson was in the Presidential chair. He issued a proclamation firmly intimating that any recourse to violence on the part of South Carolina would be met by stern measures from the Union. Calhoun learned that his arrest for treason was under serious consideration, and with the assistance of Clay a compromise was reached.

Andrew Jackson possessed a correct insight and an accurate foresight. He saw that the root of these troubles was in the disappointment of political aspirants. Referring afterwards to this episode, he said, "The tariff was but a pretext. The next will be the slavery or negro question."

While these discussions and agitations were in progress, the effective abolition movement came into being. The country heretofore had not been ripe for the effectual dissemination of its principles; and never before had there been a William Lloyd Garrison.

The abolitionist movement has three distinct stages. In the first of these the advocates of freedom for the blacks were few in number, and their efforts were sporadic. Yet a steady, though feeble, sentiment continued, and in the first days of the Constitution it resulted in legal freedom for Northern blacks. After 1800 came a period of inactivity, an interim at whose close began the second period of the abolition movement. This was marked by the formation (in 1815) of the "Union Humane Society," in Ohio, by Benjamin Lundy, the father of aboli-

tionism, to whom Garrison, until compelled to a radical position by the force of his convictions, was an active assistant. In the second decade of the nineteenth century the activity of the abolitionists constantly increased. Class journals were established,—*The Genius of Universal Emancipation,* by Lundy, in 1812; the *Herald, Free Press, National Philanthropist,* and *Journal of the Times,* all identified with Garrison; the *Liberator,* founded by him in 1831; and many another enthusiastic sheet whose name has been forgotten save by students of the history of slavery.

The *Liberator* was established at Boston because, as Garrison stated, there was the place where such a paper was most needed. In the first number of the *Liberator,* he said of the attitude of Boston towards the abolitionist movement, "I found here contempt more bitter, detraction more relentless, prejudice more stubborn, and apathy more frozen than among slave-holders themselves." No platform speech of Garrison, of Wendell Phillips, no poem of Whittier, no article in the *Liberator,* was more eloquent or moving than the picture on the front page of that periodical.

Here was represented a Southern auction scene. In the midst of "slaves, horses, and other cattle," which, with an entire impartiality of sentiment, were being exposed for sale, was shown a whipping-post at which a slave was undergoing a cruel flogging. To give point to the whole, in

the background was the Capitol at Washington, on the dome of which floated a flag whereon was inscribed the word "Liberty." The slaves could not read, but they could easily interpret this representation of the injustice and inconsistency of their lot. True, the vast majority of them were docile and insensibly contented. But there were those in whose hearts the word "Liberty" met a responsive longing; and the increase of fugitive slaves soon became an added source of discontent in the South, and a reason for her demand for legislation that irritated the North.

The abolitionist campaign was carried on by three methods,—(1) Individual persuasion, by which the most substantial gains were made in the first years of the second stage of the movement. (2) Circulation of printed matter: great quantities of antislavery literature were distributed; much of this was sent to the South, where its main effect was to excite bitter opposition. This went so far that the postmasters in 1835 refused to deliver the abolition newspapers and pamphlets. Amos Kendall, of Massachusetts, then Postmaster-General and a stanch Unionist, refused to compel the delivery of the obnoxious literature. He held that the postmasters were justified in their action, because the law authorizing the transmission of newspapers and pamphlets through the mail was intended to promote the general good of the public and not to injure any section; that the abolitionist literature injured the South, and the postmasters of

that section were therefore justified in refusing to deliver it. (3) Lectures: this method of promulgating the abolition doctrines was confined chiefly to the North, and there it met with the bitterest opposition.

The labors of the abolitionists would have been comparatively resultless had not the South in the heat of the onslaught forced issues that need not have been raised. The North, from the beginning until the close of the second stage of the abolitionist movement, was well-nigh a unit in opposing interference by one State in the domestic institutions of another, and, until the passage of the Fugitive Slave Bill, was almost unanimous in declaring that the duty of a State into whose territory a fugitive from another State took refuge was to aid the State from which flight had been made to regain jurisdiction over the fugitive.

In 1832 the abolition movement began to resolve itself into units of effort; the New England Antislavery Society was formed, with the fundamental tenet, "Immediate emancipation the duty of the master and the right of the slave." In 1833 the National Antislavery Society was organized at Philadelphia, and in 1837 it claimed a membership of one hundred and twenty-five thousand persons. State societies were established throughout the North, and the propaganda became active. To an abolitionist a slaveholder was an inhuman monster in whom was no good; by the people at large he was not re-

WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON

garded with aversion. To the slave-holder the abolitionist was an anarchist; to the bulk of the people of the North he was an incendiary endangering the welfare of the common country.

The testimony of contemporary abolitionists is unanimous as to the treatment the abolitionists received at the hands of the North. Against them churches were closed, and school-houses, usually the open court for the debate of all subjects, were locked. Mobs attacked and damaged the houses of leaders of the movement. Antislavery lecturers were pelted with eggs, stones, and brickbats. The Rev. G. Storrs, while on his knees in prayer at an antislavery meeting in New Hampshire, was arrested as a "common rioter and brawler." Garrison was seized while addressing a meeting in Boston and haled through the streets with a rope around his neck; his life was with difficulty saved. Samuel J. May was mobbed five times while lecturing in Vermont, and H. B. Stanton had his meetings broken up one hundred and fifty times in six years. George Thompson, the eloquent Englishman who came at Mr. Garrison's invitation to aid the cause of abolition, was so maltreated in New England that his friends in Boston, "to save his life," surreptitiously conveyed him to a ship, in which he fled to British territory and thence to England. The attitude towards abolitionist meetings is shown by a placard posted in 1835 in Boston, before Thompson's last advertised lecture:

"THOMPSON THE ABOLITIONIST.

"That infamous foreign scoundrel, Thompson, will hold forth this afternoon at 46 Washington Street. The present is a fair opportunity for the friends of the Union to *snake* Thompson out! It will be a contest between the abolitionists and the friends of the Union. A purse of *one hundred dollars* has been raised by a number of patriotic citizens, to reward the individual who shall first lay violent hands on Thompson, so that he may be brought to the Tar Kettle before dark. Friends of the Union, be vigilant!"

This broadside is of the usual type of anti-abolition bills, though the spirit of opposition in it seems to have been intensified by the fact that Thompson was a foreigner.

Every State in the North mobbed abolitionist lecturers. Every State in the North repudiated their doctrines. Printing-presses and types were destroyed in Cincinnati; for example, an "organized mob, led on by popular men and church-members," destroyed the office of the *Philanthropist* and gave its editor, James G. Burney, twenty-four hours to leave the city; only the iron will and determined courage of the fervent abolitionist enabled him to remain at his post. In Alton, Illinois, the office of the *Observer* was four times sacked by a mob, and on the last raid Elijah Lovejoy, its editor, was killed.

The opposition to the abolitionists was directed against the negroes also; they were assaulted, their houses damaged, and every effort for their education was thwarted. In Connecticut Miss Prudence Crandall's school for negro

girls was mobbed. So determined was the opposition to this school that the enemies of the movement for the education of negroes caused the Connecticut Legislature to pass, on May 24, 1833, a special "Black Law" practically prohibiting the education of colored persons. This was received with joy, the bells were rung and cannons were fired. Miss Crandall was arrested and confined in the cell from which a murderer had just been led. After Miss Crandall's release, her house was set on fire; the incendiary attempt failed. A few nights afterwards the school was again attacked and so damaged that Miss Crandall abandoned it and gave up her struggle to maintain in Connecticut a seminary for colored girls. This failure had its forerunner in the abandonment, because of the opposition by the "most respectable citizens of the place," of the school for the education of male negroes, which had been organized two years before (1832) in New Haven.

In New Hampshire the opposition to negro education was as great as in her sister State. The trustees of "Noyes Academy," in Plymouth, voted to admit colored pupils. "The respectable people of the town were so incensed" that they razed the building in which the school was kept. These are not isolated examples, for, says Samuel J. May, the ardent abolitionist, colored children were not admitted into the common schools. "This was not the utmost of the contempt in which colored people were treated. They were

not permitted to ride in any public conveyances, stage-coaches, omnibuses, or railroad cars, nor to take passage on any steamboats, or sail-packets, excepting in the steerage or on deck." In church, they were compelled to sit in the back pews; when, in one instance (in 1835), a colored man bought a pew on the floor of Park Street Church, Boston, his pew door was nailed up and so much disturbance was caused that the trustees were obliged to eject the colored purchaser. In Dr. Storrs's church a clause was inserted in the pew-deeds providing that the pews should "be held by none but respectable *white* persons." In Connecticut a certain colored family so increased and multiplied that it overspread the dimensions of the "negro pew." The minister invited the negroes to take a front pew, with the following result:

"They hesitated some time, lest their doing so should give offence. But I insisted that none would have any right to be offended, and at length persuaded them to do as I requested. But one man, a political partisan of the leader of Miss Crandall's persecutors, was, or pretended to be, much offended. He said, with great warmth, 'How came that nigger family to come down into that front pew?' 'Because,' I replied, 'it was unoccupied; they are uncomfortably crowded in the pew assigned them, and I requested them to remove.' 'Well,' said he, 'there are many in the society besides myself who will not consent to their sitting there.' 'Why?' I asked. 'They are always well dressed, well behaved, and good-looking withal.' 'But,' said he, 'they are niggers, and niggers should be kept to their place.' I argued the matter with him till I saw he could not be moved, and he repeated the declaration that they should be driven back. I then said, with great earnestness,

'Mr. A. B., if you do anything or say anything to hurt the feelings of that worthy family, and induce them to return to the pew which you know is not large enough for them, so sure as your name is A. B. and my name is S. J. M., the first time you afterwards appear in the congregation I will state the facts of the case exactly as they are, and administer to you as severe a reproof as I may be able to frame in words.' This had the desired effect. My colored friends retained their new seats." ("Recollections of the Antislavery Conflict," pp. 270, 271.)

It has been asserted that, in the general attack upon the abolitionist movement, certain sects took no part. The Universalists, it is true, gave to the movement its greatest men, but the Universalists as a sect never advocated it; the Unitarians were no exception to the general rule, and the Quakers, we may say in destruction of a popular fallacy, never as a body in the nineteenth century took a stand against the institution. This, too, despite the most urgent appeals of the abolitionist leaders.

Though for fifty years from the founding of the Union Humane Society, in 1815, the abolitionists were to continue their struggle, they steadily gained adherents and advanced their position. This was because of the steadfast purpose and fervid energy of their leaders, who were honest in their belief that they were carrying out God's will and were convinced, therefore, that their doctrine was to be maintained in spite of popular opinion, positive law, and the Constitution itself. Theirs was the reincarnated spirit of the Puritan and theirs the Puritan success;

but as the Restoration, because of the errors of the Roundheads, overthrew their government, so the white race in the South was, by the overthrow and subordination of reconstructionist legislation, to regain its supremacy in the opening years of the twentieth century.

The activity of the abolitionists caused petitions to pour into Congress, demanding the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Thereupon was passed (1836) the Atherton "Gag Law," named after the anti-abolitionist member from New Hampshire, to whom it owed its introduction; it ruled that all such petitions should be laid on the table without being debated, printed, or referred. This, however, John Quincy Adams contended, was unconstitutional; and he made a point of occupying the whole time allowed for the reception of petitions in presenting those of the abolitionists, which on one day numbered five hundred and eleven.

The South was now fully aroused to the danger which threatened her peculiar institution. In Congress, and elsewhere, she fought as one fights for life. She secured the passage of a resolution, offered by Clay (1837):

"that any attempt of Congress to abolish slavery in any Territory of the United States in which it exists would create serious alarm and just apprehension in the States sustaining that domestic institution, and would be a violation of good faith towards the inhabitants of any such Territory who have been permitted to settle with, and hold, slaves therein; because the people of any such Territory have not asked for the abolition of slavery therein; and

because, when any such Territory shall be admitted into the Union as a State, the people thereof shall be entitled to decide that question exclusively for themselves."

This resolution was intended to cover the case of Florida; and doubtless it also had in view the annexation of Texas, upon which the South was now tenaciously bent in order to carve from it new slave-States. American colonists had entered it for that express purpose. In 1829 the republic of Mexico had emancipated all slaves within its boundaries. But the American settlers in what is now Texas had refused to obey this decree, and in order to avoid insurrection, which in the weakened condition of their government the Mexican authorities felt unable to cope with, they had permitted the matter thus to rest. In 1830 an attempt was made by President Jackson to purchase Texas, but without success. The Mexican government prohibited the immigration of Americans into the territory; but Sam Houston, whose mysterious flight from the gubernatorial chair of Tennessee to the Cherokee nation in the Indian Territory had kept him in enforced idleness, now passed over into Texas with the express purpose of raising an insurrection. Bloody conflicts took place, and on March 2, 1836, the independence of Texas was declared. The declaration was signed by about sixty men, all of whom, with the exception of two, were Americans.

On April 22, 1836, Santa Anna, the Mexican President, was made prisoner; and in his ex-

tremity he was compelled to recognize the independence of Texas. A republic was formed, modelled after the United States, and Houston was inaugurated as its first President.

It took eight years for the South to compass the annexation of this temporary republic; and it was accomplished only after the fiercest opposition from the North.

Mississippi voiced the sentiment of the South in a report of a committee of its Legislature, declaring that "The South has very peculiar interests to preserve, already violently assailed and boldly threatened. Your committee are fully persuaded that this protection to her best interests will be afforded by the annexation of Texas; and equipoise of influence in the halls of Congress will be secured, that will furnish us with a permanent guarantee of protection."

Thus the South boldly showed her hand, and the challenge was met in the same determined spirit. Several Northern members of Congress, headed by Ex-President John Quincy Adams, issued an address in which it was charged that "it was intended, by the admission of new slave States, to secure undue ascendency for the slaveholding power in the government, and rivet that power beyond all redemption."

In this same address is found a note which is not usually credited to the North. It is familiar, but intensely surprising, considering its source:

"We hesitate not to say that annexation effected by any act or proceeding of the Federal government, or any of

its departments, would be identical with dissolution. It would be a violation of our national compact, its objects, designs, and the great elementary principles which entered into its formation, of a character so deep and fundamental, and would be an attempt to eternize an institution and a power of a nature so unjust in themselves, so injurious to the interests and abhorrent to the feelings of the people of the free States, as, in our opinion, not only inevitably to result in a dissolution of the Union, but fully to justify it."

This doctrine from a member of Congress from Massachusetts was but an echo of 1811, when Josiah Quincy, another member of Congress from Massachusetts, speaking in opposition to the bill to introduce the "Orleans Territory" into a State, said that such an act would be a breach of the Constitution, and a virtual dissolution of the bonds of the Union, freeing the States composing it from "their moral obligations of adhesion to each other, and making it the right of all as it would become the duty of some, to prepare definitely for separation, *amicably if they might, forcibly if they must!*" The gentleman from Massachusetts was called to order by Poindexter, of Mississippi, who said that "no member of the House ought to be allowed to stimulate any portion of the people to insurrection and a dissolution of the Union."

The assertion by the New England man, fifty years before the Civil War, of the right to secede "*amicably if they might, forcibly if they must!*" and the denial of the doctrine by the Southerner, is a pointed illustration of our thesis that slavery and secession were the tools whereby the poli-

ticians moved the people. In the first years of the nineteenth century New England again and again advanced the right to secede; before the half-century mark was passed the South claimed the right, and New England denied it. For a decade opinion was divided in North and South, and in 1860 the politicians forced the war on both sections.

Hence we see that, even in the North, secession was not an idea of such strange and horrid guise as, twenty years later, it was made to appear. Also, we know that the enforced annexation of Texas by the South did not avail in the purposes for which it was sought.

As the result of the Mexican War (1846), which, although inevitable, was needlessly provoked by President Polk and his advisers, the United States acquired New Mexico and California. The pregnant question thus faced the politicians of both sections: Should the newly gained territory be slave or free? This time the North took the initiative; and when, in August, 1846, Congress was considering an appropriation of two millions "for the settlement of the boundary question with Mexico," David Wilmot, a Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania, offered his famous "Proviso" amendment. Its terms were as follows:

"Provided that, as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty that may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the executive of the moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery

nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime whereof the party shall first be duly convicted."

By accident, the bill failed. But the significance of it is that this proviso was offered by a Democrat. The extension of slavery had produced a schism in the Democratic ranks, which was fated to bring about the downfall of the political power of the South.

The god of the Southern machine was Calhoun. This great man, who, from the day he entered Congress in his twenty-ninth year, was a power therein, and soon evinced a genius which placed him high among the statesmen of the world, was devoted to the Union, yet nevertheless he was the greatest exponent of that theory of politics by which a Representative gives the first cream of his interest to his own immediate constituents. Two ideas now dominated his political creed,—the sovereignty of the individual State, and the inviolableness of the Southern institution of slavery. His programme of forcing the issue on these two principles in a large measure led to their being overthrown. In 1847 he wrote a letter to a member of the Alabama Legislature, in which he said:

"Instead of shunning, we ought to court the issue with the North on the slavery question. I would even go one step farther, and add that it is our duty—due to ourselves, the Union, and our political institutions—to force the issue on the North. We are now stronger relatively than we shall be hereafter, politically and morally. Unless we bring on the issue, delay to us will be dangerous indeed. . . .

This brings up the question, How can it be so met without resorting to the dissolution of the Union? . . . There is, in my opinion, but one way in which it can be met, and that is by retaliation."

This furnishes "the key which unlocks his whole system of slavery agitation which he commenced in the year 1835. That system was to force issues upon the North under the pretext of self-defence, and to sectionalize the South, preparatory to disunion, through the instrumentality of sectional conventions, composed wholly of delegates from slave-holding States."

But early in the history of this agitation the position of the South was too morally weak to endure the discussion which was brought upon her by "forcing the issue." Calhoun and his friends did not realize that their strength lay in passive resistance and not in aggressive action.

The third stage in the abolitionist movement may be dated from the beginning of the final steps leading to the admission of Texas to the Union, in 1845. The abolitionists had been persistent in their propaganda, but up to the period of differences between North and South over the question of territorial acquisition their progress had been unaided by politicians. The proposed annexation of territory and the formation of new States aroused the leaders of the North, and, though persistently and vehemently disavowing the theories of the abolitionists, they were henceforth to be the means by which the aims of the latter were to be gained. The efforts of the

abolitionists were directed to the total abolition of slavery because of its evils; and because of these evils the efforts of the politicians were directed to the confinement of slavery to designated sections. The proslavery opinions of the people of the North were thus under great pressure; yet down to the outbreak of the war of secession the majority of them, despite the fact that they had no inclination to permit slavery in their section, were bitterly opposed to interference with the institution as it existed in the South. However, they were no less determined to follow the lead of their politicians and repress the extension of slavery into new Territories, than were the people of the South to follow theirs and enlarge the territory of the slave States.

In 1838 the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Ohio, and Rhode Island had protested against the admission of Texas. In 1843 Connecticut and New Jersey joined the protestants. The movements leading to these protests marked the changed status of abolitionism. We find an alliance between the politicians and the abolitionists perfected, and Garrison and his colleagues addressing large and respectful audiences. Yet even at this time there was generally a great reluctance to discuss the question of slavery. Conservatism still controlled North and South, and abolition, when viewed apart from politics, was looked on askance. The treatment of the negro and his supporters was, however, less

severe, and platform and pulpit resounded with the clamor of the abolitionists. The "underground railway" was in active operation by 1838. A constant northward movement of slaves went on. From abolitionist to abolitionist at the chain of stations (private houses usually a night's journey apart) the fleeing slaves were passed until they were safe from pursuit, in Canada. From 1850 to the outbreak of hostilities between North and South the work of the underground railway steadily increased; and the change in public sentiment in the fifties enabled the majority of the escaped slaves to remain in the Northern States and defy those laws by which the South had deemed the right to the possession of her slave property to have been secured in whatever State it might be found.

The aggressiveness of the South served only to render impregnable the position of the anti-slavery politicians of the North, and to goad to frenzied activity the abolitionists, now divided into a radical, seceding society, and a conservative *laissez-faire* one. Every day the number was growing of those who not only were indomitably opposed to the extension of the domain of slavery, but also saw in its presence upon American soil an intolerable evil. The preachers of abolition were possessed of a spirit like that of enthusiasts who court eternal glory in martyrdom for their cause. No argument could silence them, and mob violence could not put them down. They were intemperate, and it may per-

haps be laid to their door that they precipitated a terrible war in eradicating an institution of which the country might have been rid peacefully; but in the whole history of zeal for humanity, few are the examples that have equalled the devotion given to the abolition movement in the United States.

In 1850 the parliamentary fight centred on the admission of California. This Territory had framed an antislavery constitution. But the North insisted on attaching the Wilmot Proviso to the organization of the rest of the Territory gained from Mexico. This was the deadlock. The South was willing to admit California as a free State without this proviso.

The air was full of secession talk, which, though many affected to regard it as gasconade, after-events proved to be seriously meant. In this year (1850) Robert Toombs wrote:

"I saw General [President] Taylor and talked fully with him, and, while he stated that he had given and would give no pledges either way about the proviso, he gave me clearly to understand that if it were passed he would sign it. My course became instantly fixed. I would not hesitate to oppose the proviso, even to the extent of a dissolution of the Union."

The South was then drifting towards the point reached ten years later. But a temporary stay was effected by the compromise introduced by Henry Clay, his last signal service. Clay was a genius in compromise. No man knew better than he how to ward off imminent political dan-

ger by temporary measures which neither party could with good grace reject. His principles invested him with that sufficient ease that enabled him, without an effort of conscience, to accommodate his action to the requirements of contradictory positions. His present measure provided for the admission of California with her free constitution; the establishment of Territorial governments in the rest of the Mexican cession, without any restriction as to slavery; a determination of the boundary between Texas and New Mexico, which was in dispute; provision for the payment of the public debt of Texas; a declaration of the inexpediency of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia; the prohibition of the slave-trade in that District; an effectual provision for the restoration of fugitive slaves; a declaration that Congress has no power to interfere with the slave-trade between the States.

This was a compromise worthy of Clay. In regard to the Mexican territory, it conceded nothing by which the antislavery people would lose, for slavery was not likely to be established there; and it recalled to the North the terms of the Constitution.

Clay was followed by Calhoun in an appeal for peace, without any abatement of his contention for Southern rights, as they were understood by him. It only needed that the other one, and the supreme, of the great senatorial triumvirate should be heard. Of Daniel Webster, Carlyle

said, "As a logic-fencer or parliamentary Hercules, one would incline to back him at first sight against all the extant world." Never did statesman's mere word, independent of political combinations,—though Webster was an able politician,—go farther than his. In these days of the decline of popular respect for oratory, it is difficult to conceive of the full effect of Webster's utterances. His "Seventh of March Speech" was one of those efforts which are potent in making history. He began with, "I wish to speak to-day, not as a Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern man, but as an American. . . . I speak to-day for the preservation of the Union." In his recital of the history of slavery he alluded to the fact that at the framing of the Constitution the eminent men in both parts of the country held slavery to be an evil. But the evil still existed, and was more strongly than ever intrenched in the South. He called the attention of the sober-minded men of the North to the fact that the Constitution demanded the rendition of fugitive slaves. He paid his compliments to the abolitionists: "I do not think them useful. I think their operations for the last twenty years have produced nothing good or valuable." Referring to the change of sentiment on the part of Virginia in regard to slavery, he attributed it to the intemperance of the abolitionists. "Everything that these agitating people have done has been, not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind faster, the slave population of

the South." And for those who talked of "peaceable secession" he said:

> "Sir, he who sees these States, now revolving in harmony around a common centre, and expects them to quit their places and fly off without convulsion, may look the next hour to see the heavenly bodies rush from their spheres, and jostle against each other in the realms of space, without causing the wreck of the universe."

Webster's speech was a terrible disappointment for the North. Theodore Parker, the abolitionist Unitarian minister of Boston, who more than once wrote his sermon with loaded pistols on his desk, and a determination in his mind to protect from arrest fugitive slaves who were concealed in his house, accused Webster of having sold himself for a chance of the Presidency. Seward spoke of the "higher law," and thus gave the antislavery men a doctrine that served them in good stead. But Webster was constitutional. California was admitted, and the Fugitive Slave Law was passed. The fact that the bill was signed by Millard Fillmore, "a New York man and a Unitarian withal," was a fact that was particularly grievous to the abolitionists, whose cause received a setback. But it was only a lull before the gathering of the final storm. What both sides failed to grasp was the change wrought by circumstances beyond individual or party control. Viewed from a strictly legal stand-point, the South was unquestionably correct in its interpretation of the Constitution; but it failed to give due weight to the moral

aspects of the case. On the other hand, the North—or that portion of it which had now set its face resolutely against slavery—did not always put itself in the place of its Southern rivals, so as to understand fully what emancipation meant for them. In the course of time morality always outstrips the law in its ideals of justice and righteousness, and, unless through the interposition of equity or legislation, the popular mind will itself make short work of objectionable legal conceptions. This was the doctrine of the "higher law" which was then established at the North. It was the basis of action. In the South the doctrine of State rights was no less potent to force the issue. The antagonists were now face to face. Which should give the provocation for assault was now the one question.

IV

THE NATIONALIZATION OF SLAVERY

"THERE is a higher law than the Constitution," Seward had said, and this phrase became a shibboleth of the abolitionists. Moral sentiment thus became an effective political weapon, but one that its creator shrank from using in any cause but that of emancipation; for the "higher law" meant one thing when applied to slavery, and it meant quite another when considered in connection with the tariff. The doctrine by which the Constitution might be abrogated found little favor with President Fillmore,—this perhaps because of the jealousy which he bore to its author, the brilliant Senator from New York. However that may be, Fillmore, who when a Representative was a radical antislavery Whig, reversed his political position, abandoned principles for the sake of policy, and gave his support—which was decisive—to the passage of the Compromise Bill. The position of Seward and the action of Fillmore illustrate the effect personal aspirations had upon the political movements that preceded the war. That the national policy was shaped upon personalities, and that the selfish interests of ambitious politicians determined the course of national as well as of local affairs, are undeniable truths.

The Compromise, or Omnibus Bill (1850), as it was derisively called by its opponents, was far-reaching in its effect. Its ultimate results were, however, the opposite of those alleged to have been its purpose; for instead of allaying irritation it stirred up bitterness. The two most important provisions of this bill—in which it may well be said were planted the roots of the parliamentary struggle of the late fifties—were the waiving of the Wilmot Proviso in the establishment of New Mexico and Utah as Territories, and the Fugitive Slave Law. The former provided a logical argument for the subsequent repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and also made possible the bitter struggle over Kansas. The latter gave the antislavery men in the North a powerful engine wherewith to work on the popular emotions of their section.

The Fugitive Slave Law caused more pitiful shifting and skulking to avoid responsibility than any previous piece of national legislation. The Northern men were willing enough to see it enacted, but many of them were not willing to share in the Act that placed it upon the statute books. It was carried by a vote of 109 to 76. Many Northern Representatives purposely absented themselves while the vote was being taken. Thaddeus Stevens suggested to the Speaker that he "send a page to notify the members from our side of the House that the Fugitive Slave Law has been disposed of, and that they may now come back into the hall." A resolution

was afterwards passed by the Common Council of the city of Chicago that "the Senators and Representatives in Congress from the free States, who aided and assisted in the passage of this infamous law, and those who basely sneaked away from their seats, and thereby evaded the question, richly merit the reproach of all lovers of freedom, and are fit only to be ranked with the traitors Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot, who betrayed his Lord and Master for thirty pieces of silver."

The South, of course, viewed the law in a different light, though there is great reason for supposing that it was elated by it less as a means of retaining its property than for its effect as a defeat of the North. In the first place, the slaveholders of the Cotton States were not suffering to a great extent by the loss of fugitive negroes; these came mostly from the border States of the South. Then, again, the advocates of the Fugitive Slave Law had little confidence in the possibility of enforcing the law. When Webster expressed his determination to aid in putting into effect that part of the Constitution which required the rendition of runaway slaves, Calhoun replied, "What if you do enact such a law? The people of New England will not submit to it."

It is even possible that the Southern extremists did not wish the bill passed. Their plan seems to have been to propose a measure so stringent that the North would not agree to it, whereupon the Northerners might be charged

with wilfully invalidating the Constitution. Seward's opinion was that "Political ends—merely political ends—and not real evils, resulting from the escape of slaves, constituted the prevailing motives to the enactment." After the measure had become law, Senator Butler, of South Carolina, admitted in so many words that he "would just as soon have the law of 1795 as the present law, for any purpose, so far as regards the reclamation of fugitive slaves."

But the passing of the Fugitive Slave Law proved to be an unfortunate move for the South. Its severe terms were calculated to increase the irritation of the North, and, indeed, did arouse the people there to the highest pitch of indignation. Because of the use made of its text by the abolitionists, it helped more than anything else to array men against slavery. Those who, hitherto, had been wavering as to their acceptance of radical abolitionist principles, on its account now decided in favor of universal freedom. It gave the politicians who professed antislavery views a tremendous vantage-ground for argument. The poorest of their speakers could work on the sympathies of voters, already predisposed against the Southern system, by holding up to execration a law which placed the determination of a man's freedom wholly in the hands of a commissioner, and that, too, without benefit of jury or right of appeal! A particularly objectionable feature of the law, and one that rendered it open to criticism, was found in the fact that

the United States commissioner received a fee of ten dollars if he sent an alleged fugitive back to slavery, and but five dollars if he pronounced him free.

The law was rendered almost inoperative by the opposition of the people of the North, and the comparatively few instances in which it was enforced augmented the strength of the abolitionists. Not infrequently, black men and women were violently rescued from the slave-hunters and the officers of the law. When the negro Burns, for instance, was delivered up by Commissioner Loring, he could be taken out of Boston only under the escort of a United States artillery battalion, three platoons of marines, the marshal's civil posse of one hundred and twenty-five men, a field-piece, with another platoon of marines as its guard. The mob had been excited to frenzy by speeches from Theodore Parker and Wendell Phillips, who incited it to rescue the slave.

Wendell Phillips represented as well as led the most uncompromising school of abolitionists. For him the Constitution was nothing other than a compact with hell in so far as it protected slavery. His sincerity is as unquestionable as his eloquence was powerful; but his devotion to idealism in regard to the rights of the negro can only be characterized as fanatical. He never voted, for he would have no part or lot in a system which supported this "sum of villanies."

Between the radical wing of the abolitionists

Springfield, Ills. June 20. 1859

Hon S. P. Chase

My dear Sir

Yours of the 13th Inst. is received. You say you would be glad to have my views. Although I think Congress has Constitutional authority to enact a Fugitive Slave law, I have never elaborated an opinion upon the subject. My view has been, and is, simply this. The U. S. Constitution says the fugitive slave "shall be delivered up" but it does not expressly say who shall deliver him up. Whatever the Constitution says "shall be done" and has omitted saying who shall do it, the government established by that constitution, ex vi termini, is vested with the power of doing; and Congress is, by the Constitution, expressly empowered to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers vested by the constitution in the gov-

LETTER FROM ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO SALMON P. CHASE

ernment of the United States. This would be my view, on a simple reading of the Constitution; and it is greatly strengthened by the historical fact that the Constitution was adopted, in great part, in order to get a government which could execute its own behests, in contradistinction to that under the Articles of Confederation, which depended, in many respects, upon the States, for its execution; and the other fact that one of the earliest Congress, under the Constitution, did enact a Fugitive Slave law.

But I did not write you on this subject, with any view of discussing the constitutional question. My only object was to impress you with what I believe is true, that the introduction of a proposition for repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, into the next Republican National convention, will explode the convention and the party. Having turned your attention to this point, I wish to do no more. Yours very truly A. Lincoln.

and the politicians of both great parties there was, however, even yet a great gulf fixed. The former were eager to settle the whole question of slavery by the "higher law." On the other hand, even the Whigs of the North could not forget that there was in existence such a thing as the Constitution. That document left no room for argument in regard to what the different States should do as to runaway slaves. In it was not only an unequivocal Federal provision, but a direct inhibition on State legislation.

Unjust, iniquitous, inconsistent with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, this clause was held to be by the antislavery party; nevertheless, it was the weapon of the Southern Democrats and the sharpest horn of the dilemma which confronted the Northern Whigs. Consequently, whatever may have been the private sentiments of individual members of the latter party, the platform to which the whole party agreed was far from according with the views of the extreme abolitionists.

The Democratic Convention, which met on the 1st of June, 1852, and nominated Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, for the Presidency, adopted the following plank regarding slavery:

"That Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs, not prohibited by the Constitution; that all efforts of the abolitionists, or others, made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in

relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences; and that all such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people, and endanger the stability and permanency of the Union, and ought not to be countenanced by any friend of our political institutions."

When it is remembered that on a platform containing this clause a New England man was elected President in 1852, it will be seen that at that date there was a large body of men in the North who were still sympathizers of the South in her fight for the protection of its peculiar institution.

The Whig Convention, also, was held in Baltimore, on the 16th of June. Note now the platform on which General Winfield Scott was nominated:

"The series of acts of the Thirty-first Congress—the act known as the Fugitive Slave Law included—are received and acquiesced in by the Whig party of the United States as a settlement in principle and substance of the dangerous and exciting question which they embrace; and so far as they are concerned, we will maintain them and insist on their strict enforcement, until time and experience shall demonstrate the necessity of further legislation, to guard against the evasion of the laws on the one hand and the abuse of their powers on the other, not impairing their present efficiency; and we deprecate all agitation of the question thus settled, as dangerous to our peace; and will discountenance all efforts to renew or continue such agitation whenever, wherever, or however the attempt may be made; and we will maintain this system as essential to the nationality of the Whig party of the Union."

Thus there was little to choose between the platforms of the two great parties. Both were

willing to allow the country to rest from the bitter disputes over slavery. It was tacitly agreed that the compromise measures of 1850 were to be accepted by both parties as oil allaying the troubled waters. Franklin Pierce was now at the helm, which expression in his case is nothing more than a figure of speech, for of him no more is needed in the way of characterization than to say that he was an honest man and a gentleman, and of average mediocrity as Presidents go. In his inaugural address, President Pierce said,—and it is easy to imagine the sigh of content with which he prepared this part of his speech,—"I believe that involuntary servitude is recognized by the Constitution. I believe that the States where it exists are entitled to efficient remedies to enforce the constitutional provisions. I hold that the compromise measures of 1850 are strictly constitutional, and to be unhesitatingly carried into effect. And now, I fervently hope that the question is at rest."

The controversy for a time was stilled. For a time there was to be a truce, an era of apparent good-will. Aside from the abolitionists, the North was contented; it had acquiesced in such measures as gave the South all she could possibly expect. This state of peace was rudely shattered, however, by Douglas, and for no other reason than the desire to further his ambitious schemes for personal aggrandizement.

A bill for the organization of the Territory of

Nebraska had been passed in the House of Representatives. This bill was introduced into the Senate in December, 1853, and was referred to the Committee on Territories, of which Douglas was chairman. The Territory of Nebraska included the present States of Kansas, Nebraska, Montana, North and South Dakota, Wyoming, and part of Colorado.

On January 4, 1854, Douglas made a report intended to be far-reaching in its effect, which was so, indeed, for it precipitated afresh the sectional quarrel with such vehemence that it could no more be allayed until after there had been a terrific and fratricidal war. In this report it was declared that "It is a disputed point whether slavery is prohibited in the Nebraska country by valid enactment. . . . In the opinion of those eminent statesmen who hold that Congress is invested with no rightful authority to legislate upon the subject of slavery in the Territories, the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri is null and void."

It was this eighth section of the Missouri Compromise which prohibited the extension of slavery in all the Louisiana territory lying north of latitude 36° 30′, the State of Missouri excepted. This enactment had become a source of bitter regret to the Southerners, for—since all available territory lying south of north latitude 36° 30′ had been organized into States—it precluded all expansion of the slave-holding power. Moreover, it gave the North a vast

country out of which numerous free States might be carved. The South saw its equality of power in the Senate doomed. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was therefore its last hope. This could never be formally carried. But that measure might be abrogated by being declared unconstitutional. This is what Douglas discovered that the compromise measures of 1850 had done. His report stated that "It is apparent that the compromise measures of 1850 affirm, and rest upon the following propositions:

"*First.*—That all questions pertaining to slavery in the Territories, and in the new States to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the people residing therein, by their appropriate representatives, to be chosen by them for that purpose.

"*Second.*—That 'all cases involving title to slaves,' and 'questions of personal freedom,' are to be referred to the adjudication of the local tribunals, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

"*Third.*—That the provision of the Constitution of the United States in respect to fugitives from service is to be carried into faithful execution in all 'the original Territories,' the same as in the States.

"The substitute for the bill which your committee have prepared, and which is commended for the favorable action of the Senate, proposes to carry these propositions and principles into

practical operation, in the precise language of the compromise measures of 1850."

The proposition to repeal the Missouri Compromise came upon the North with the stunning effect of a thunderbolt. The settlement of 1820 had come to be regarded as something sacred and inviolate. To repudiate it seemed in the nature of a breach of faith. To obliterate the prohibitive line at 36° 30′ was to overthrow the bulwarks upon which the North had all along relied to stem the tide of slavery extension. There were very many in Massachusetts who, so distinctly sectionalized had the country become, would have as freely welcomed a proposition to eradicate their State line. Doubtless it is hard for the present generation to realize what, in those days of the fifties, the terms North and South meant. They were as separate as two nations who, diametrically opposed in every interest, yet abode discontentedly under the same government and eyed each other with suspicious jealousy across the same legislative halls. And both sections were conscious of these facts. No more striking proof of this could be found than in the literature of the day, which, North and South, reflects sectional sentiment.

The form in which the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was finally passed provided for the organization of both Kansas and Nebraska. The understanding was, among those who engineered the measure (without, however, divulging all their purpose), that Kansas should be an acquisition to

the slave-holding States. This notwithstanding the fact that Douglas declared that the true intent and meaning of the bill was not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, and not to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people perfectly free to regulate their domestic institutions in their own way.

This was the doctrine known as "popular sovereignty," but nicknamed "squatter sovereignty" by the opponents of the bill. The measure was finally passed on May 26, 1854. It was signed by the President amidst the firing of cannon and the triumphant shouting of its friends. But these demonstrations were truly premonitory of the battle-cries and deadly bombardments which were to follow, for the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was a direct and causal antecedent of the war. Doubtless the controversy would have sprung up again in some other guise; but, as it was, Stephen A. Douglas, in stirring up this subject which was for the time quiescent, made himself responsible for the conflict which followed.

The repeal of the Missouri Compromise was the beginning of the end. By it the South made her last throw, and lost. It was a desperate and hopeless attempt to break the barrier which confined the slave power to proportions which were daily being outstripped by the North. There was no possibility of slavery taking root in the newly opened country; climate, soil, and the very configuration of the land itself entirely un-

fitted it for anything but the energetic resources of free labor. It was useless, as Daniel Webster had said, to "reaffirm an ordinance of Nature, or to re-enact the will of God." Nevertheless, the effect on the North was tremendous, the conviction there growing strong that the Union and slavery could not much longer exist together. The expression of this opinion proceeded at first from the extremists, but at this day it is not the habit to acknowledge how ready the abolitionists were to give utterance to disunion sentiments. On the 4th of July, 1854, Garrison publicly burned a copy of the United States Constitution with the words, "The Union must be dissolved." Again he said, "Justice and liberty, God and man, demand the dissolution of this slave-holding Union, and the formation of a Northern confederacy, in which slave-holders will stand before the law as felons and be treated as pirates." In another chapter we shall have an opportunity to point out and illustrate the fact that Northern antislavery men did a fair share in the work of promulgating the idea of secession, just as the Hartford Convention furnished ammunition for the South Carolina nullifiers.

The immediate consequence of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was that many to whom slavery had hitherto been a matter of indifference now became opposed to it on the ground that its defenders were persistently putting the Union in danger.

It will thus be seen that the slavery question, which was hurrying the two sections to the abyss of war, now overshadowed all other political considerations and was at the same time the chief line marking the division of parties. In the North the words of the Declaration of Independence—especially those Jefferson had borrowed from the doctrinaire philosophers of revolutionary France, regarding natural law and the equality and brotherhood of man—appealed with telling effect, just as they had done to the majority of New England men at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution. It was claimed by them, moreover, that the Southern slave-holders were abandoning their old position, which had been one of defence, and in exchange therefor were adopting an aggressive attitude with the object of nationalizing their institution.

That there was much reason in this contention becomes obvious when we recall the position assumed by the South in 1787, and contrast it with the policy that actuated the Southern leaders during the quarrel regarding Kansas. Generally accepted in the former period as a local customary institution, with no other protection in the free States and elsewhere than what was accorded it by either comity or treaty, the slave-holders had arrived at a point where they undertook to argue that there was no difference between their human chattels and any other form of property. This altered opinion had been partly the cause and partly the effect of the series

of events, in part already discussed here, which, however natural, were well calculated to deepen the chasm between the sections.

These events, briefly recapitulating, were: the purchase of Louisiana; the Missouri Compromise; the annexation of Texas; the war with Mexico and the territorial acquisitions resulting therefrom; the compromise of 1850; the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; the amendment of the Fugitive Slave Law; the Kansas-Nebraska Bill; the extension of slavery to Territories like Utah and New Mexico; to these we must add the various filibustering expeditions fitted out by "Southern annexationists" against Cuba and Central America, with the avowed purpose (only thwarted by threat of Federal interference) of carving out new territory from which to construct slave-holding States; and, finally, an increasing demand, voiced by Governor Adams, of South Carolina, in his message to the Legislature of 1856, for the reopening of the African slave-trade.

To the South, if slavery were to continue, this policy of extension was not only natural, but necessary. It already saw its rival far ahead of it in population and wealth. The future held still further gain for the North. The public lands of the great Northwest—long unavailable for lack of means of communication—were being rapidly settled by busy and industrious immigrants, who were carried thither by the lines of railway that were beginning to gridiron the country; and the

construction of artificial waterways like the Erie Canal had already laid the foundation of new communities in the region bordering the Great Lakes. Nor was the West the only part of the country that was thus rapidly developing. The opening up of the coal, iron, and oil fields of Pennsylvania was fast adding to the richness and population of the Middle States; McCormick's reaper and other agricultural implements brought about the cultivation of lands in the wheat-growing portions of the North; and New England, under the protection of a high tariff and with the multiplication of new inventions, was from an industrial point of view fast approaching the social and economic type of manufacturing Great Britain.

The original differences between the North and the South were now heightened to a degree they had never before reached, for few of the great industrial forces were felt in any marked degree below Mason and Dixon's line. Slavery excluded them. The natural advantages of the South were unutilized. Such resources, for example, as the rich coal and iron mines of Tennessee and Alabama were almost untouched. Urban life, moreover, was becoming even more sluggish. It is true that seaports like Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans maintained a more or less active trade, but the population was largely composed of planters who made these cities their homes in winter and were too often but slightly interested in the improve-

ment of community life, and who were in many cases hostile to anything that might impel change or advancement. In the interior of the South there were numerous small towns, to be sure, but, as a rule, they were mere political and administrative centres, whose inhabitants consisted in the main of office-holders, a few professional men, some merchants, together with their slaves and a sprinkling of lazy, shiftless, free negroes. Rural interests were well-nigh supreme, and each plantation was not only a social but an industrial centre, for almost everything needed was produced by the slaves themselves.

Nor were the differences between the sections thus accentuated only by mere material agencies. In matters of education there was a vital difference between the North and the South, and one that in course of time did no little to foster the inherited and mutual dislike of the people of the two sections. Town life at the North—not to speak of the ideals of the people—had contributed largely to the creation and development of a system of education far superior to that possible to agricultural communities Free schools had multiplied and finally attained to a degree of efficiency that did much to raise the level of general intelligence, while numerous colleges and universities aided in the work of advancing the cause of civilization and enlightenment. Not so with the South, whose entire social constitution was in every manner calculated to hinder the growth of general culture. It is true that there

were Southern people whose critical tastes could be said even to surpass those of Northern citizens, and there were not a few notable private libraries. At the same time, the fact cannot be disguised that there were few Southern authors of note; and when readers desired books they sought them rather in England and France than at the North, whose literary productions were increasingly crowded with attacks upon slavery. Thus the two peoples often thought differently because they did not read the same things. Meanwhile, in the domain of higher education there was every whit as much variance. State universities like those supported by Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi were admirable so far as they went. Indeed, in some instances their courses of instruction will bear very favorable comparison with those provided by the Northern institutions of learning, while more than one professor at such colleges as those maintained by Virginia and the Carolinas won universal esteem by reason of his culture and learning. Notwithstanding these facts, however, the education thus imparted was little calculated to develop catholicity of thought.

The students, as a rule, met men from their own States who thought and acted as they themselves did. It is true, many young men of the South went abroad, as well as to such Northern institutions as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. But this custom began gradually to decline, as

the discussion of the slavery question forced itself into the intimate life of the people, and students preferred to remain at home, where their feelings would not be irritated by attacks upon their section and its institutions. Thus we find a line of demarcation in the educational life of the period.

A similar line of cleavage took place between the religious organizations of the country. The members of great bodies like the Methodist Conference, the Presbyterian Assembly, and the Baptist Convention found it impossible to harmonize, and separated into Northern and Southern bodies, over the slavery question. Hence men who had theretofore met annually or less frequently in national meetings became estranged from one another.

Of political controversies much has been said already. That these should have increased in virulence as time went on, and slavery ceased to remain a local and moral issue and became instead a political and national question, was natural. It was slavery, for example, that slowly produced a great political party almost wholly composed of Northern men and directed to the denationalization, if not to the uttermost overthrow, of the institution. How this came about is indisputable, yet it may not be out of place briefly to trace here the formation of Northern opinion as the advocates of slavery extension grew bolder and bolder in their efforts to retain and strengthen their power.

To do this will require us to add something

more to what has been previously said on the tariff, which was a potent factor in swelling the number of agencies at work in bringing about the war between the sections. Hence it may be well to speak now of the latter phase of the subject.

The so-called "era of good feeling" that set in with the Presidency of Monroe and the enunciation of the policy that has been associated with his name was one largely swayed by personal and factional considerations rather than by those larger political conceptions which are supposed to guide the conduct of thoroughly organized parties.

Because of its behavior during our second struggle with Great Britain, the old Federal party had committed suicide. Now and then, to be sure, it gave fitful exhibitions of returning vitality, but these, by its enemies, at least, were regarded more in the light of the spasms of a reptile whose head had been crushed than as the threat of a restoration to life. At first there was nothing to take its place. The old Democratic-Republican party of Jefferson alone maintained its existence. It is true, a group of young men like Calhoun, Clay, and others already gave evidence of a trend towards national aspirations that was very far from the doctrines of the orthodox Jeffersonian school; but they still gave their loyal adherence to the party in spite of their support of the bill rechartering the Bank of the United States and

their endorsement of the Tariff Act of 1816. But as the disposition not only to maintain but to raise the tariff manifested itself, as well as a spirit of national activity looking to increasing expenditure for internal improvements, the Democratic factions began to ripen into parties, and sectionalism to lift its head in a new direction.

At first in sympathy both with the policy of protecting infant industries and that implying so liberal an interpretation of the Constitution as to sanction the improvement by national agencies of highways, canals, and harbors, the South soon began to recede from a policy which apparently enriched the North without giving herself any proportionate return. With the election, by the House of Representatives, of the second Adams to the Presidency, the altered situation had become sufficiently marked to attract attention. In the first place, Adams received but slight support in the South; secondly, he was elected by Clay's casting the tie vote in his favor. This was the beginning of that alliance between the North and the West which during the Civil War was destined to disappoint the South in all its hopes towards the securing of Western assistance, or, at least, indifference. Leadership, moreover, both North and South passed through a shifting process of unusual importance. As Monroe had been the last President of the Old Virginia type, so Adams marked the end of New England's hegemony. To the West the North

was henceforth to look for her leadership, while, at the same time, Virginia, partly by reason of her new Constitution widening the franchise, partly because of the development of the lower South, was forced to abdicate in favor of South Carolina and the Gulf States.

One of the earliest results of this altered state of things was the birth of the Whig party, whose principles were largely represented by Clay's "American System," with a large share of the Federal party's ideas of a loose construction of the Constitution. The party, despite its leanings, soon found a number of warm Southern supporters.

Committed to the policy of protection, the Whigs were responsible for the "Tariff of Abominations" of 1828, that resulted in the nullification movement in South Carolina, and what was, in point of fact, the first germ of the Civil War. The Whig party was opposed by the Democrats, then, as usual, divided into hostile factions. Its Southern members, moreover, were in favor of slavery, opposed to the tariff, and, as a rule, opposed to the bank. To this Southern wing the party owed its final destruction when the slavery question dominated every other political subject.

The South naturally looked upon England as its best market. There it could buy at reasonable prices the necessaries and luxuries of life, and at the same time find an excellent opportunity to dispose of Southern products. After the repeal of the British Corn Laws and the increased

activity of commerce brought about by this change of policy, English manufacturing industries took on a new lease of life, from which all parts of the world reaped advantages, but few more so than the Southern States. What was more natural, therefore, than that they should embrace with enthusiasm Peel's doctrines of free trade, and view England with friendlier eyes than they did the North? Was not the tariff a direct blow at the commercial interests of the Southern States? Depending as they did on commerce in its largest sense, they now found that interest shattered in pieces for the welfare of a section already threatening the horrors of a servile war.

Above Mason and Dixon's line there was a lack of that unanimity of opinion that prevailed so widely south of it. Politically speaking, there were, in the first place, the Democrats who were disposed to adopt Southern views out and out and those members of the same party who were heartily sick of their Southern friends. Arrayed against this organization was the Whig party; it, too, was disposed to wink at slavery in order to obtain Southern support. Added to these was the abolitionist party, composed of two factions, conservative and liberal; the one opposed to slavery extension but unwilling to disturb its continuance at the South; the other unreservedly committed either to the extinction of slavery or the dissolution of the Union.

In the North at this time there were abolitionists, Free-soilers, antislavery Whigs, and anti-

Nebraska Democrats, as well as minor groups. The Whig party went to pieces on the rock of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and the new Republican party took its place. This was destined to develop into a mighty force, which, in the armed contention of the nation, was to demolish slavery itself. From the start its policy was sectional rather than national,—a party desiring no entangling Southern alliance to cripple it as the Whigs had been crippled. The advent of the Republican party definitely arrayed the North against the South. No Southern wing hampered this new organization; and from the first its object was confessedly the overthrow of the slave power.

V

KANSAS—BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION

"BLEEDING KANSAS" was both a premonition and an immediate cause of the blood-shedding into which the strife between the sections was soon to develop. The South was not directly responsible for the movement to repeal the Missouri Compromise, but she gladly hailed the measure as a means of extending her power. Never was there greater lack of political foresight. Had the South been contented with the territory south of 36° 30′, the overthrow of her institution might have been a much slower process, and accomplished peaceably and with satisfaction based upon due compensation. The marvel is that the Southern statesmen did not clearly perceive that the North had become not only too strong for them, but also too greatly dominated by antislavery principles to relinquish the least portion of the public domain to slaveholding control. The opinion is here ventured that the leaders of the Southern people must have seen it. It seems evident that, resting on what they believed to be their constitutional right, they were determined to push, if necessary, the issue of slavery to the point of secession. At the same time, it must be added that among

the larger slave-holders, as opposed to mere politicians, there was a decided opposition to the secession movement. The conservatism of wealth in both the North and the South strove to preserve the *status quo*.

But Kansas seemed to afford a chance for Southern expansion. The South threw, and lost; for the dice, so to speak, were heavily loaded in favor of the North. From this time forward the controversy takes a new form. It is no longer a legal and constitutional argument, a Congressional debate, or even a manœuvring for the passage of laws; it is an open quarrel, with deeds of violence becoming steadily more frequent; skirmishes between the pickets of armies marching rapidly to meet each other.

Kansas was in a virtual state of war. There "Border Ruffians" from Missouri and "Free State Settlers" from the North carried on a course of violence in which arson and assassination were incidents of daily occurrence. Such was the extent of these outrages that a conservative estimate thus enumerates their effects: value of crops destroyed, $37,349; number of buildings burned and destroyed, 78; horses taken or destroyed, 368; cattle taken or destroyed, 533; property taken or destroyed by pro-slavery men, $318,718; by free State men, $94,529. Over two hundred lives were lost, and the expeditions to Kansas cost over two million dollars. The Territory was divided, in accordance with the views of the settlers, into two dis-

tricts, each vying with the other in the perpetration of every species of outrage. The pro-slavery men gathered around Leavenworth and Lecompton, where they held conventions and formulated a State constitution, while the free-State people met at Topeka and Lawrence and put into operation rival political machinery, neither party recognizing the legislative performances of the other.

The *New York Times* said, "The question of slavery domination must and will be fought out on the plains of Kansas." This was the feeling both North and South. Accordingly, in sending out men each section was careful to see that they were well armed. Some of the contingents from both sections were equipped with Bibles, but it is difficult to see that they had any effect whatsoever on the dispute in Kansas or the manner in which it was carried on. A remarkable scene was enacted in Connecticut, at New Haven, where Deacon Lines had raised a company of seventy-nine emigrants. Before their departure, a mass meeting was held, in a church, for the purpose of raising funds for their equipment. There were present many eminent clergymen, and of Yale professors not a few. Henry Ward Beecher, who was afterwards to do a far better service for the Union by his mission to England, made a stirring address. Then Professor Stillman started the subscription with one Sharp's rifle; others, including the pastor of the church, followed. Beecher announced that if twenty-five

rifles were subscribed on the spot, his church would duplicate the number. He had already expressed his opinion that for the slave-holders of Kansas the rifle was a more effective moral agency than the Bible; consequently, from that time on Sharp's rifle was popularly known as "Beecher's Bible." This incident fairly illustrates the spirit in which the North met the Kansas troubles.

The Southern method was no less strenuous. The pro-slavery men had an advantage in that they were favored by the Administration in Washington. The Territorial officers were all of this party. That they did not fail to take advantage of their power—and that to the utmost limit—is illustrated in the destruction of Lawrence. Sheriff Jones, during an attempt to arrest a free-State man in that town, was wounded. The pro-slavery men were immeasurably incensed, and demanded that the abolition town be wiped out of existence. A legal pretext for attacking the place was sought.

The Territorial Legislature had passed laws which inflicted the death penalty upon those who committed certain acts prejudicial to slavery. Even to speak, write, or print matter by which slaves might be advised or induced to rebel was a capital crime. In accordance with these enactments, Judge Lecompte, the chief justice of the Territory and an ardent pro-slavery man, enunciated his doctrine of Constructive Treason. In charging the grand jury at Lecompton, he ruled

that to resist such laws was equal to treason against the United States. He said:

"If you find that no such resistance has been made, but that combinations have been formed for the purpose of resisting them, and that individuals of influence and notoriety have been aiding and abetting in such combinations, then must you find bills for constructive treason."

Accordingly, this grand jury, in addition to indicting prominent free-State leaders for treason, recommended the abatement as nuisances of newspapers published at Lawrence.

Marshal Donaldson, in May, 1856, issued a proclamation to the people of Kansas, announcing that he had certain writs to execute at Lawrence, and that as previously his deputy (Jones) had been opposed in the execution of justice, he had every reason to believe that on this occasion he would likewise be resisted by a large and armed force. Therefore all law-abiding citizens were commanded to appear at Lecompton in order to aid in the due execution of the law. Pro-slavery men—otherwise designated as "law-abiding citizens"—appeared in ample force.

These men, so flatteringly designated, comprised the marshal's posse. There were seven hundred and fifty of them, and, to state the fact moderately, they were a gang of ruffians. Armed with rifles and five pieces of artillery, they took a position on the bluffs which from the West commanded the town. The inhabitants of Lawrence were not prepared to resist

such a force. Right was on their side, though they were law-breakers; but it was an instance in which "the heaviest battalions" prevailed independent of the justice of the cause. Donaldson, after making some arrests, turned the posse over to Jones, the sheriff of Douglas County, with the avouchment, "He is a law-and-order man, and acts under the same authority as the marshal." Jones immediately proceeded to exemplify his idea of law and order. The men were marched into the town with banners flying. One of these was ornamented with the inscription:

> "Let Yankees tremble, abolitionists fall;
> Our motto is, Give Southern rights to all."

The first objects of this disciplinary visitation were the offices of the offending free-State newspapers. These were quickly destroyed, presses, type, books, and all. The sheriff also had a writ against the large stone hotel which had just been erected and was the pride of the town. The execution of this writ gave him a welcome opportunity to test the mettle of his artillery. But the walls being proof against the balls, the torch was applied to the edifice, and it was burnt to the ground—not until the wines and liquors it contained were first preserved for immediate use. Under the influence of these, and unsubmissive to the control of Buford and Atchison, who counselled against the destruction of property, the posse sacked the town and set fire to Governor Robinson's house. In one project, however, they

did not succeed. They failed to get possession of the Sharp's rifles which were in the hands of Pomeroy, the representative of the Emigrant Aid Company. These were retained by the free-State men for future and effective use.

This, though a victory for slavery in Kansas, only served to strengthen and crystallize the Northern antagonism to that institution. It made Republicans.

But the outrages in the Territory were not all perpetrated by the pro-slavery men. In fact, if careful investigation is made with such evidence as is available and trustworthy, it will be found that dishonors were not far from being even between the two parties. In 1857 the retiring governor of Kansas said truly:

"Desolation and ruin reigned on every hand; homes and firesides were deserted; the smoke of burning dwellings darkened the atmosphere; women and children, driven from habitations, wandered over the prairies and among the woodlands, or sought refuge among the Indian tribes. The highways were infested with numerous predatory bands, and the towns were fortified and garrisoned by armies of conflicting partisans, each excited almost to frenzy, and determined upon mutual extermination."

In the annals of crime we can learn of no deed more atrocious than that laid to the charge of the demented agitator John Brown, later of Harper's Ferry infamy, and afterwards canonized by public opinion at the North. After the destruction of Lawrence, Brown determined to expiate the blood of five free-State men who had been killed since the beginning of the troubles. He

called together his four sons, a son-in-law, and two neighbors, to whom he had made known his determination to put to the sword all the pro-slavery men living on the Pottawatomie. To the objection of one of them he replied, "I have no choice. It has been decreed by Almighty God, ordained from eternity, that I should make an example of these men." Brown and his party went out one night, and coming to the house of Boyle, one of the proscribed men, compelled him and one of his sons to go with them. What followed is indicated by the evidence, given under oath, of a surviving son:

"I found my father and one brother, William, lying dead in the road, about two hundred yards from the house. I saw my other brother lying dead on the ground, about one hundred and fifty yards from the house, in the grass, near a ravine; his fingers were cut off and his arms were cut off; there was a hole in his breast. William's head was cut open and a hole was in his jaw as though it was made by a knife; and a hole was also in his side. My father was shot in the forehead and stabbed in the breast."

John Brown and his band then went to the house of another settler named Wilkinson. Despite the pleading of his sick and helpless wife, they compelled him to go with them. In the morning he also was found dead. William Sherman made up the number of the five. In nearly all the accounts of the life of John Brown this incident is either slurred over, or extenuated by the conditions which then obtained in Kansas, or excused by Brown's principles. But in any true history it can be regarded only as one of the

most atrocious, cold-blooded, cowardly murders that have blotted the history of the United States.

The troubles in Kansas had a great effect on the Presidential election. Though the result was not the triumph of the free State candidate, the Republican party came astonishingly to the fore, and was given strong hope of victory in the next Presidential campaign. The election, in 1856, of Nathaniel T. Banks, of Massachusetts, on the one hundred and thirty-third ballot, to the Speakership of the House stimulated the Republicans. They saw that Southern ascendency in Congress was doomed, and were encouraged to bend every energy to capture the executive branch of the government.

Prejudices ran high during these years of excitement and passion. Men were often quite as much enraged by hatred of the Southern slaveholders as by any love of the blacks, for whom, in many respects, the Southerners really had a higher regard. As Carlyle bluntly put it, the South said to the negro, "'God bless you and be a slave; the North, 'God d—n you and be a freeman.'" In many a Northern heart, moreover, there was *jealousy,* that consumer of the fairest of ideals. At the South there grew up a scarcely less noxious product. It was *hatred.*

Nothing so strikingly illustrates the height of sectional animosity as the personal assault on Charles Sumner by Brooks, of South Carolina. Sumner's ability placed him in the foremost rank

of the leading spirits of his time, his consciousness of that ability endued him with a self-confidence which never failed. He had a highly wrought moral sense, leading him to devote himself to the benefit of his country and the uplifting of the enslaved race; but it did not include a quick sense of the courtesy due to those who differed from him in opinion. Consequently he was a man who made many enemies; indeed, it has been said of him that at the period of the controversies before the outbreak of the war he was the most hated man in Washington. Possessed of indomitable courage, he made no attempt to mollify this enmity. Indeed, his public addresses were ultrasensational and characterized more by invective than by argument. On the 19th and 20th of May, 1856, Sumner had delivered his famous speech on "The Crime against Kansas." It was a needlessly bitter attack on South Carolina, one of those speeches frequently delivered by Northern men to make political capital, and naturally calculated to goad the South to madness and thus defeat the very object which the speakers professed to be seeking. Moreover, Sumner's address contained insulting allusions to Senator Butler, who was a relative of Brooks. Seward, who read the speech previous to its delivery, strongly advised the elimination of some of its expressions. But Sumner was not fully "conscious of the stinging force of his language." The story is well known,—how Brooks attacked Sumner while the latter was writing letters at his

desk in the Senate Chamber, and with a walking-cane rained upon his head blows that would have resulted in the death of a man of weaker constitution. From the effects of this assault Sumner never fully recovered.

The South approved of the attack. It lauded Brooks and eulogized his action. The North, on the contrary, seemed to lack words to express the bitterness of its detestation and resentment. Congress did not expel Brooks, but, sure of a triumphant re-election, he defied the House and resigned from it. He was well-nigh unanimously returned to his seat by his district.

This assault has been made altogether too much of by our historians. It carried no deep political significance. It was nothing more nor less than the ebullition of passion intensified by sectional feelings. It was strictly personal and had little or no connection with matters of statecraft.

It is remarkable that in 1856 all parties drew their candidates from the North. The South would have preferred the re-election of Pierce or the election of Douglas as its second choice. But both these men had estranged the members of the Northern Democracy. The only available candidate was Buchanan. Fortunately for himself, he had been serving the country as Ambassador to England while the Missouri Compromise was being repealed and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill passed. Consequently, in regard to both these measures he could prove an alibi.

It was found on examination that he had never given a vote "against the interests of slavery, and never uttered a word which could pain the most sensitive Southern heart." He satisfied the South, promising that the aim of his administration should be to settle the slavery question in such a manner that the Union might be preserved and Southern interests amply guarded. "If," said he, "I can be instrumental in settling the slavery question on the terms I have named, and then add Cuba to the Union, I shall, if President, be willing to give up the ghost and let Breckinridge take the government." The North was even more satisfied with the Democratic candidate; he was supposed to view the repeal of the Missouri Compromise with disfavor.

This Presidential campaign (1856) showed a striking disintegration and re-formation of political parties. There were four political organizations before the people,—a small remnant of the Whigs, the Know-Nothings, Democrats North and South, and the new Republican party. The Whigs and the Know-Nothings combined in the nomination of Millard Fillmore. The Republican party, though only four years of age, was yet sturdy enough to challenge the South and the Northern Democracy. Their nomination was governed entirely by availability. John C. Frémont's picturesque character and career were relied upon as qualities sufficient for a Presidential candidate. But so far as the Republicans were concerned, this was pre-eminently a cam-

paign for principles rather than for the man. Frémont was chosen solely because he was popular and had made no enemies. They were decisive, however, in their platform, which declared it to be "both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery."

The Republican party was absolutely sectional; and undoubtedly for this reason many in the North, who otherwise were not unfavorable to its principles, dared not endanger the Union by giving it their support. To these Fillmore effectively appealed when he said:

"We see a political party presenting candidates for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency selected for the first time from the free States alone, with the avowed purpose of electing these candidates by suffragists from one part of the Union only, to rule over the whole of the United States.

"Can it be possible that those who are engaged in such a measure can have seriously reflected on the consequences which must inevitably follow in case of success? Can they have the madness or the folly to believe that our Southern brethren would submit to be governed by such a chief magistrate? Would he be required to follow the same rule prescribed by those who elected him in making his appointments? If a man living South of Mason and Dixon's line be not worthy to be President or Vice-President, would it be proper to select one from the same quarter as one of his Cabinet council, or to represent the nation in a foreign country, or, indeed, to collect the revenue, or administer the laws of the United States? . . . Therefore you must see that if this sectional party succeeds, it leads inevitably to the destruction of this beautiful fabric reared by our forefathers, cemented by their blood and bequeathed to us as a priceless inheritance.

"I tell you, my friends, that I speak warmly on this

subject, for I feel that we are in danger. I am determined to make a clean breast of it. I will wash my hands of the consequences, whatever they may be; and I tell you that we are treading on the brink of a volcano that is liable at any moment to burst forth and overwhelm the nation."

This feeling of imminent danger prevailed among the conservative men of the North and was justified by the bitterness with which the possibility of a sectional government was regarded by the South. Southern men were not slow to declare with approval their belief that Republican victory would result in immediate disunion.

This was met by expressions of equal intolerance and what was later called "treason" on the part of abolitionists in the North. So prominent a man as Horace Greeley is reported to have said, "I have no doubt but the free and the slave States ought to be separated. . . . The Union is not worth supporting in connection with the South." Such declarations as that made by one Hurlburt, a lawyer in Herkimer, New York, were common: "Rather than admit another slave State into the confederacy I would dissolve it. Rather than endure the curse of another four years of governmental infamy as that Pierce, Douglas & Co. have inflicted upon us, I would dissolve it, so help me Heaven."

The result of the election was: Popular vote for Buchanan, 1,838,169; Frémont, 1,341,264; Fillmore, 864,534; electoral vote: Democrats, 174; Republicans, 114; Know-Nothings and

Whigs, 8. Thus James Buchanan became President of the United States, March 4, 1857. It is noteworthy that a bare twelve hundred Republican votes were cast in all the Southern States. It was the Republican party against the South. The North was now beginning to "press the issue." The South was thrown upon its defence.

Immediately after President Buchanan's inauguration the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its memorable decision in the case of Dred Scott (March 6, 1857). This negro, the property of a surgeon of the army, had been taken by his master to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, where he resided as a slave until May, 1856. At that time his owner removed to Fort Snelling, which was situated north of latitude 36° 30′, and also north of the State of Missouri. Dred Scott's claim was that by his residence in Illinois, where negro slavery does not exist by law, and in the territory north of 36° 30′, where by the Missouri Compromise it was prohibited, his liberty had been acquired. This question had been carried in course to the Supreme Court of the United States. Chief Justice Taney, whose accurate knowledge of the law was held in the highest estimation, but who was a man of intense political opinions, and withal a lover of Southern institutions, delivered the opinion of the Court:

Negroes "were not intended to be included under the word citizens in the Constitution, and therefore can claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument

provides for and secures to the citizens of the United States. . . . They had for more than a century been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; *and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect,* and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit."

Referring to the clause in the Declaration of Independence asserting that "all men are created equal," the chief justice said:

"The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and form no part of the people who framed and adopted this Declaration."

Justice Taney furthermore passed on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, the discussion of which political question in the opinion was a mere *obiter dictum* not necessary to a decision of the matter involved. It was included wholly for the pleasure and benefit of the South. The declared opinion of the court was that the Missouri Compromise Act "is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void." Taney from the Supreme Court Bench completed the work done by Douglas in his seat in the Senate. Sound law the decision from a strict point of view may have been, but it was a most disastrous one in its results.

"The negro has no rights that the white man is bound to respect" became an effective legend on the abolitionist banner. It added new force

to the fiery zeal of the antislavery party, and went far towards insuring Republican victory four years afterwards.

President Buchanan was very tender of Southern interests. We may credit him with, however, an earnest and honest desire to allay the troubles that were rending the country; but he had an eye to only one side, and he was willing to sacrifice justice in Kansas in order to give satisfaction to the South. Twenty years earlier he might have been an ideal executive. As it was, at a most critical position of affairs he proved himself incapable. Had a strong man filled the office of President,—the last political tie uniting the North and the South,—the Civil War might have been averted. Buchanan's term of office proved how utterly weak the Union had become.

A pro-slavery Legislature had been established at Lecompton (September 5, 1857), by means which were farcical and fraudulent in the highest degree. A convention was called and a constitution submitted to the people, which was of course in accord with the wishes of the men who wrote it. The people were required to vote not on the constitution itself, but on the question whether they would accept that instrument with or without slavery. This, as it was characterized at the time, was like the ancient method of trying witches: they were thrown into deep water; if they floated, they were judged guilty and forthwith taken out and hanged; if they were drowned, they were pronounced innocent.

The free State men refused to vote in this manner, or to have anything whatsoever to do with this constitution. Consequently, it was adopted by a unanimous vote, the returns including thousands of ballots beyond the number which were actually cast. The Lecompton constitution was transmitted to Congress, accompanied by a message from President Buchanan recommending the admission of Kansas as a State. On the ground of this Lecompton transaction he declared that Kansas was as much a slave State as were Georgia and South Carolina. "It has been solemnly adjudged," said he, "by the highest judicial tribunal known to our laws that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the Constitution of the United States." This action proved the downfall of the Democratic party. Douglas broke away, and refused to give his countenance to the proceeding.

But the South fought hard for the admission of Kansas as a slave State; it was needed to preserve the balance of power in the Senate. In connection with this phase of the controversy it is worth while to quote the reason for Southern aggression, as adduced in an address to the Senate by Jefferson Davis while this bill was before that body:

"We are arraigned day after day as the aggressive power. What Southern Senator during this whole session has attacked any portion or any interest of the North? In what have we, now or ever, back to the earliest period of our history, sought to deprive the North of any advan-

tage it possessed? The whole charge is, and has been, that we seek to extend our own institution into the common territory of the United States. Well and wisely has the President of the United States pointed to that common territory as the joint possession of the country." . . . In the South is presented "a new problem. . . . A race suited to our labor exists there. Why should we care whether they go into other Territories or not? Simply because of the war that is made against our institutions; simply because of the want of security which results from the action of our opponents in the Northern States. Had you made no political war upon us, had you observed the principles of our confederacy as States, that the people of each State were to take care of their domestic affairs, . . . then, I say, within the limits of each State the population there would have gone on to attend to their own affairs, and have had little regard to whether this species of property or any other was held in any other part of the Union."

These words fairly represent the prevailing Southern opinion. They were fatuous, however, inasmuch as they failed to take into consideration the change of Northern views.

Every effort was made by the administration to force through Congress the bill for the admission of Kansas; but Douglas stood in the way, and, though he could not prevent a majority vote for it in the Senate, it failed to pass the House. The marvellous spectacle of Douglas voting with the Northern Republicans was now being witnessed, and the South branding with the term "traitor" him whom it had but recently adored. The important aspect in all this, however, is the effect it had in disintegrating the Democratic party, thus making possible the election of Abraham Lincoln.

VI

THE ELECTION OF LINCOLN

THE Kansas-Nebraska Bill, by a bold, desperate stroke, had swept away all compromise measures and set in motion a campaign of sectional vituperation. Editors and pamphleteers, both North and South, from this time forward indulged in reckless statements and objurgative expressions which, because they were regarded as reflecting popular opinion, increased the rancor that now prevailed on both sides of the Potomac.

The Dred Scott decision, however sound its doctrine to the effect that a slave did not become free by being taken to a non-slave-holding Commonwealth, had startled the North. That section was the more incensed because it now felt that, instead of being dependent on local custom, slavery was nationalized by the highest tribunal in the civilized world.

Meanwhile, the tariff reduction of 1857 and the financial stringency of the same year had the natural result of widening the chasm between the agricultural and industrial States. Nor could the South view with complaisance the admission into the Union of two new States which, because of natural causes, were destined to be free. These were Minnesota and Oregon, which joined

the sisterhood of States in 1857 and 1859 respectively.

But of all the immediate agencies which rent the Union in twain, the most potent was John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. This occurred on October 17, 1859, when Brown, with seventeen white men and five blacks, seized the Federal arsenal at this point, captured several prominent citizens, slew others, and terrorized the entire community. Claiming to have been inspired "by the authority of Almighty God," Brown displayed unusual courage, and surrendered only after having been overpowered by the militia and a company of United States marines under the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee.

Brown's followers, white and black, were drawn entirely from the North, and among the papers discovered on his person or in the house in Maryland which he had occupied for several months, were documents which, in the opinion of many Southern and not a few Northern people, implicated some of the abolition leaders. No less significant was the fact that, in addition to revolvers, rifles, and other weapons found in possession of the insurgents (as Brown's men were called), were a large number of pikes which are said to have been manufactured at the North. These spears were about ten inches in length, shaped like a dagger, with both sides sharpened, and were attached to handles of white ash about six feet in length. Evidently intended for negroes unaccustomed to the use of fire-arms,

their existence indicated a plan of a wide-spread servile insurrection. These instruments of death caused a shudder to convulse the whole South. All the horrors that had overtaken the West Indies seemed to rise before the minds of the entire slave-holding population.

John Brown's raid also persuaded a large section of the South that the movement was inaugurated for the purpose of strengthening the abolition cause in the border States. It did more than this. Southerners, failing to distinguish between a handful of fanatics and a whole population, began to think that Brown's ideas were those of a great majority of the Northern people, particularly those whose political views were those of the new Republican party. "Disguise it as we may," said the *Petersburg Express,* in commenting on the Harper's Ferry tragedy, "large portions of the North are our enemies. More bitter, more deadly hostile than though hereditary enmity had pitched their opposing hosts on a hundred battle-fields. The spirit of the effort to wrest Kansas from slavery, made by the concert of a party which polled more than a million votes at the last Presidential election, is manifest enough from the dead and captured agents of the bloody design at Harper's Ferry. Had one of the men of the irrepressible conflict school occupied the Presidency in the past five days, who can tell the bloody news which would at this instant be ringing through the land?"

Brown had formulated his plans in Canada.

He and his admirers had, moreover, a printed constitution, together with a set of by-laws, for a provisional government of the United States. Also, from a so-called War Department at a point near Harper's Ferry, they had issued commissions, of which the following is a specimen:

"Whereas, W. H. Leeman has been nominated Captain of the army established under the Provisional Government, now, therefore, in pursuance of authority vested in me by the said constitution, I do hereby appoint and commission the said W. H. Leeman, Captain. Given at the office of the Secretary of War on the 15th day of October, 1859.

(Signed) "JOHN BROWN,
"*Commander in Chief.*"

This document was countersigned by a man styling himself "Secretary of War," and is interesting as a proof of Brown's attempt to organize a government hostile to the Union.

Brown and his surviving confederates were tried by the Virginian courts and promptly executed. To one section he was a dangerous anarchist, a red-handed murderer; to the other, a martyr who had yielded up his life on the altar of human liberty. Whether the result would have been the same had he, at that time, been tried for treason by the Federal authorities, may admit of some doubt; but, at all events, the tragedy left an ugly wound which was ready to gape at the first shock given the body politic. This occurred when the Republican party came into power at the election of 1860. To the rank and file of Northern people the victory of the

Republicans meant the denationalization of slavery; but to an augmenting number of Southerners it announced the repetition, on a more elaborate scale, of the strife in Kansas and the conspiracy that ripened at Harper's Ferry. Counsel was thrown to the winds, and those bent on secession proved stronger than State conventions.

Three names had now come to dominate American politics; three new men had taken the places formerly occupied by Webster, Clay, and Calhoun. These, of course, were Lincoln, Douglas, and Jefferson Davis. And around these three names may be gathered the theories and influences upon which the States were divided. Each was as distinct in the doctrine which he held as in personal characteristics and circumstances.

The antecedents of Lincoln were found in the despised "poor whites" of Kentucky. His father was dull, ignorant, and shiftless, but his mother (the natural offspring of a Southern planter) possessed unusual qualities of intellect. While he was yet a child the family of Lincoln moved to the sparsely settled and uncivilized West, where he was brought up in extreme poverty as well as in entire lack of educational advantages. When, on his nomination for the Presidency, a newspaper requested the facts of his life for a biographical article, Lincoln replied that it could all be summed up in one sentence found in Gray's Elegy,—"The short and simple annals of the poor." His mind was early attracted to national

politics. Though wanting in the training of the schools, the strength of his intellect compensated for his lack of educational advantages. Beyond all his contemporaries, Lincoln had the power of penetrating, to the utmost depths, the problems which engaged his earnest thought. It was this quality which rendered him the successful rival of the more brilliant Douglas.

The latter was of aristocratic origin. On his father's side he descended from the famous Scotch family of that name. His mother traced her ancestry to William Arnold, of Rhode Island, who assisted Roger Williams in founding that colony. Though poor like Lincoln, Douglas managed to acquire a fair amount of education. In 1834, when he was not yet twenty-one years of age, Douglas was admitted to the bar in the State of Illinois. In the same year, he made a speech at Jacksonville in favor of President Jackson's anti-Bank proposal. This, on account of its remarkable vigor and the speaker's lack of inches, gained for him the sobriquet of "The Little Giant." Immediately thereafter he conceived the plan of organizing the Democratic party in the State of Illinois, that certainty in its nominations might be assured. This was a new method in political campaigns, and it became popularly known as the "Douglas Machine." To the end of his life Douglas was the soul of this machine. It sent him to the Legislature in 1836, when he was but twenty-three years of age. In 1841 it enabled him to obtain the office of Secre-

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
From a photograph by Brady

tary of State of Illinois, and early in the same year the election, by the Legislature, to a judgeship in the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth. Gaining his seat in the House of Representatives in 1843 by the same influence, through it he remained, from that year to the end of his life, a member of the National Congress. Possessing a ready intellect and a flashing eloquence, Douglas's chief strength, aside from his power of political management, lay in those superficial qualities which have an immediate but not lasting effect in debate.

The Southern member of this triumvirate—Jefferson Davis—differed in every respect from the other two. He was saturated with the traditions of the South. After a course of training at Transylvania University, Lexington, Kentucky, he was sent to West Point, from which he was graduated in 1828 and was immediately assigned to duty in the regular army. During seven years of arduous service, chiefly on the frontier taking part in Indian wars, he distinguished himself by bravery and a devotion to duty. Resigning, in 1835, his commisssion as first lieutenant, he married the daughter of Zachary Taylor and settled down to the life of a prosperous cotton planter in Mississippi. It is interesting to remark that it is claimed that during the Black Hawk War of 1831–32 he received the oath of allegiance from Abraham Lincoln, who had been appointed captain of a company of volunteers. Davis entered Con-

gress in 1845, in which year he took his seat as a member of the House of Representatives. This, however, he resigned in June of the following year, in order to become colonel of the First Mississippi Volunteers, which he led with brilliant success in the Mexican War. He was appointed by the governor of Mississippi to fill a vacancy in the United States Senate in 1847, and in the following year the Legislature of his State unanimously elected him to the Senatorial office. Davis's quality of mind was intensely logical. He saw clearly, but not deeply. He based his political opinions on the strict letter of the Constitution, to which he held with absolute tenacity. No changing social conditions or developments of the country were allowed by him to justify deviation from the interpretation which had been given to that document by the Fathers. Thus he was peculiarly adapted to succeed Calhoun as the leader of the Southern section.

In the Presidential campaign of 1860 these three strong men—Lincoln, Douglas, and Davis—were pitted against each other in a three-cornered fight. The preponderance of power was clearly with Lincoln, owing to the division in the Democratic party.

When at the Republican State Convention, which met at Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858, Lincoln quoted the Scriptural aphorism which he adopted as his political watchword,—"A house divided against itself cannot stand,"—he uttered

a prophecy which applied equally to the heretofore dominating Democratic party and the sectionalized Union. The Democratic party had been wrenched asunder when Douglas opposed the Lecompton policy of the Buchanan administration. His motive for this action has been questioned. Was it that he saw the impossibility of holding the allegiance of the Northern Democracy and at the same time opposing the sentiment prevailing in that section against the proslavery Kansas scheme; or did he deliberately endanger his Presidential prospects for the sake of his conscientious convictions? Notwithstanding the blame attaching to him in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, we are inclined to hold the latter as the correct view.

Political affairs had now reached such a pass in the North that Lincoln's Springfield doctrine was the only possible solution of the difficulty. With his natural perspicacity, he saw what must come to pass, and said, on his nomination to the United States Senate, at the Republican State Convention at Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858:

"If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it. We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object, and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved,—I do not expect

the house to fall,—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South."

When, before its delivery, he read over this speech to his friends, one said, "It is a damned-fool utterance." The speech was condemned by all, with the exception of Herndon, who said, "Lincoln, deliver that speech as read, and it will make you President." To one and all it is reported that he replied, "This thing has been retarded long enough. The time has come when these sentiments should be uttered; and if it is decreed that I should go down because of this speech, then let me go down linked to the truth —let me die in the advocacy of what is just and right."

Pity it is to spoil a climax, but Lincoln never made such a response, though, with his political astuteness, which excelled that of most men, we can well believe that he expressed the thoughts to which admiring biographers have given an elegance of diction unwonted to Lincoln's off-hand utterance.

However, it was with these or approximate sentiments, chosen not from moral but expedient reasons, that Lincoln started on his Senatorial campaign and the ever-memorable joint debate with Douglas, his political opponent. His

friends believed that he would win. Lincoln thought otherwise; but he sapiently declared that he would prevent Douglas's success in the next Presidential campaign. In this he succeeded; for Douglas found it impossible to make his Popular Sovereignty doctrine agree with his acceptance of the Dred Scott dictum, and was compelled to place himself on record in a manner which was hardly satisfactory to the North and repugnant to the South.

The poor whites of North Carolina produced Hinton Rowan Helper, who in 1857 wrote "The Impending Crisis of the South: How to meet It." It is safe to say that, with the exception of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," no abolition work created a greater effect in the North or aroused more animosity among the slave-holders. Its purpose was to show that the influence of slavery was fatal to the interests of the immense majority in the South. Helper brought forward a mass of data of which the majority of the items, when viewed individually, are accurate enough, but the uses made of the facts were such as to deprive them of a large part of their value as evidence. The spirit of the book, which had an enormous circulation for its period, is well shown by the following quotation (page 361, fiftieth thousand, 1860):

"Now, so long as slave-holders are clothed with the mantle of office, so long will they continue to make laws, like the above, expressly calculated to bring the non-slave-holding whites under a system of vassalage little less oner-

ous and debasing than that to which the negroes themselves are accustomed. What wonder is it that there is no native literature in the South? The South can never have a literature of her own until after slavery shall have been abolished. Slave-holders are too lazy and ignorant to write it, and the non-slave-holders—even the few whose minds are cultivated at all—are not permitted even to make the attempt. Down with the oligarchy! Ineligibility of slave-holders—never another vote to the trafficker in human flesh!"

How far "The Impending Crisis" accorded with the views of the non-slave-holding people of the Southern community it is difficult to determine; for these were not in a position, nor was it to their interest, to make known their wishes if these were antagonistic to those of the slave-holders. The ignorant class of Southern whites (except in the mountain sections) was as completely dominated by the slave-holders as were the blacks. There was also in the slave-holding States a strong element which was not greatly concerned regarding the protection of the peculiar Southern institution. The census of 1850 showed that of the Southern population of about 8,000,000 whites only 325,000 were owners of slaves. What were the exact sentiments of the immense preponderance of the people regarding slavery it is impossible to determine. The press of the South was subservient to the slave-holders. That the non-slave-holders were not antagonistic to the institution is certainly true; nevertheless, that they were actively sympathetic is not so demonstrable.

When, however, John Brown and his follow-


THE UNITED STATES
IN 1860.
Union States
Territories
Seceding States
BRITISH POSSESSIONS
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
REPUBLIC OF MEXICO
GULF OF CALIFORNIA
WASHINGTON TERRITORY
NEBRASKA TERRITORY
DAKOTA TERRITORY
MINNESOTA TY.
OREGON
CALIFORNIA
NEVADA TY.
TERRITORY OF UTAH
COLORADO TERRITORY
KANSAS TERRITORY
TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO
TEXAS
UNORG.
SO CALLED INDIAN TERRITORY
ARKANSAS
MISSOURI
IOWA
WISCONSIN
MICHIGAN
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
OHIO
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
FLORIDA
SOUTH CAROLINA
NORTH CAROLINA
VIRGINIA
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW YORK
VERMONT
N. HAMPSHIRE
MAINE
MASS.
CONN.
DEL.
MARYLAND
WASHINGTON
Olympia
Columbia
Salem
Sacramento
San Francisco
Salt Lake City
Denver
Santa Fe
Austin
San Antonio
Galveston
Jackson
Baton Rouge
New Orleans
Little Rock
Jefferson City
St. Louis
Springfield
Madison
Chicago
Lansing
Detroit
Cleveland
Columbus
Indianapolis
Cincinnati
Frankfort
Louisville
Nashville
Montgomery
Atlanta
Tallahassee
St. Augustine
Savannah
Charleston
Columbia
Raleigh
Richmond
Annapolis
Dover
Harrisburg
Pittsburg
Trenton
Philadelphia
New York
Hartford
Boston
Providence
Concord
Montpelier
Augusta
Montreal
Ottawa
Toronto
Buffalo
Quebec
St. Lawrence
Red River of the North
Assiniboine
Missouri
Platte
Republican
Arkansas
Red
Brazos
Rio Grande
Colorado
Gila
Pecos
Ohio
Tennessee
Savannah
Lake Superior
Lake Michigan
L. Huron
L. Erie
L. Ont.
120°
110°
100°
90°
80°
70°
40°
30°

ers attempted to incite an insurrection of the slaves in Virginia, which, had it been successful, might have resulted in the indiscriminate murder, outrage, and robbery of many of the Southern whites, all classes were united in a common fear. The possibilities of servile insurrection were, naturally, magnified, and the South was united in a unanimous and bitter hatred of the North, of which section Brown was regarded as the recognized emissary.

The exploit of this fanatical abolitionist, had not the Civil War followed, resulting in the biassing of Northern opinion, could never have been regarded by historians as other than a vicious atrocity; and men like Gerrit Smith and Theodore Parker, who abetted his crime by financial aid and sympathy, could have been considered only as abominable conspirators. Professor Burgess is correct in his estimation of the importance and bearing of this event, when he says ("The Civil War," vol. i. p. 43):

"From the Harper's Ferry outrage onward the conviction grew among all classes that the white men of the South must stand together, and must harmonize all internal differences in the presence of the mortal peril with which, as a race, they believed themselves threatened. Sound development in thought and feeling was arrested. The follies and the hatreds, born of fear and resentment, now assumed the places of common sense and common kindliness. And war and bloodshed became a necessity for the relief of burning hearts. The South believed that the Harper's Ferry outrage was perpetrated with the connivance of the leaders, and was commended by the rank and file, of the Republican party."

In this view even Mr. Douglas might have concurred, for he had said (January 23, 1860):

"Without stopping to adduce evidence in detail, I have no hesitation in expressing my firm and deliberate conviction that the Harper's Ferry crime was the matured, logical, inevitable result of the doctrines and the teachings of the Republican party, explained and enforced in their platform, their partisan presses, their pamphlets and books, and especially of their leaders in and out of Congress. . . . The great principle that underlies the organization of the Republican party is violent, irreconcilable, eternal warfare upon the institution of American slavery, with a view to its ultimate extinction throughout the land. Sectional war is to be waged until the cotton-fields of the South shall be cultivated by free labor, or the rye-fields of New York and Massachusetts shall be cultivated by slave labor."

That Northern men were able to look with equanimity on the possibility of a servile uprising and its horrible accompaniments, is seen from the words of Mr. Giddings, member from Ohio, who, during the Thirty-third Congress, is reported to have spoken as follows:

"When the contest shall come; when the thunder shall roll, and the lightning flash; when the slaves shall rise in the South; when, in emulation of the Cuban bondmen, the Southern slaves shall feel that they are men; when they shall feel the stirring emotions of immortality, and shall recognize the stirring truth that they are men, and entitled to the rights that God has bestowed upon them; when the slaves shall feel that, and when masters shall turn pale and tremble, when their dwellings shall smoke, and dismay shall sit on each countenance, then, sir, I do not say, we shall laugh at your calamity and mock when your fear cometh; but I do say, that when that time shall come, the lovers of our race will stand forth and exert the legitimate powers of this government for freedom. We shall then have con-

stitutional power to act for the good of our country, and do justice to the slave. Then will we strike off the shackles from the limbs of the slave. Then will be a period when this government will have power to act between slavery and freedom, and when it can make peace by giving freedom to the slaves. And let me tell you, Mr. Speaker, that time hastens. It is rolling forward. The President is exerting a power that will hasten it, though not intended by him. I hail it as I do the dawn of that political and moral milennium, which I am well assured will come on the earth."

During the closing days of 1859 Ex-President Tyler wrote, though with gross exaggeration:

"Virginia is arming to the teeth; more than fifty thousand stand of arms already distributed, and the demand for more daily increases. Party is silent and has no voice. But one sentiment pervades the country,—security *in the Union,* or separation. An indiscreet move in any direction may produce results deeply to be deplored. I fear the debates in Congress, and above all, the Speaker's election. If excitement prevails in Congress, it will add fuel to the flame which already burns so terrifically."

On December 5, 1859, the Thirty-sixth Congress—assembled. In the Senate there were thirty-eight Democrats, twenty-five Republicans, and two Know-Nothings. In the House there were one hundred and nine Republicans, eighty-eight Administration Democrats, thirteen Anti-Lecompton Democrats, and twenty-seven Know-Nothings; the last, with the exception of four, from the South. No party having a majority, it was inevitable that the election of a Speaker would mean a bitter contest. It was precipitated by Mr. Clark, of Missouri, who offered a resolution that no Representative who had endorsed

Helper's "Impending Crisis" was fit to be the Speaker of the House. The contest was almost as prolonged as the one which ended in the election of Mr. Banks; but unlike the preceding, this struggle was characterized by the most intense passion. The members all carried deadly weapons, and on more than one occasion it seemed that the wrangles which occurred on the floor of the House would end in bloodshed. "I believe," wrote Senator Hammond, "every man in both Houses is armed with a revolver—some with two—and a bowie knife." This was typical of the feeling which prevailed throughout the country. In the South the large slave-holders had a black-list on which were the names of Northern merchants known to be antagonistic. These were boycotted. On the other hand, every effort was made to prevent those Northerners who were likely to winter in the South from doing so; they were urged to go to the West Indies or to Europe.

Jefferson Davis, the fully recognized leader of the Southern party, uttered his ultimatum before the Senate. It was to the effect that the Union would be dissolved in event of the election of a radical Republican. Moreover, he introduced, on the 2d of February, 1860, a series of resolutions which clearly defined the Southern position. The most important of these resolutions were the following:

"*Resolved,* That the unity of these States rests on the equality of rights and privileges among its members, and

JEFFERSON DAVIS

that it is especially the duty of the Senate, which represents the States in their sovereign capacity, to resist all attempts to discriminate, either in relation to person or property, so as, in the Territories—which are the common possession of the United States—to give advantages to the citizens of one State which are not equally secured to those of every other State."

"*Resolved,* That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, whether by direct legislation or legislation of an indirect and unfriendly nature, possesses the power to annul or impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave property into the common Territories; but it is the duty of the Federal government there to afford for that, as for other species of property, the needful protection; and if experience should at any time prove that the judiciary does not possess power to insure adequate protection, *it will then become the duty of Congress to supply such deficiency.*"

"*Resolved,* That the inhabitants of an organized Territory of the United States, when they rightfully form a constitution to be admitted as a State into the Union, may then, for the first time, like the people of a State when forming a new constitution, decide for themselves whether slavery, as a domestic institution, shall be sustained or prohibited within their jurisdiction; and if Congress shall admit them as a State they shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission."

These resolutions contained the doctrine of Davis; to it Douglas was unalterably opposed. He held that Congress had no right to prohibit slavery in the Territories, and at the same time it was not obliged to protect it. In this view, he placed himself in opposition to the South and also to the Republicans of the North. But he was the mouth-piece of the Northern Democracy. Lincoln, on the other hand, held that Congress

had the power to prohibit slavery in the Territories, and that this had always been the interpretation given to the Constitution by the great statesmen, and that consequently the Republican party was not revolutionary, but rather in the way of being conservative. These were the opposing views of the three great leaders in the Presidential contest which was imminent.

The Democratic Convention met at Charleston, South Carolina, April 23, 1860. The Douglas men were in the majority; but their opponents, owing to the fact that California and Oregon seemed to be leagued with the slave States, held the majority in the committees. Consequently, the reported resolutions of the committee on the platform declared that the Territorial Legislature has no power to abolish slavery in a Territory, to prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, or to destroy the right of property in slaves whatever; and that it is the duty of the Federal government to protect, when necessary, slavery in the Territories. Henry B. Payne, of Ohio, submitted a minority report. In his address defending it, he said:

"The Northern mind is thoroughly imbued with the principle of popular sovereignty. We ask nothing for the people of the Territories but what the Constitution allows them, for we say we abide by the decision of the courts, who are the final interpreters of the Constitution."

In an eloquent speech, Mr. Yancey, of Alabama, replied:

"The proposition you make will bankrupt us of the South. Ours is the property invaded, ours the interest at stake. The honor of our children, the honor of our females, the lives of our men, all rest upon you. You would make a great seething cauldron of passion and crime if you were able to consummate your measures. . . . I say it in no disrespect, but it is a logical argument that your admission that slavery is wrong has been the cause of all this discord."

The Douglas platform was adopted, with the result that Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas withdrew from the convention. Those who remained failed to nominate, and on the tenth day the convention adjourned to meet at Baltimore on the 18th of June. The seceders formed themselves into a separate convention, adopted a platform consistent with their own views, and passed a resolution to meet at Richmond on the second Monday in June.

Stevens saw clearly to what end all this was tending. To Johnston he said, "Men will be cutting one another's throats in a little while. In less than twelve months we shall be in a war, and that the bloodiest in history."

"Why must we have civil war, even if the Republican candidate should be elected?" Johnston asked. "Because," replied Stevens, "there are not virtue and patriotism and sense enough left in the country to avoid it."

The Republican Convention met at Chicago on the 16th of May, 1860. Though called a national convention, it was far from being such;

no delegates from the slave States were present, except those from what were known as "Border States." This Convention resolved:

"That the new dogma that the Constitution, of its own force, carries slavery into any or all of the Territories of the United States is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instrument itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and with legislative and judicial precedent; is revolutionary in its tendency and subversive of the peace and harmony of the country; that the normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom."

A protective tariff plank was inserted in the platform for the purpose of securing the adherence of Pennsylvania. This was purely a politic measure, the wisdom of which was proved by its success.

Seward was the logical but not the available candidate for nomination. His radical anti-slavery utterances were too fresh in the memory of the people. It was agreed that, because of them, he could carry neither Pennsylvania nor Indiana. This is an important indication of the disinclination of the majority of people in the North, at that time, to the principles of abolition.

Illinois had a candidate. He was not pressed in opposition to Seward, but rather as an alternative. Lincoln owed his nomination to the astuteness of his political managers, and also very largely to the fact that the Convention was meeting on his home ground. He did not come forth at the call of the nation; for, though his debate

with Douglas had given him some fame, he was practically unknown outside of Illinois.

It is possible, indeed probable, that had the Convention been held in any other State than Illinois, Lincoln would not have been nominated. The opinion of judicious contemporaries—and it has been supported by careful historians—is that he very largely owed his success to the fact that his fellow-statesmen outshouted the Seward faction.

Weed told the story of how, years afterwards, he and Seward were riding by the statue of Lincoln, in Union Square, and Seward said, "Weed, if you had been faithful to me, I should have been there instead of Lincoln." "Seward," replied Weed, "is it not better to be alive in a carriage with me than to be dead and set up in bronze?" But had it been as he wished it is doubtful if Seward, notwithstanding his professed adherence to a "Higher Law," could have won the confidence which the people learned to place in "Honest Abe." The man who so eagerly sought the honor of the Presidency was not the man whom the times and the crisis demanded.

Greeley also, though as editor of the *Tribune* he exerted an influence far greater than that of the chief magistrate, was far from being unmoved by ambitions for office. When Raymond was elected lieutenant-governor he was not able to hide his disappointment that the office had not fallen to himself. In his attitude towards the causes which brought on the war, Greeley was

often paradoxical. This arose from his dual disposition. Holding the highest theories, he had an eager desire for the loaves and fishes of politics.

Lincoln was nominated on the third ballot, thanks to the efforts of Greeley, who, while he did not support the successful candidate, secured the defeat of Seward, whom he sacrificed for the good of the party. The nomination was received with a shock of surprise by the country. "Who is this huckster in politics? Who is this county court advocate?" ungraciously asked Wendell Phillips.

Douglas was nominated by a strictly Northern Democratic vote, at Baltimore, on the 18th of June. The Democratic seceders, on the 28th, organized a convention consisting of delegates from twenty-one Commonwealths, and nominated John C. Breckenridge, of Kentucky, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon. Thus, for the first time, the election of a United States President was fought out on strictly geographical lines.

In the result Lincoln received 180 of the electoral votes; Breckenridge, 72; Bell, 39; and Douglas, 12. But the popular vote is far more worthy of attention, as it more closely indicates the position in which the people stood. Lincoln received 1,866,352, all from the free States with the exception of 26,430. Douglas received 1,375,157 (free States, 1,211,632; slave States, 163,525); Breckenridge, 571,871 slave, 277,082 free; Bell, 515,973 slave, 74,678 free. It will

be seen from this that the Republicans polled only about two-fifths of the popular vote; and the Southern Democracy did not carry the South. There the Union candidates received together 679,498 votes against 571,871 for the secession candidate. Thus the Republican party was not supported by the will of the people; and the disunion element had not a majority in the South. Consequently, it would seem as if, with the exercise of wisdom and patience, the country might yet have been saved without the horrors of a civil war.

But the preponderating inclination among the leaders, North and South, was against the exercise of that patience. Douglas declared at Baltimore, on September 6:

"In my opinion there is a mature plan through the Southern States to break up the Union. I believe the election of a Black Republican is to be the signal for that attempt, and that the leaders of the scheme desire the election of Lincoln so as to have an excuse for disunion."

Immediately after the election the truth of this assertion seemed to be demonstrated. South Carolina did not hesitate in her action. Secession was declared by the leaders and welcomed by the people. Wrongly, they judged the Republican party to be controlled by abolition sentiment, and Lincoln to be bent on emancipation. They believed ruin was all they could expect from the Union, for they were certain that the destruction of their prosperity, and, indeed, their economic life, would follow the freeing of their

slaves. The South Carolinians sincerely believed that they were subject to grievances which were irremediable in the Union. Therefore, on the 20th of December, in convention assembled, they solemnly declared:

"That the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America is dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State, with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do."

Among the reasons adduced for this action is found the following:

"Observing the *forms* of the Constitution, a sectional party has found within that article establishing the Executive Department the means of subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be intrusted with the administration of the common government, because he has declared that that 'Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free,' and that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction. . . .

"On the fourth of March next this party will take possession of the government. It has announced that the South shall be excluded from the common territory, that the judicial tribunal shall be made sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States.

"The guarantees of the Constitution will then no longer exist; the equal rights of the States will be lost. The slaveholding States will no longer have the power of self-government or self-protection, and the Federal government will have become their enemy."

Three commissioners—R. W. Barnwell, J. H. Adams, and James L. Orr—were appointed to treat with the government of the United States, and negotiate the withdrawal of the Federal troops then in the State, and the terms on which the forts, arsenals, etc., situated therein, might be handed over to South Carolina. The informal negotiations which occurred between them and the Secretary of State,—for they were not officially received at Washington,—and the promises they were cajoled with, on no authority, only served to furnish the somewhat unstable foundations on which certain historians afterwards rested the allegation that from the beginning of the active secession movement the South was treacherously dealt with by the Federal authorities.

VII

THE FIRST BLOWS

THE fact that James Buchanan was President of the United States in 1860 and during the first months of 1861 was unfortunate for both the South and the North. Buchanan was not able to master circumstances. He failed, not through inability to grasp the full meaning of the situation, but because he brought a vacillating mind to a problem which imperatively demanded firmness and decision. Consequently, Buchanan has been blamed by both sides. He was loyal to the Union, but did not protect it. He loved the South and sympathized with the motives which prompted secession, but dared not pronounce upon the withdrawing States a parting benediction.

In his message of December, 1860, he said that "the long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern people with the question of slavery in the Southern States has at last produced its natural effect." He asserted that those States were suffering under such grievances that, "after having used all peaceful and constitutional means to obtain redress, [they would] be justified in revolutionary resistance to the government of the Union." He declared further that after considerable reflection he had come to "the

conclusion that no power has been delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the Federal government, to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, from the Union." Nevertheless, he denied the right to secede.

The message was, despite this last statement, bitterly assailed at the North, where it was regarded as weak, vacillating, incendiary, and as furnishing the secessionists with potent arguments to support their claims. The North held that Congress had the same power to enforce a law in South Carolina that it had to enforce in Massachusetts the Fugitive Slave Law. In speaking of Buchanan, the *Boston Herald,* on March 4, 1861, declared, "he will stand out in the future as a monument of all that is hideous and deformed." Seward fairly characterized Buchanan's attitude when he said that the message "shows conclusively that it is the duty of the President to execute the laws—unless somebody opposes him; and that no State has a right to go out of the Union—unless it wants to."

Buchanan, however, had good authority for his doctrine of non-coercion. The forcing of recalcitrant States by the Federal government is a measure to which the fathers of the Constitution clearly expressed themselves as being opposed. Alexander Hamilton, for example, said:

"It has been observed, to coerce the States is one of the saddest projects that was ever devised. A failure of com-

pliance will never be confined to a single State; this being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war? Suppose Massachusetts, or any larger State, should refuse, and Congress should attempt to compel them, would they not have influence to procure assistance, especially from those States that are in the same situation as themselves? What a picture does this idea present to our view! A complying State at war with a non-complying State; Congress marching the troops of one State into the bosom of another; the State collecting auxiliaries, and forming, perhaps, a majority against its Federal head. Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any reasonable man be well disposed towards a government which makes war and carnage the only means of supporting itself?"

On the same subject, George Mason, of Virginia, said:

"The most jarring elements of nature, sin and malice, are not more incompatible than such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution. Will the militia march from one State into another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the citizens of the invaded States assist one another till they rise and shake off the Union altogether?"

A very large contingent in the North agreed with the President in his belief that the Federal government did not possess the right to force unwilling States to remain in the Union. The most astonishing feature of the history of this period — that immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities—is the slight and insignificant amount of war-talk that was in the air. The idea of peaceable secession prevailed. In the *New York Tribune* of November 9, 1860, so

thorough a Northerner as Horace Greeley said:

"We hold, with Jefferson, to the inalienable right of communities to alter or abolish forms of government that have become oppressive or injurious; and, if the cotton States shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede may be a revolutionary right, but it exists, nevertheless; and we do not see how one party can have a right to do what another has a right to prevent. We must ever resist the asserted right of any State to remain in the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof; to withdraw from the Union is quite another matter. And, whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep her in. We hope never to live in a Republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets."

Northern historians have written of this expression of Greeley's as though it were made in a moment of temporary aberration. On the other hand, there is ample evidence to prove that a large section of Northern opinion was in strict accord with that expressed by the *Tribune*. Not only was there a dread of civil war and a belief in the wrongfulness of violent measures, but there was a strong sense that constitutional sanctions had been overridden by the North in respect to the rights of the South. Note, for instance, this opinion of the *Albany Argus:*

"We sympathize with and justify the South so far as this: their rights have been invaded to the extreme limit possible within the forms of the Constitution; and, beyond this limit, their feelings have been insulted and their interests and honor assailed by almost every possible form of denunciation and invective; and, if we deemed certain

that the real animus of the Republican party could be carried into the administration of the Federal government, and become the permanent policy of the nation, we should think that all the instincts of self-preservation and of manhood rightfully impelled them to a resort to revolution and a separation from the Union, and we should applaud them and wish them Godspeed in the adoption of such a remedy."

In February, 1861, the *Detroit Free Press* said, editorially:

"If there shall not be a change in the present seeming purpose to yield to no accommodation of the national difficulties, and if troops shall be raised in the North to march against the people of the South, a fire in the rear will be opened upon such troops, which will either stop their march altogether or wonderfully accelerate it."

These utterances represent the conservative—by far the prevailing—thought of the North, as expressed by both Republicans and Democrats during the first months of secession. How stood the abolitionists,—the men who for many years had been active in stirring up anger and bitterness against the South? Were they ready to fight the South in order to preserve the Union intact? Nay; the Union in their estimation was nothing; their whole purpose was confined to the freeing of the government to which they were bound from the disgrace of human slavery. They were not patriots. Hear William Lloyd Garrison:

"At last the covenant with death is annulled and the agreement with hell broken, by the action of South Carolina herself, and ere long by all the slave-holding States, for their doom is won. . . . Justice and liberty, God and

man, demand the dissolution of this slave-holding Union, and the formation of a Northern confederacy, in which slave-holders will stand before the law as felons and be treated as pirates. . . . Up, then! Up with the flag of disunion! That we may have a free and glorious union of our own! How stands Massachusetts at this hour in reference to the Union? Just where she ought to be, in an attitude of open hostility."

Wendell Phillips was, if possible, still more enthusiastically gleeful over the prospect of cutting loose from the slave-power.

"We are," said he, "disunionists, not from any love of separate confederacies, or as ignorant of the thousand evils that spring from neighboring and quarrelsome States; but we would get rid of this Union to get rid of slavery. . . . All hail, disunion! Sacrifice everything for the Union? God forbid! Sacrifice everything to keep South Carolina in it? Rather build a bridge of gold, and pay her toll over it. Let her march off with banners and trumpets, and we will speed the parting guest. Let her not stand upon the order of her going, but go at once. Give her the forts and arsenals and sub-treasuries, and lend her jewels of silver and gold, and Egypt will rejoice that she has departed."

It will thus be seen that the attitude of the abolitionists, as expressed by their greatest leaders, was just as inimical to the integrity of the nation as was that of the most rabid secessionists of the South. And when later the sword was drawn for the purpose of preserving the Union intact, the abolitionists regarded it as a fight in which their conscience called upon them to take no part. The Hon. Sherrard Clemens, of Virginia, speaking in the House of Representatives,

January 22, 1861, fairly characterized the position of the abolitionists.

"We have, then," he said, "before us, these knights of a new crusade. The Constitution of the United States is the sanctified Jerusalem, against which their deluded cohorts are arrayed. They contend the only mode to overthrow slavery is to overthrow the Constitution. They refuse to take office under it, because it recognizes slavery. They will not take an oath to support it, because it protects slavery. They claim their allegiance is due to the State, and to the State alone. They are State rights men of the straitest sect; and they wield the legislative power of the State for the extinction of slavery, as South Carolina professes to wield hers for the perpetuation of slavery."

In view of all this anticoercive feeling existent in the various parties of the North, representing as it did the opinion of the majority of the people, it is not a matter of wonder that President Buchanan was hesitant in his policy. The question has frequently been asked: Why did not he follow the example of Andrew Jackson during the Nullification trouble, and prepare himself to strongly enforce the observance of the laws. But the situations were not similar. In 1830 South Carolina did not secede; she determined while remaining in the Union to repudiate its enactments. Moreover, at that time she stood alone in her attitude towards the Federal government. In 1860, however, South Carolina was, according to her own belief, a separate and independent power to which the laws of the United States were totally foreign. The South upheld her in this belief, and almost every Southern State was

prepared to take the same stand, or, at least, looked with extreme jealousy on every Northern contradiction of the right to secede. Moreover, as we have seen, a considerable proportion of Northern sentiment upheld the President in his opinion that he had no right to use coercion. Consequently, had Andrew Jackson been in James Buchanan's place, although it is very certain that he would have adopted measures entirely different from those employed by the latter, it cannot justly be argued that the course he took in 1830 would have been followed in 1860.

Public opinion at the South at this time might be conveniently arranged into four classes. Under the first came the radical section of Southern men,—mainly Senators and Congressmen, who were clamoring for secession,—and a small but active and influential group that found its counterpart in the extreme wing of the abolitionists of the North. Indeed, they were in accord regarding the impossibility of union. In this first group of Southern leaders were men like Yancey and Fitzpatrick, of Alabama; Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi; Robert Toombs, of Georgia; James Chestnut, of South Carolina; R. B. Rhett, of the same State; Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, and John Slidell, his colleague in the United States Senate, together with Wise, Mason, and Hunter, of Virginia, and Wigfall, of Texas. These leaders wished, because of their theories in respect to State rights, that each State should

act independently in withdrawing from the Union; but they asserted that after having resumed its sovereignty a State could enter any confederacy it pleased.

The second and larger group of Southern men represented those who were every whit as much devoted to Southern interests, but were opposed to hasty, separate-State action. They desired time both for reflection and to test the justice of Lincoln's administration; to gain this breathing-space, they favored a co-operation of the Southern States,—a general convention which was to set forth their claims and present them to the government at Washington. These men, whose most conspicuous leader was Alexander H. Stephens, were derisively called submissionists by their opponents. They numbered in their ranks some of the ablest and wealthiest men of the South. Indeed, they were often charged with being conservative because of their riches.

The Union men represented the third and smallest section of Southern opinion. Some of these were Federal office-holders who wished to retain their posts; but others — comparatively few—were descendants of the old Federal and Whig families,—men noted for their possessions and intellectual attainments. If in the Federal army or navy, they often remained in the service. But the majority of out-and-out Union men were included in the ranks of the poor, ignorant whites of the mountain region of the South.

ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS
From a photograph by Brady

Finally, we have the fourth class of Southern men at the outbreak of the war,—the large and important element found everywhere,—men who let others think for them and are ready to be blown in any direction. In the ranks of these were to be found the tradesmen, the small farmers, and the artisans.

How to form these four classes of men into one united whole rallying around the standard of "Southern Rights" was the problem of the out-and-out secessionists. The first step of the secession advocates was to hold a meeting in Washington while the Committee of Thirty-Three, appointed by Congress, was discussing plans for peaceably settling the issue raised by the triumph of the Republican party. This meeting took place on the evening of December 14, 1860, and was called by Reuben Davis, of Mississippi, a Representative in the Lower House. It was attended by about thirty Congressmen, all of whom were from the far South. Among the States represented were Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, and South Carolina. Those present at the meeting, which was held in the rooms of Reuben Davis, included A. G. Brown and Jefferson Davis, Senators from Mississippi; John Slidell and Judah P. Benjamin, Senators from Louisiana; Wigfall, Hemphill, and other active secessionists.

The result of this gathering was the immediate issue of a "Southern manifesto" (Decem-

ber 14, 1860), signed by all present, and telegraphed to their constituents.

"The argument is exhausted," said the document. "All hope of relief in the Union through the agency of committees, Congressional legislation, or constitutional amendments, is extinguished, and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances or the pretence of new guarantees. In our judgment the Republicans are resolute in the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy the South. We are satisfied the honor, safety, and independence of Southern people require the organization of a Southern Confederacy—a result to be obtained only by separate State secession; that the primary object of each slave-holding State ought to be its speedy and absolute separation from a union with hostile States."

This Washington meeting outlined the programme of the chiefs of the secession movement. The proceedings indicated, moreover, that South Carolina would secede within a few days, and that her example would be quickly followed by the lower South. In each case there was to be a convention, a debate, and then an ordinance of secession; but, as already observed, the separatists more than once encountered such opposition in the convention that they were forced to resort to a *coup de guerre* in order to carry their States with them.

There is no evidence of any such strong and determining sympathy on the part of the people towards secession as some writers have claimed. It was far from being a popular uprising. The secessionist movement, while it was not of the nature of a plot,—for there was little of secrecy about its development,—was fostered in Wash-

ington, and presented to the Southern people by their leaders. In the conventions, therefore, it was not so much the will of the people that was executed as the determination of the politicians.

The first chapter in the history of secession was to be written by South Carolina, and she prepared for the work by electing an unusually strong man as her governor,—F. W. Pickens, who had been minister to Russia under the Buchanan administration. Pickens was a firm believer in Southern rights, which he believed to include the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, the repeal of the antislavery enactments for the District of Columbia, the protection of Southerners travelling or sojourning at the North in the enjoyment of their property in slaves, and the full and equal protection of slave property in all the Territories of the Union. Among the various declarations of the new governor's inaugural address was one to the effect that the Northern people "propose to inaugurate a chief magistrate at the head of the army and navy, with vast powers, not to preside over the common interests and destinies of all the States alike, but upon issues of malignant hostility and uncompromising war to be waged upon the rights, the interests, and the peace of half the States of this Union."

The influence of South Carolina's ordinance of secession was immediate. Salutes were fired at Mobile, Pensacola, New Orleans, Norfolk, and

other points. Palmetto cockades and flags were displayed. Speeches sustaining the action of South Carolina were everywhere heard. The enthusiasm thus kindled swept over the South. The question of the hour was what was to be the action of the President and the Federal government.

Buchanan evaded the issue. The sole determination to which he adhered with any degree of firmness was to close his administration without taking any step towards a solution of the trouble. But South Carolina was determined to press the question. She had at her hand an opportunity in the Federal forts within her boundaries. The State of South Carolina asserted its right to control these forts, but Federal forces, disregarding the claims of the secessionists, still held them. The state of affairs was intolerable to the South Carolinians, and the question as to Federal action was a momentous one.

There were two courses open to the President. He might protect the property of the Federal government by sending reinforcements, as he had been warned was necessary by both Major Anderson and General Scott; or he might evacuate the forts, as Davis, Secretary of War Floyd, and other men of the South wished him to do in the hope that such a procedure would result in the greater likelihood of arriving at a peaceable understanding.

The latter course, dishonorable as it would have been, viewed from the stand-point of the

North, would have been less weak than the drifting policy which characterized the last months of the administration of President Buchanan. On December 8, 1860, he seems to have come to a tacit understanding with South Carolina to the effect that the forts would not be attacked, provided that the military status should "remain as at present." But shortly after this Assistant Adjutant-General Buell was sent to Charleston with verbal instructions to Major Anderson:

"You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in the harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act."

Buchanan, though he had not seen these instructions when they were sent by the Secretary of War, afterwards acceded to them.

On the evening of December 26 Anderson, believing that an attack on Fort Moultrie (which he was then occupying) might be expected at any time, and in view also, of its untenable condition, spiked the cannon and burned the gun-carriages of that fort, and moved his small force

to the new and unfinished Fort Sumter. This action the governor of South Carolina deemed to be a violation of the understanding which had existed between his commissioners and the President. Thereupon he ordered the State troops to take possession of Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney, and soon the flag of the State was raised above them.

Secretary of War Floyd, failing to have the action of Major Anderson condemned, resigned his office. He was glad of the opportunity to relinquish it with some pretension to honor, seeing that the President had asked for his resignation on account of malversation in respect to funds.

The resignation of Floyd seemed the signal for revolt. On January 5 a caucus of the Southern Senators was held, and it decided on the immediate secession of all the Southern States, the meeting of a convention at Montgomery, Alabama, not later than February 15, 1861, to organize the seceding States into a confederacy, and the continuance of the Southern Senators in office to obstruct action opposed to the plans of the caucus. A committee headed by Jefferson Davis was appointed " to carry out the objects of this meeting."

On the 9th of January, 1861, was struck the first blow of the Civil War. The forces of South Carolina fired upon and drove from Charleston harbor the steamship " Star of the West," which had been chartered, as secretly as possible, by

the Federal government and despatched with men and provisions for the relief of Major Anderson.

The "Star of the West" episode attracted little attention. It forced no effective action, for everything in the North waited for the advent of the new administration. Not so, however, in the South. There events moved with surprising rapidity. Mississippi seceded from the Union on the 9th of January, 1861. Two days later Florida and Alabama took the same course. On the 20th Georgia, though hesitating under the influence of the powerful arguments of Alexander H. Stephens, severed her connection with the North. Louisiana followed on the 26th, and Texas on the 1st of February. How thoroughly consistent were the Southern men with their State rights theory is notably illustrated in the case of Stephens. He urged, with all the power of logic and eloquence he possessed, against the necessity of secession. But when his State voted against him, as a loyal son he bowed to the decision and did his best to aid the cause of his section.

The Confederate Constitution contained the following article:

"Congress shall . . . have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of this confederacy."

When it is remembered that the principal industry of Virginia was the breeding of slaves for

the supply of the cotton States, it looks as if this was intended as a forcible argument to induce Virginia to cast in her lot with the Confederacy. It was not, however, until the 17th of April, 1861, after Lincoln's call for volunteers, that she determined so to do. Her mind was at first bent on conciliation. Her General Assembly invited the other States, slave-holding and free, to join with her in a conference looking towards the proposing of such concessions as might ward off hostilities. The invitation furthermore announced that the Crittenden Compromise would be, in the estimation of Virginia, a satisfactory basis for conciliation.

The Crittenden Compromise provided in its Article I. for prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30′ in all the territory now held or which may hereafter be held, and recognizing it as existing in all the territory south of that line, and for allowing any territory to come into the Union when it has a sufficient population for a member of Congress, according to the existing ratio of representation of the people of the United States, on an equal footing with the other States either with or without slavery, as the Constitution of such new State shall provide. In Article II. it declared that Congress shall have no power to abolish slavery in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress and within the limits of States that permit the holding of slaves. In Article III. it declared that Congress shall not have power to abolish slavery in the District of Co-

lumbia except on certain conditions. In Article IV. it declared that Congress shall not interdict the transportation of slaves from one State to another where the laws permit slavery. In Article V. it declared that the Fugitive Slave Law shall be modified in such a manner that, in case the owner meets with forcible obstruction from people to the recovery of his slave, the United States shall pay for such fugitive slave; it being provided that the county where this force, or intimidation, or rescue takes place, shall be liable for the amount paid, with authority to remunerate itself by a suit against the rescuers or wrong-doers.

The Peace Congress desired by Virginia assembled on the 4th of February, 1861; twenty-one Commonwealths — fourteen Northern and seven slave-holding States — were represented. In this Conference the six Confederate States did not, of course, take part. The Union men of the North were not hopeful of any salutary result from the Conference; indeed, it appears as if some were not even desirous of it. Senator Chandler, of Michigan, writing to the governor of his State, and forwarding the request of Massachusetts and New York that Michigan would send delegates, said:

"No Republican State should have sent delegates; but they are here, and cannot get away; Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in, and there is danger of Illinois; and now they beg us, for God's sake, to come to their rescue, and save the Republican party from rupture. I hope you will send *stiff-backed* men, or none. The whole thing

was gotten up against my judgment and advice, and will end in thin smoke. Still I hope, as a matter of courtesy to some of our erring brethren [the Northern men who were willing to compromise for the sake of peace], that you will send the delegates. Some of the manufacturing States think that a fight would be awful. Without a little blood-letting this Union will not, in my estimation, be worth a rush."

The advantage of the Republican party seems to have caused Chandler more concern than did the integrity of the Union. In this he was not alone.

Nothing resulted from the Peace Convention, and the Crittenden Compromise was defeated in Congress, the House vote being 113 to 80, and that of the Senate 20 to 19. But the peace-at-any-price party proposed a Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which read as follows:

"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State."

This was not satisfactory to the Border Commonwealths, and it received no attention from the seceded States.

In the mean time the day of Lincoln's inauguration (March 4, 1861) approached. On his journey from Springfield to Washington the President-elect made many speeches, none of which, because of his uncultured manner and off-hand mode of expression, tended to increase the

respect and confidence of the people. His declarations that "nobody was going to be hurt," and that "nothing was going wrong," were subjects for the caricaturists and created a painful impression upon the minds of serious men.

Inauguration day fell on a Monday. The morning broke clear and beautiful; a passing shower prevented the troubling presence of the dust clouds that are an accompaniment of early Spring in Washington. The public buildings, schools, and business houses were closed that all might make holiday, and sounds of martial music echoed throughout the city. National flags hung everywhere. As the hour drew near for administering the oath of office to the first Republican President that had ever occupied the White House, Pennsylvania Avenue was thronged as it had not been for many a year. The vast multitude moved towards Capitol Hill, where it occupied every vantage-point. Diplomats in a greater number than usual attended the exercises; distinguished men were more numerous than ordinarily, and all sections save the South were represented.

Lincoln's inaugural address indicated that he was not at this time fully decided as to what the situation demanded. His attitude towards slavery, however, was a positive one.

"I have no purpose," said he, "directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so."

There was also no uncertain sound in his expressed views on the subject of secession.

"I consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."

On the question of coercion, however, he was somewhat at sea:

"I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior locality shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist in the government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego, for the time, the uses of such offices. The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the na-

GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT
From a photograph by Brady

tional troubles and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections."

No one listened to Lincoln's address more attentively than President Buchanan and Chief Justice Taney. By the latter, who had sworn in Van Buren, Pierce, and Buchanan, Lincoln was inducted into office.

Lincoln soon assembled his Cabinet, which for the first time in American history met to discuss civil war. It was composed of William H. Seward, Secretary of State; Simon Cameron, shortly to be succeeded by Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War; Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Edward Bates, Attorney-General; Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy; and Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-General.

The Southern Confederacy raised its flag over Montgomery as its national capital and adopted a Constitution, much of which was borrowed, and of right, from the Federal Constitution. Special stress was laid upon the doctrine of State sovereignty, general taxation for the benefit of particular localities or industries was prohibited, internal improvements were to be at the expense of the sections profiting by them, and the question of slave-holding in any Territory that might apply for admission to the Confederacy was to be decided by the people of that Territory. Jefferson Davis was elected President; Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President; Robert Toombs, Secretary of State; Charles G. Memminger, Sec-

retary of the Treasury; John H. Reagan, Postmaster-General; Leroy P. Walker, Secretary of War; Stephen R. Mallory, Secretary of the Navy; and Judah P. Benjamin, Attorney-General. It was distinctly a far-South cabinet, and both South Carolina and Virginia were left out. Rhett, of South Carolina, whose ambition was to become President, never forgave Davis, whose election was due to a misunderstanding, the majority of the States favoring Robert Toombs, of Georgia, but giving their votes to Davis rather than to Howell Cobb, whose name was falsely represented to be the favorite of the Georgia delegation by the managers of the Davis interests. It may also be said, on the authority of Alexander H. Stephens, that Davis did not seek the presidency at first, nor until he found it impossible to accomplish his desire to be commander-in-chief of the forces of the Confederacy, a post for which he was almost alone in believing himself eminently qualified.

The provisional Congress of the Confederacy authorized the calling to arms of one hundred thousand volunteers to serve for twelve months. Acts were also passed providing for the establishment of a navy. A post-office was organized and a judiciary provided for. An issue of one million dollars in treasury notes was authorized. Commissioners were sent to the European courts; and thus the seceded States objectified their belief that they were in all respects an independent nation. But, in accordance with

their settled policy, the powers agreed not to recognize the new government until it should be recognized by the United States. Mason and Slidell, two of the commissioners, were taken from the English ship "Trent" by the captain of the United States steamer "San Jacinto," but because of pressure threatened from England were released shortly afterwards.

The outlook for the Union cause was far from encouraging. The country was still suffering from the results of the recent panic; Federal forts, arsenals, and mints had been seized throughout the South; the attitude of the rank and file of the Democratic party was unknown until Douglas pledged the government its support; the border States were hesitating, and State after State in the far South had passed ordinances of secession or had been forced unwillingly into the Confederacy. On the other side of the Atlantic sympathy was scant and opinion critical.

The extent to which the South hoped to secure aid from Europe is a question that may never be satisfactorily answered. It is true that as the war progressed, especially after the recognition of belligerency by Great Britain, France, and Spain, there was more or less expectancy of foreign intervention; but even before the outbreak of hostilities the more clear-sighted leaders of the ill-starred Confederacy realized that it was vain to expect any assistance whatever from England. In a letter, for instance, written

in Washington, December 3, 1860, by John B. Floyd and addressed to Nathaniel Tyler, at Richmond, Virginia, the writer declared that

"the South should remember that, in dissolving the Union she annihilates a mighty army of true, unselfish, and devoted friends at the North who battle for the constitutional rights of the slave States. Without this great and efficient aid the power of abolition fanaticism would be unbroken and unchecked—would indeed 'surround the South with a wall of fire.' It would do more. New England would consort with old England in devising means by which the cruel and inhuman philanthropy practised by the latter in the West India islands should be practised here. That religious zeal which turned away from all rational hope of progress in the Christian faith half a million of Africans to the barbarism of fetish worship, and converted the fairest islands of the sea into a desert and a waste; that English justice which seized upon a thousand millions of her subjects' property and vaunted herself before the world for having paid one-tenth of its value, would find, surely and speedily, ample room, in conjunction with New England abolitionism, for the practice of her pharisaical virtues amidst the fields of Virginia and Louisiana." (*Richmond Enquirer*, December 7, 1860.)

Floyd then points out a few other reasons for believing that the South must not commit the error of counting on the support of Great Britain. All the work of the North in harassing the South and impairing the security and value of her slave property would, in his estimation, be justice, honesty, and fair dealing, compared with "the inexorable hate and majestic fanaticism of England directed against the slavery of a dismembered Union and a feared and hated commercial rival." With prophetic insight, he main-

tains that twenty-five years of union and harmony will concentrate the commercial power of the world in the waters of New York, and that then

"the decline of England becomes as certain as was that of Alexandria and Venice, and for the same cause. Instead of the first, she becomes a third-rate European power. But let disunion take place, let civil war and discord distract this country, and England well knows that the ships of the North must rot at their wharves and the busy hum of their manufactories must cease forever. Then, indeed, would England feel again that she was mistress of the seas without a rival, secure in a commerce that no power would ever shake."

Meanwhile, aside from the outspoken utterances of Queen Victoria, Albert, the Prince Consort, and Lord Palmerston, the upper classes of England professed to feel much sympathy towards the South, whose leaders they flattered and cajoled by turns. Gladstone uttered an expression so favorable towards the nascent confederation that even his ingenuity was never able entirely to avoid its effect. The South had hoped, also, that the great mill-owners of England, whom she furnished with cotton, would be inclined, from selfish motives, to favor her cause; but industrial England was on the side of the North, while Henry Ward Beecher's visit to Great Britain, together with the firm attitude of the Federal government, soon destroyed all prospects of open sympathy with the South.

In point of fact, moreover, our transatlantic

kinsmen had never looked for an American civil war. It seemed, in the first place, too good to be true. Then, again, it was not supposed that a nation of "shopkeepers" would do any fighting. The Presidential campaign of 1860 had naturally aroused keen interest throughout Europe; but the result, judging from the general tone of the English press, does not appear to have given rise to any widespread conviction that internecine strife was imminent. Some, indeed, professed to view the subject with indifference, others as a victory for human progress, and but an exceedingly small minority regarded disunion as inevitable. The *London Review,* for example, whose sympathies were apparently with the Republican party, informed the South that her only hope of preserving slavery was in the Union, and that any attempt to organize a Southern Confederacy would be resisted by the whole strength of Europe and civilization. The *Times* was no less optimistic. It expressed no fear for the safety of the Union.

"Of course, it will take some time before men can cool down from the bluster, which has been so profusely used for electioneering purposes, to the language of moderation and truth. When the cooler heads of the South begin to consider how imaginary is the injury which they have sustained, how vast are the interests involved, how heavy would be the cost, how considerable the danger of disunion, and how impossible it would be for the Southern States to maintain in the face of the world the strong position they hold as members of the great American Confederation, we suspect that the South will think better of it, and turn its activity into the more practicable channel of providing Mr.

Lincoln a Democratic successor in 1864." ("Summary of English Views," *Richmond Enquirer,* December 11, 1860.)

The faith thus expressed in the good sense of the American people, North and South, by the press of Great Britain, was shared in a measure by Continental publicists. Europe had grown weary of war. The useless struggle in the Crimea, the war of Italian independence, not to speak of the increasing suspicions regarding the forward policy of Napoleon III., were facts in themselves sufficient to create a genuine desire for peace. Nor had the revolutionary movements of 1848 been without the resultant creation of an extensive popular sympathy in favor of the black slaves of the South. Facts such as these were not calculated to win for the leaders of a movement at conflict with the pacific and liberal views current abroad that hearty, spontaneous good-will which is often, because of sentiment, bestowed on the efforts of a nationality to secure for itself an independent State life. On the contrary, the average person on the Continent saw one-half of our country seeking to overthrow slavery, and the other half endeavoring by force of arms to perpetuate the institution. To this conception of the nature of the American conflict may accordingly be traced that lack of encouragement met with by the South at the outset, and which prevented her from having her independence recognized. The world was unreservedly against slavery. Nevertheless, the

North, contrary to European opinion, did not enter into the war to secure the liberation of the bondmen, but to preserve the Union. Nevertheless by the progress of events Lincoln was forced to free the slaves as a war measure, and by so doing he gained the approval of Europe.

VIII

THE THREE-MONTHS WAR

THE history of the negotiations which took place between the Southern commissioners and Secretary of State Seward is of the most vital importance in the genesis of the War, for in the outcome of these conferences South Carolina found her excuse and justification for the bombardment of Fort Sumter. It appears as if Seward clung to the hope that the border States might, if time could be gained, be restrained from seceding, and that eventually the people of the States that had withdrawn might be won back, in spite of their leaders. He gave pledges that Sumter would be evacuated, and that the status at Fort Pickens should remain the same. President Lincoln, it is probable, was unaware of these promises. Seward had a way, during the early days of the administration, of taking matters into his own hands, a mistake which he soon learned to avoid committing. While preparations were being carried on by the naval authorities from New York for the relief of Fort Sumter, Seward was writing to the Southern commissioners in regard to his previously given promise: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see." The day following the delivery of this message Governor Pickens,

of South Carolina, received notice from the State Department at Washington that Fort Sumter was about to be supplied with provisions. The only conclusion possible in regard to Seward's negotiations with the Southern commissioners is that he was either acting on his own authority and deceiving his chief, or, being cognizant, as he must have been, that an expedition was in preparation for the relief of Sumter, he was playing with the South in order to gain time for the North to gather her strength.

As soon as the authorities at Charleston learned that Fort Sumter was to be succored, General Beauregard demanded from Major Anderson its surrender. This action the logic of the secessionists' position compelled them to take. The descent of the fleet was in truth the inauguration of the war between the sections. With the fleet in the harbor and Charleston menaced by the guns of Sumter, South Carolina could place no confidence in Northern pledges. Believing itself constitutionally enabled to secede, and having actually done so, the reduction of Fort Sumter was a necessary conclusion. Even Mr. Douglas said, "I take it for granted that whoever permanently holds Charleston and South Carolina is entitled to the possession of Fort Sumter." Horace Greeley said, "Whether the bombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter shall or shall not be justified by posterity, it is clear that the Confederacy had no alternative but its own dissolution." To the

demand for the evacuation of the fort Major Anderson replied that compliance with it was prevented by his honor and his obligations to his government.

The man whose fate it was to strike the first blow directly against the Union was Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard. Born near New Orleans, his sympathies were all with the South. He graduated from West Point in 1838, and served with distinguished gallantry through the Mexican War. In November, 1860, he received the appointment to the superintendency of the Military Academy at West Point. This he resigned almost immediately, owing to the crisis in the South. He was one of the very first to resign his commission in the United States army; he at once entered the service of the Confederacy with the rank of brigadier-general, receiving the command of the South Carolina troops at Charleston.

At a little before five o'clock on the morning of Friday, April 12, 1861, Beauregard opened fire with his batteries, which had been erected during the period of negotiations. The fort responded gallantly, and the bombardment continued throughout the day. After dark, Anderson ceased firing, but Beauregard's batteries continued at intervals during the night. It was a spectacle which the inhabitants of Charleston enjoyed; they thought they were celebrating their freedom; but it was a display which presaged disaster. The bombardment continued

for about thirty-four hours. Anderson's guns responded for a short time on the morning of the 13th, but it was soon discovered that the fort was on fire. Ex-Senator Wigfall, of Texas, then voluntarily and without authority went to the fort in an open boat, thus exposing himself to the fire; he pointed out the hopelessness of the Federal position and urged Anderson to surrender. The gallant major could not do otherwise. It was a bloodless battle; for although the brave defenders clung to their post until the works were in ruins and they had to cover their ammunition with earth to prevent its exploding, no one was injured except through the bursting of some of their own cannon while a final salute to the Union flag was being fired.

The news of the capitulation of Sumter reached Washington on the 14th of April. It electrified the North. Nothing is more difficult of explanation than the sudden and complete reversion of feeling which took place. This was intensified by the events at Baltimore on the 19th, when the Massachusetts Sixth Regiment, while marching through that city, was fired on by the mob and several soldiers were killed and wounded.

While the Southern States were seceding, the North was apathetic if not encouraging. "Let them go in peace," was the prevailing verdict. The firing on the "Star of the West" had scarcely aroused an interest. The North did not wish war. She seemed to be more afraid of loss of trade than

of disunion. The people expected and desired compromise; but measures directed thereto had been frustrated by their politicians. As soon, however, as the gage of battle had been thrown down or taken up—for it is difficult to determine which—by the South, and war in reality had begun, a willingness to fight was manifested. At the same time, we believe that the men of the North entered the conflict in a comparatively lightsome spirit of adventure. Few had the faintest realization of the manner of conflict that was before them. They thought the quarrel would speedily and easily be ended, and that only a show of determination was necessary to convince the South of the error of her ways. Lincoln himself, while he trusted the North, was not quite certain what to expect. After he had issued his call for seventy-five thousand volunteers, he was heard to exclaim, with the impatience born of a belief that the Confederacy would attack the National capital, as he walked the floor of his office in a particularly anxious hour of the days of waiting for the troops, "Why don't they come, why don't they come?"

In the free States the call for volunteers was responded to with enthusiasm and alacrity. In six of the eight slave States which had not seceded it was negatived with defiance. Said Governor Letcher, of Virginia:

"The militia of this State will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States,

and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object, in my judgment, not within the province of the Constitution or the Act of 1795—will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and, having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the administration has exhibited towards the South."

Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, declared:

"I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina."

Governor Magoffin said:

"Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."

Harris, of Tennessee, boldly announced that his State would

"not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the defence of our rights or those of our Southern brethren."

The reply of Governor Jackson, of Missouri, was:

"Your requisition in my judgment is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman, and diabolical, and cannot be complied with."

Rector was governor of Arkansas, and he said:

"In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas to subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury."

Governor Hicks, of Maryland, found himself placed in a serious dilemma. Not daring to defy a government with its capital situated almost in his own State, and pressed on every side by the secessionist element which predominated in Maryland, he temporized.

Governor Burton, of Delaware, waited until the 26th, when he informed the President that he had no right or authority to comply with his requisition.

Two days after President Lincoln's call for troops, President Davis retaliated by issuing a proclamation inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisal against the merchant shipping of the United States. This was a justifiable method of attack, because the latter government had refused to enter into an international compact with the European powers to prohibit privateering. Lincoln responded to this menace with a proclamation announcing the blockade of the ports of the Confederacy, which he ended with the ominous words:

"And I hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy."

On May 3 Lincoln called for forty regiments of volunteers, to serve for three years or during the war, increased the regular army by the addi-

tion of ten regiments, and directed the enlistment of eighteen thousand seamen.

In the mean time events were moving to the advantage of the Confederacy. It gained possession of Harper's Ferry and the Gosport Navy-Yard, with such supplies contained therein as the Federal commanders in their hasty exit had not been able to destroy. This prompted Secretary Chase to complain to the President "that the disunionists have anticipated us in everything, that as yet we have accomplished nothing but the destruction of our own property."

The South was fortunate in the fact that she had sent her full quota of men to the Military Academy at West Point as well as to the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The majority of them were loyal to their States. The credit which has been lavishly—though not improperly—bestowed upon Robert E. Lee for the sincerity of his motives cannot justly be denied the commanders who served under him. The Union was dear to him, and, though he believed that the South suffered under the aggressions of the North, he was not in favor of secession. Nevertheless, he held that his allegiance to his State was rightly primary.

"A Union," said he, "that can only be maintained by swords and bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take the place of brotherly love and kindness, has no charm for me. If the Union is dissolved and the government is disrupted, I shall return to my native State and share the miseries of my people, and, save in defence, will draw my sword on none."

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE

These sentiments were common to the Southern officers who brought to the Confederacy an experience gained in the United States army. They could not have been so ill-advised as to change their allegiance for ambitious reasons. It is interesting to note that not a few Southern men, such as General Thomas and Admiral Farragut, remained in the Federal service, and that many Northern men, conspicuous among whom were General Gorgas and General Francis A. Sharp, cast their lot with the secessionists. Lee was indirectly offered the post of commander-in-chief of the Federal army; but his heart would not permit him to lead an army of invasion into his native Virginia. He resigned his commission in the Federal army, and a few days later accepted that of commander-in-chief of the Virginia State forces.

The South rallied with an enthusiasm certainly equal to that of the North. Aristocrat and plebeian joined shoulder to shoulder for the protection, as they believed, of their homes and rights.

"The flower of the Southern youth, the prime of Southern manhood, are collected in the camps of Virginia. Some of the most remarkable of these are here in the close neighborhood of Richmond. Genius, learning, and wealth, enough to furnish the aristocracy of an empire, wear the coarse gray of the common soldier and learn the use of the soldier's common weapon."

"In the South the volunteers who spring to arms with so much alacrity are men of substance and position, wealthy farmers and planters, with their sons, professional men, merchants and their clerks, intelligent and industrious mechanics, and, indeed, from every art, trade, profession, and

occupation; the wealth, intelligence, industry, and backbone of society have rallied for the defence of their homes and for the assertion of constitutional liberty."

But the army of the South was wofully lacking in equipment. It possessed no ready means for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. It depended at first upon a quantity of rifles of a discarded pattern, which had been distributed through the States. Flintlock muskets were adapted to the use of percussion caps. The caps were, in great part, smuggled through from Baltimore, and the supply was extremely limited. On July 13 President Davis wrote:

"I could get twenty thousand men from Mississippi, who impatiently await for notice that they can be armed. In Georgia numerous tenders are made to serve for any time, at any place, and to these and other offers I am still constrained to answer 'I have not arms to supply you."

But what the Southern troops lacked in fighting material they made up in provision for their personal comfort. General Johnston refers to the delay occasioned by heavy baggage, and says that every common soldier came to the front provided with a trunk.

On the 24th of May General Benjamin Butler, by means of an epigram, inserted the point of the wedge which thrust the institution of slavery from the Southern States. He had been ordered to the command at Fortress Monroe. The advent of Union troops frightened the white inhabitants of Hampton from their homes, and in the confusion three negroes escaped to the Union

camp. They belonged to Colonel Mallory, of the Confederate army, who intended to remove them to North Carolina and there employ their services upon the Confederate fortifications. Butler needed labor. He argued that if they had been horses or arms or tools he would have appropriated and used them without hesitation. "These men," said he, "are contraband of war; set them at work." The sentence was epoch-making in its effect. Other negroes came in to the number of more than nine hundred. They were all welcomed and employed. The Northern Secretary of War justified Butler's view of the matter.

In the mean time the navies of both sides were beginning to play their important part in the struggle. President Davis's offer to grant letters of marque and reprisal was met with a quick and ample response; and President Lincoln's blockade of the Southern ports provided activity for all the vessels at his command. In March, 1863, the United States Congress passed a bill authorizing the President to issue letters; but he did not do so, probably for the reason that it would be considered "a recognition of the assumption of the insurgents that they are a distinct and independent nationality." The *Royal Gazette,* of England, also published a pertinent comment on this matter:

"The United States Congress, in its last session, authorized the President, if he deemed it proper, to issue letters of marque. His having not done so, in view of the

destruction of property by the "Alabama" and the "Florida," is severely censured by a writer in one of the late New York papers. This writer suggests that a reward of five hundred thousand dollars be given to any letter of marque that should capture and bring into any of the ports of the United States any Confederate privateer, or two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the sinking or otherwise destroying of such a privateer. The writer concluded by observing that the 'almighty dollar might then be the means of bringing privateering to an end.'

"We can hardly understand why such a measure should be adopted. When patriotism is not sufficient to induce men to serve their country, is it probable that the dollar will? Will the dollar inspire courage in a man when the sight of his lowered flag fails to do so? And, besides, are there not enough United States ships-of-war skimming the seas after the "Alabama" and the "Florida," the only two known Confederate privateers, and are these Federal vessels not commanded by admirals and officers that the Union boasts of? The issuing by the Washington government of letters of marque would be, indeed, an acknowledgment of the inefficiency of their navy compared to the two or three comparatively small vessels-of-war owned by the Confederacy, and of the incapacity of the men at the head of their fleet." (Scharf's "The Confederate Navy," p. 61.)

The privateers soon became a very efficient department of the Southern navy. They almost succeeded in driving the United States merchant marine from the seas. The "Alabama" captured no less than sixty-nine vessels of various description during her career. It was an exceedingly effective method of damaging the North and rendering her people weary of the war.

The *New York Herald* of May 7, 1861, printed a letter from a correspondent in Montgomery which throws a curious light on this feature of our civil strife. "But it may be asked," it says,

"who will take these letters of marque [issued by President Davis]? Where is the government at Montgomery to find ships? The answer is to be found in the fact that already numerous applications have been received from the *ship-owners of New England,* from the whalers of New Bedford, and from others in the Northern States for these very letters of marque, accompanied by the highest securities and guarantees! This statement I make on the very highest authority." It would be extremely interesting if we could demonstrate the veracity of this authority.

The first privateer which received a commission from the Confederate States was the "Savannah." She was also the first to be captured. She was a schooner of fifty-four tons, carrying one eighteen-pound gun. Her crew numbered thirty-two. The career of the "Savannah" was a brief one. Putting to sea on the 3d of June, she immediately fell in with and made prize of the brig "Joseph," of Rockland, Maine. Exulting over this success, the "Savannah" next encountered the United States brig "Terry," disguised as a merchantman. The privateer was confident of another prize; but no sooner had she come within gun-range than the sides of the brig yawned with portholes and bristled with guns. A short chase with a few shots which disabled her rigging convinced the Confederate of the wisdom of surrendering. Her crew were transferred to the United States man-of-war "Minnesota," by which they were conveyed in

irons to New York, where they were incarcerated in the Tombs. President Lincoln, as we have seen, in a proclamation, declared that the officers and crew of privateers would be dealt with under the laws relating to piracy. The crew of the "Savannah" were so tried. But it was soon made apparent both by Northern and English jurists that there was no law to sustain such a position. It was with seeming reluctance, however, that Mr. Lincoln receded from his position; and it is probable that he was influenced by the Confederate threat of retaliation more than by any other argument. As soon as it became known in the South that Captain Baker and his crew were in irons, thirteen Federal prisoners of war were placed in close confinement, and Washington was notified that such punishment would be meted out to them as might be inflicted on the privateer's men.

The Confederate government availed itself to the utmost possibility of injury to the North by destroying private property on the high seas. Almost all the success of the Southern navy was thus won. The most prominent of its vessels were the "Sumter," the "Florida," the "Alabama," and the "Shenandoah." For the losses inflicted by all but the first named, which was purchased by the Confederacy in April, 1861, the United States obtained redress from England, on account of the fact that they were fitted out in her ports. The sum of $15,500,000 was awarded by the Board of Arbitration, sitting at

Geneva, Switzerland, in settlement of the Alabama claims. The "Sumter" was a vessel of four hundred and thirty-seven tons, barkentine rigged, also having a propeller. She was put into commission on the 3d of June, 1861, as a vessel-of-war of the Confederate States. Commander Semmes received instructions "to do the enemy's commerce the greatest injury in the shortest time." These instructions were obeyed to the letter. Many prizes were made in American and European waters, until, at last, being blockaded at Gibraltar by the Federal vessels "Kearsarge," "Chippewa," and "Tuscarora," Semmes laid the "Sumter" up and paid off his crew.

Orders were issued for the first invasion of Virginia on May 23, 1861. About thirteen thousand men, under the command of General Mansfield, crossed the Potomac. Alexandria was entered with little or no opposition. A casualty occurred there, however, which was exaggerated in importance by the North. Colonel Ellsworth, commanding the New York Fire Zouaves, seeing a Confederate flag flying over the cupola of the Marshall House, desired its removal. Instead of sending a corporal to lower it, as the dignity of his position required, Ellsworth went through the house without a by-your-leave and seized it himself. On returning, he was met in the hall by Jackson, the proprietor. "This is my trophy," said Ellsworth. "And you are mine!" exclaimed the innkeeper, instantly shooting him dead. His

death produced intense excitement in the North, Ellsworth being popular for his handsome figure and generosity. An "atrocious murder," it was called. Jackson, the hotel-keeper, was himself slain immediately after what the people of the South regarded as his "gallant act done in defence of his country's flag."

Virginia during these stirring events was experiencing a secession within her own State borders. While her convention was seemingly hovering between allegiance to the North and to the South, one of the members from western Virginia offered a set of resolutions in which the following words were contained:

"The right of revolution can be exercised as well by a portion of the citizens of a State against their State government, as it can be exercised by the whole people of a State against their Federal government. . . . And that any change of the relation Virginia now sustains to the Federal government, against the wishes of even a respectable minority of her people, would be such an act of injustice perpetrated upon the rights of that minority as to justify them in changing their relation to the State government by separating themselves from that section of the State that had thus wantonly disregarded their interests and defied their will."

The people of the western part of Virginia were divided from the rest of the State by the character of their soil and (a result of this) their freedom from slavery. Their sympathy was with the North. These circumstances led to the creation of the State of West Virginia, soon an accomplished though an entirely unconstitutional fact.

Both Northern and Southern historians have been careful to set forth reasons for the presence of their respective armies in Virginia. They assume that an excuse is needed. But this seems hardly necessary, as the State was the natural meeting-place of the main combating forces. The Confederate troops were concentrated on the south bank of the Potomac, awaiting the movement of the Northern regiments around Washington. Major-General Patterson, purposing to march into the western counties of Virginia, moved from Pennsylvania with an army. General McClellan moved four regiments by different routes to Grafton, where Porterfield, with a small Confederate command, was harassing the country. The latter retreated to Phillippi, followed by a West Virginia regiment, and there suffered a defeat. This skirmish became known as the "Phillippi Races." To repair this loss the Confederate authorities sent ex-Governor Henry A. Wise and General Garnett to this region. Colonel Pegram took a position in the pass at Rich Mountain with a regiment and six guns. Lee, under whose command these forces were combined, was at Laurel Hill with four regiments.

At the beginning of July General McClellan determined to clear West Virginia of these Confederate troops. On the 11th Brigadier-General Rosecrans, with nineteen hundred men, ascended Rich Mountain from the south, while Pegram was expecting him to make the attempt

at the north. The latter made a plucky resistance, but was overpowered by numbers, losing about one hundred and thirty-five killed and about twenty wounded, while twenty-one were made prisoners. On the 13th, after a vain attempt to get out of the toils which McClellan had thrown around him, Pegram and his whole command surrendered at Beverly as prisoners of war. On the 14th Garnett was beaten at Carrick's Ford by a greatly superior Union force and himself killed. McClellan telegraphed:

"Garnett and forces routed; his baggage and one gun taken; his army demoralized; Garnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia, and have lost thirteen killed, and not more than forty wounded. We have in all killed at least two hundred of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at least one thousand. Have taken seven guns in all. I still look for the capture of the remnant of Garnett's army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the crack regiment of eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and Carolinians. Our success is complete, and secession is killed in this country."

The Confederates were in possession of Harper's Ferry. General Patterson concluded (and in the opinion he was supported by Scott) that the taking of this position would have a good moral effect in the encouragement of Virginia Unionists and would, also, protect Maryland. Patterson wrote to the Secretary of War, on June 10:

"I beseech you, therefore, by our ancient friendship, give me the means of success. You have the means; place them

at my disposal, and shoot me if I do not use them to advantage."

But Johnston did not attach the importance to Harper's Ferry that his opponent supposed. He retreated upon Winchester. Beauregard was at Manassas. The authorities at Washington, having determined upon a movement against this place, gave Patterson the task of preventing Johnston from effecting a juncture with Beauregard. His failure to block Johnston's movements was the direct and only strategic cause of the Federal defeat at Bull Run. His order from Scott was:

"If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in force towards Manassas, and if too hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Keys Ferry, Leesburg, etc."

On the 18th Scott again telegraphed:

"I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and I suppose superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reinforcements towards Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win victories."

Patterson replied:

"The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissances in force, caused him to be reinforced. I have accomplished in this respect more than the general-in-chief asked, or could well be expected in face of an enemy far superior in numbers with no line of communication to protect."

There is only one fault that can be found with this dignified response; it was not true. Johnston was no more than two-thirds as strong as Patterson; he was already stealing the march, though Patterson did not discover this until two days later. On the 17th of July his army marched to Charleston, thus doubling the distance between himself and Johnston. The latter was alert to the opportunity, and on the 18th his advance regiments passed through Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge. By the morning of the following day they had reached the Manassas Gap Railroad, and seven regiments were in Beauregard's camp that afternoon. Johnston arrived next day with the last detachment of his force, in time to join battle that same afternoon, Sunday, the 20th, and turn the first great fight to the advantage of the Confederacy.

McDowell was in command of the Union forces which engaged in the Manassas campaign. The plan of battle was formulated by himself, and he emphatically stated that he could not hope to beat the combined armies of the two Confederate generals. But Scott gave him the assurance that, "If Johnston joins Beauregard he shall have Patterson on his heels."

The men under McDowell were extremely poor war material. They were all three-months volunteers, and entirely unacquainted with effective discipline. McDowell said of them:

"When marching they stopped every moment to pick blackberries or get water, they would not keep in the ranks,

order as much as you pleased; when they came where water was fresh, they would pour the old water out of their canteens and fill them with fresh water; they were not used to denying themselves much; they were not used to journeys on foot."

The term of enlistment of many of the men was expiring, and they were leaving. One Pennsylvania regiment, whose service had ended, turned its back upon the army on the morning of the battle.

The Confederate forces were intrenched in a line extending eight miles along the course of Bull Run, defending seven fords and a bridge. McDowell held his position at Centreville. His plan was to outflank his enemy. Owing to the failure of his engineers to find a ford, this was not attempted until the 21st, thus giving time for Johnston's reinforcements, which had escaped Patterson, to arrive. The main force, under McDowell, marched by night, and, crossing at Sudley's Ford, attacked the end of the Confederate line, while feints were being made at the centre. The brigades under Evans and Bee received the brunt of the onset, and after a stiff resistance were thrown into confusion. While striving to restore order to his troops, Bee called their attention to Jackson and his men "standing like a stone wall." Johnston notes that at the moment those of Jackson's brigade who were in sight of Bee's men were lying down to avoid the enemy's artillery. The presence of Johnston and Beauregard, who came galloping to the scene, rallied

the Confederates, and a line was re-formed at right angles to the original. More than once during the day it seemed as if the Southern army was beaten and on the point of going to pieces. In fact, President Davis, whose anxiety drew him from Richmond to the field of battle, met Confederate fugitives on the way, who assured him that all was lost. But belated and fresh detachments of Johnston's army kept breaking into the battle, and at last the fear grew upon the Union troops that they were beaten. Their total lack of discipline resulted in the panic which followed. Captain Woodbury says:

"At four o'clock on the 21st there were more than twelve thousand volunteers on the battle-field of Bull Run who had entirely lost their regimental organization. They could no more be handled as troops, for the officers and men were not together. Men and officers mingled promiscuously; and it is worthy of remark that this disorganization did not result from defeat or fear."

But the impression that they were beaten grew to conviction in the minds of the Federal troops, and to the astonishment of their enemies, whose leaders did not seem to have the battle well in hand, a spontaneous retreat soon broke into an awful panic.

Sightseers—and among them members of Congress—had come out from Washington in their carriages, "to see the rebels run." But, as one of the latter put it, the cry "On to Richmond" was now changed to "Off for Washington." The fear of the retreating men gathered

momentum as they ran. Soon there was a headlong flight, in which mingled, in wild and confused jumble, carriages and cannon, soldiers and civilians. They ran without cause; for the victors were themselves so much surprised at their success that they made no pursuit worth mentioning.

When, on the following day, these multitudes of haggard and begrimed fugitives poured into Washington, it seemed to many that the Union cause was lost and that immediately the capital itself would be in the hands of the Confederacy.

IX

PREPARATIONS FOR THE LONG CONFLICT

THE Northern disaster at Manassas (Bull Run), July 21, 1861, had markedly different effects on the mental attitude of the two sections. The South thought the war was over; the North saw that it had only begun. The Confederate volunteers believed, with one of their poets, that the artillery of the North had been stilled; that they had whipped the despised Yankees and driven them bleeding homeward; that thence they would not come back for a second drubbing. So general was this conviction, and so slight a sense of discipline existed among the soldiers of the South, that after the battle many went back to their homes, believing that there was no further need of their services. The wisest of their leaders, however, knew otherwise. Jefferson Davis had from the first been convinced that there was no hope of the permanent establishment of a Southern nation except by means of a prolonged and bloody struggle. The courage of a man who was willing to accept the leadership with such a conviction and with a clear perception of the disproportionate resources of the two contending parties, is in itself worthy of commendation, though his judgment may be open to criticism.

The North was now aroused in a different manner from what it had been by the bombardment of Sumter. The "bloodletting" desired by Senator Chandler had come to pass. After Sumter, the men of the North freely responded to Lincoln's call, with the idea that they were to administer a salutary but light castigation to the erring South. They volunteered for three months' service, the majority thinking that a summer's outing in the South, enlivened by military operations (of the seriousness of which they knew nothing by experience), would be hardly more than a frolic. But after Manassas frolic was over, for honor had to be retrieved and revenge satisfied. The North was now thoroughly angered and was determined to fight the South to a stand-still. Anglo-Saxon doggedness, which is born of encounter with obstacles, brushed away all propositions of conciliation and forced the issue.

Mr. Crittenden, who won everlasting honor by his earnest counsels for peace, introduced (July, 1861) a resolution in the House that well sets forth the opinion of the bulk of the Northern people. It ran thus:

"The war is not waged in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or the overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired, and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

This resolution was adopted by both Houses. In the discussion which arose over it in the Senate, it was agreed that slavery in the South was not to be molested; but when Harris of New York said that if it should be abolished as the result of the war he would not shed a tear, he gave expression to the feeling of the largely increased radical party in the North. The time was near at hand when the majority of the people who believed in the war were to expect the abolition of slavery as its consequence.

The ultimate defeat of the South was a foregone conclusion from the start. There being no racial distinction, courage and spirit being equal, the vast preponderance of resources in the North confronted the South as with an inevitable fate.

When Congress met, July 4, 1861, there were in attendance forty-nine Senators, — thirty-one Republicans and eighteen members opposed to the policy of the administration, ten Democrats and eight Unionists, men of the conservative type, who, though in favor of the war, were opposed to any interference with slavery. In the House there were one hundred and six Republicans and seventy-two of the opposition, forty-two of whom were Democrats. Thus Congress was overwhelmingly in favor of voting the government everything needed to prosecute the war.

On the day after the defeat at Manassas (July 21, 1861) the House of Representatives passed a resolution:

"That the maintenance of the Constitution, the preservation of the Union, and the enforcement of the laws are sacred trusts which must be executed; that no disaster shall discourage us from the ample performance of this most sacred duty; and that we pledge to the country and to the world the employment of every resource, national and individual, for the suppression, overthrow, and punishment of the rebels in arms."

This resolution received the abundant and enthusiastic support of the people.

The previous military acts of the President, which were of doubtful constitutionality, were ratified. His suspension of the writ of habeas corpus—so forcefully employed in the border States — was also tacitly acquiesced in. The President was authorized to enlist volunteers to the number of five hundred thousand, for a maximum service of three years. The appointment of general officers was left to him, subject to the consent of the Senate. He was furthermore authorized to make substantial additions to the regular army and to increase the volunteer force to a million men. Carte blanche was given him in the matter of the increase of the navy. The Secretary of the Treasury was permitted to borrow two hundred and fifty million dollars, on the credit of the government, by the issue of treasury notes. Duties on imports were increased, thus providing for the levying of a direct annual tax of twenty million dollars. Provision was made for an annual income tax, the levying of which the Supreme Court has since declared unconstitutional. These resources placed nearly

one million dollars a day in the hands of the government for the purpose of carrying on the war. On the 6th of August, having employed the whole of the short session in placing the government on a war footing, Congress adjourned, leaving President Lincoln practically in the position of absolute dictator. On that one occasion was recognized the principle that the Constitution was made for the Union and not the Union for the Constitution.

When Congress convened again the following December, it reflected the change that had taken place in the North regarding the wisdom of abolishing slavery. The North had accepted the necessity of war. The Republican party was united in its hearty support of the President. The Democratic party, it is true, was still for peace, but it was constantly losing by desertion to the Republican ranks, and there were not a few war Democrats.

But from the beginning to the end of the war Republican prestige fluctuated in accordance with the success or failure of Northern arms. In the autumn of 1862, after the Confederacy had surprised the North with the amount of its fighting strength, considerable opposition to the President manifested itself at the elections outside of New England; New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin showed decided gains for the Democracy; but subsequently, with the triumph of the Federal armies, the Republicans gained renewed strength, and

in 1864 re-elected Lincoln to the Presidency. To lose sight of the political situation at the North during the war—a situation Lincoln had to keep constantly before him—is to lose sight of fully half of his work.

The political situation in the South is of no less importance. The case of Davis presents many contrasts. His temperament was obstinate and domineering. He soon made all branches of the government subservient to his will, although there were both a Congress and a Supreme Court. He was the State. And this unfortunate disposition alienated from him some of the ablest men of the South,—men who were ardent supporters of the independence of their section and whose self-sacrificing spirit could not be challenged.

Despite the loyalty of her citizens to the South, her President from the inception of the war found himself faced by a bitter opposition that again and again thwarted his plans and refused to support his measures. The spirit of antagonism to the executive manifested in the North was as bitter in vituperation of Lincoln, but he could always count on the support of Congress and the obedience of his officials, but this Davis could not always do, and the result was unhappy. Now that the war is far in the past, the tendency to idealize Lincoln and Davis is present and increasing, but in their days of power they were the most vilified men in America. Stanton wrote of "the pain-

ful imbecility" of Lincoln, and Governor Curtin said "the country is at the mercy of a dotard," while Bowles called him "a simple Susan," and, when fortune was against the Northern arms and passions ran wild, even worse things were said of Lincoln by the dissatisfied and the malicious. Davis endured no less bitter vituperation, and with less opportunity to receive it with equanimity. The Confederate President was in a position for which he was not fitted and which he did not desire. It is a thankless task to lead a losing cause.

At a new election, Davis and Stephens were re-elected. But the situation did not change for the better. The Southern President, though with better justification, because of military experience, than the Northern, like him constantly meddled with the plans of his generals. This led to regrettable consequences, of which Davis cannot be held guiltless. He was, however, constantly harassed and hampered by the unjustified bickerings of disgruntled subordinates.

The North, though it was in possession of every necessary resource, was entirely unprepared for war. It is true, several States, notably Ohio, New York, and Massachusetts, had reorganized their militia shortly before the war, and that the famous war governor of the last-named Commonwealth had been sent as an agent to Europe to buy munitions; but, on the whole, the North was not ready. She had no drilled troops

worth the mention. That fact was in a large measure the cause of the reverse at Manassas. The volunteers who had come forward on the first call were officered by men elected by their neighbors for any sort of prominence except experience and aptitude in military affairs. The Three-Months War was beneficial to the North in that it increased the standard of the efficiency of her volunteer regiments.

At the beginning of the war the government owned but one establishment for manufacturing arms, that of Springfield, Massachusetts, which had a capacity of only ten thousand guns annually. Everybody set earnestly to work; subscriptions from States as well as from citizens poured in; men and women vied with those of the South in inspiring general enthusiasm; and the largest iron-mills were transformed into cannon foundries. At first it was necessary to depend on purchases in Europe. There was no reservoir of military equipment of any sort. The destruction of the Gosport Navy-Yard had well-nigh demolished what remained of a fleet already scattered to the four quarters of the globe. But the North possessed a great population of mechanics. Her people had already manifested a mechanical genius unequalled among the nations. Every requisite for manufacture was abundantly produced within her own borders. The sources of wealth were unlimited. Above all, the great wheat fields assured abundant sustentation for however large an army the exi-

gencies of the war might demand. Though the personnel of available officers had been greatly depreciated by the withdrawal of the men whose loyalty to their States carried them over to the Confederacy, yet there were left able and experienced men and, as events proved, an abundance of the most promising material.

After his defeat, General McDowell resigned his command of the Army of the Potomac, but did not thereby lose the respect of his countrymen; nor did he, in his after career, give occasion for its withdrawal. But the event forced upon the Northern government the need of thoroughly reorganizing the army. Political generals—except those like Banks and Butler—were now thrust into the background to make room for experienced soldiers such as Grant, Sherman, Meade, Hooper, Slocum, and Thomas. There was daily drilling, the medical department was put on a good footing, the engineer corps was reinforced by trained civil engineers, and a large number of woodsmen were secured. The venerable commanding general, Scott, was retired; his high post was given to McClellan. This officer, though his subsequent operations and his character gave occasion for serious animadversions, certainly rendered an immense service to the North by the magnificent military organization which he created at the beginning of the war. General Meade's verdict that Grant could not have accomplished what he did had not McClellan given him the army which he did may

GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT

From a photograph by Brady

be accepted so far as the nucleus of the forces which compelled Appomatox is concerned. Rosecrans, Anderson, W. T. Sherman, Buell, Halleck, and Frémont also assisted in the organization and discipline of the six hundred thousand volunteers who were assembled during the summer and autumn of 1861.

When the war—to the South one of defence, to the North a struggle to preserve the Union—had fairly begun, the limits of the Confederacy were definitely outlined. Prompt action had prevented the secession of Maryland and Missouri. At Paducah Grant, by his promptness in preventing the Confederates from gaining a foothold in that important point at the mouth of Tennessee River, "neutralized the Confederate seizure of Columbus," and prevented Kentucky from going into the Confederacy. The western portion of Virginia belonged no longer to the Old Dominion; but the following States had either adopted ordinances of secession and formed the Confederate States of America, or had been annexed thereto, in spite of the protests of the opponents of separate State action: South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Georgia, together with the Indian Territory and Arizona. Briefly, the frontier of this incipient government extended along the Potomac westward through the boundary line between Kentucky and Tennessee to the Mississippi River and, crossing it, through the centre of

Missouri to Kansas, thence southward to the Mexican Gulf. Through a large part of this extensive region flowed the Mississippi and other important streams; it contained numerous spurs of the great Appalachian range, and several thousand miles of sea-coast from the North Atlantic to the far-off ports of southern Texas, and from beyond its borders the Confederacy received aid and comfort and promises that seemed to presage increase in territory and strength.

Judged from the utterances of her public men, California was either in sympathy with the South or in favor of erecting a republic on the Pacific; the border States, especially the slave-holding States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, desired a central Confederacy and leaned strongly to the South; while the North was honeycombed with organizations in communication with Southern leaders and ready to supply them with all the information they could obtain. Because of this hidden though active treachery to the policy of his administration Lincoln did not call an extra session of Congress as soon as he was inaugurated.

The South decided on a policy of defence, and in doing so was influenced in no small measure by the topography of the country as well as by its vast area. Moreover, by keeping her slaves at work there was a possibility that she might provide for the sustenance of her armies.

To the North, when affairs at last emerged from the nebulous condition of the first few

months, it became plain that aggression must be the policy of an effective plan of military operations. The first step to be taken was to open up the Mississippi and render the blockade of Southern ports effectual. With a reorganized navy this was accomplished. Gunboats were sent to the Southern coasts. The second step was to penetrate the long frontier; this, also, was done, east and west. The third and last, the heart of the Confederacy was to be broken by a blow at the Middle South, a plan subsequently matured by Sherman in his "March to the Sea." From the beginning, therefore, the theatre of the war was to be the States of Virginia and Tennessee, States where, at the same time, a strong loyal element was to give rise to a fierce internecine conflict, a desultory, cowardly guerilla warfare that forms one of the darkest chapters in the history of that larger and nobler struggle which was now absorbing the attention, energies, and aspirations of two great peoples.

What had the South with which to meet the vast resources that the North was able to command? A comparatively small population depending on the North and Europe for commodities of subsistence; an evanescent wealth which could be replenished only by access to foreign markets; abundant courage; and a unanimous and an enthusiastic faith in its cause. The South had not expected war. The people had hoped for either a peaceable secession or a compromise enforced by the mere threat of disunion. There

was not even the nucleus of a military organization; that, like the government, had to be created. There were no arms or any other equipment for warfare. There were no establishments for their manufacture. Within the bounds of the Confederate States there was but one small powder-mill; nor was there any supply of nitre or sulphur. In the whole land there was not a single machine for the manufacture of percussion caps. For these necessaries the South was at first wholly dependent upon the North and upon Europe. From the former but a small supply was procured. But owing to the fact that the Confederate agent reached the European market in advance of the agent of the United States government, large contracts for the supply of arms and ammunition were placed. Immediately after his inauguration President Davis sent Captain Semmes to the North for the purpose of procuring what supplies he could. The letter of instruction from Mr. Davis is interesting as indicating for what small mercies the Confederate government was at first thankful.

"MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, February 21, 1861.

"DEAR SIR,—As agent of the Confederate States, you are authorized to proceed, as hereinafter set forth, to make purchases and contracts for machinery and munitions, or for the manufacture of arms and munitions of war.

"Of the proprietor of the ——— Powder Company, in ———, you will probably be able to obtain cannon and musket powder—the former to be of the coarsest grain; and also to engage with him for the establishment of a powder-mill at some point in the limits of our territory.

"The quantity of powder to be supplied immediately will exceed his stock on hand, and the arrangement for further supply should, if possible, be by manufacture in our own territory; if this is not practicable, means must be sought for further shipments, from any and all sources which are reliable.

"At the arsenal at Washington you will find an artisan named ———, who has brought the cap-making machine to its present state of efficiency, and who might furnish a cap-machine and accompany it to direct its operations. If not in this, I hope you may in some other way be able to obtain a cap-machine with little delay, and have it sent to the Mount Vernon Arsenal, Albany.

"We shall require a manufactory for friction-primers, and you will, if possible, induce some capable person to establish one in our country. The demand of the Confederate States will be the inducement in this as in the case of the powder-mill proposed.

"A short time since, the most improved machinery for the manufacture of rifles, intended for the Harper's Ferry Armory, was, it was said, for sale by the manufacturer. If it be so at this time, you will procure it for this government, and use the needful precaution in relation to its transportation. Mr. ——— ———, of the Harper's Ferry Armory, can give you all the information in that connection which you may require. Mr. Ball, the master armorer at Harper's Ferry, is willing to accept service under our government, and could probably bring with him skilled workmen. If we get the machinery, this will be important.

"Machinery for grooving muskets and heavy guns is, I hope, to be purchased ready made. If not, you will contract for its manufacture and delivery. You will endeavor to obtain the most improved shot for rifled cannon, and persons skilled in the preparation of that and other fixed ammunition. Captain G. W. Smith and Captain Lovell, late of the United States army, and now of New York City, may aid you in your task; and you will please say to them that we will be happy to have their services in our army.

"You will make such inquiries as your varied knowledge will suggest in relation to the supply of guns of different calibers, especially the largest. I suggest the advantage, if

to be obtained, of having a few of the fifteen-inch guns, like the one cast at Pittsburg.

"I have not sought to prescribe so as to limit your inquiries, either as to objects or place, but only to suggest for your reflection and consideration the points which have chanced to come under my observation. You will use your discretion in visiting places where information of persons or things is to be obtained for the furtherance of the object in view. Any contracts will be sent to the Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, for his approval; and the contractor need not fear that delay will be encountered in the action of this government.

"Very respectfully yours, etc.,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

The charge laid against John B. Floyd, who was Secretary of War under Buchanan, of having taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by his office to supply the South with arms, might lead one to infer that the South was well supplied with weapons, but the charge was in itself false, and the assertion that the South was without modern or sufficient weapons for even the preliminary campaigns of the war between the sections cannot be disproved.

The statement was, however, generally believed during the war. Even a Southern historian like Pollard said that Floyd "had by a single order effected the transfer of one hundred and fifteen thousand improved muskets and rifles from the Springfield Armory and Watertown Arsenal to different arsenals at the South. Adding to these the number of arms distributed by the Federal government to the States in preceding years of our history, and those purchased

by the States and citizens, it was safely estimated that the South entered upon the war with one hundred and fifty thousand small-arms of the most approved pattern and the best in the world." This is the only instance we know of in which a Southern historian unduly magnifies the advantage of his side. The report made February 18, 1861, by the House Committee on Military Affairs, of which Stanton was the chairman, indicates the true nature of those "improved muskets." One hundred and five thousand of them were condemned fire-arms which were offered for sale to the States at two dollars each. Ordnance officers had reported that the government would do well to get rid of them at any price. They were purchased by one Belknap, whose plan was to sell the muskets in Europe. But few of them found their way to the South, and they were sent there during the spring of 1860 for storage. At this time Floyd was not a secessionist. The insinuation is that the alleged action by Floyd was part of a conspiracy to secede existing among the Southern leaders, a theory which has no warrant in established facts. The charge that Floyd tried to arm the unfinished Southern forts with heavy ordnance should be laid at the door of the lobbyists of the Pittsburg iron-founders. The motive which brought about the manufacture of this ordnance is found not in a conspiracy to arm the South, but in the enterprise of the iron-founders of the North. That they were prepared for delivery before the

forts at Ship Island and Galveston were finished was owing to the fact that the manufacturers were to receive their pay for the ordnance only when it reached its destination; therefore, quick delivery was to their interest. The guns, however, were never shipped, the order for their delivery being rescinded by Acting Secretary Holt. So far were the Southern States from making preparation for armed rebellion that in 1860 they did not even make requisition for, nor did they receive, their full quota of new arms.

Truly, the South before going to war did not "sit down first and count the cost." She sprang incontinently into the conflict, and then prepared for its continuance. All the vessels of the navy, with one or two insignificant exceptions, remained with the United States. Commanders who were Southern in birth and sympathy, and who determined to cast in their lot with the Confederacy, first took their ships into Northern ports. President Davis, though honoring the sentiment, remembered with regret "how much was lost by their view of what their honor and duty demanded." It is a signal proof of their devotion to the cause that they offered themselves for any position in its service, leaving, with empty hands, posts which had become endeared by association and in which future recognition was assured.

Whatever may be our opinion as to the judgment of these men, it is impossible to doubt their sincerity. We may unquestionably take it

for granted that the men who followed the fortunes of the South were actuated by principle. A man does not change his allegiance, when to do so provides no prospects of gain and does open a possibility of loss, for other than what he deems to be honorable motives. The withdrawal of three hundred and twenty-one secessionist officers for a short time seriously crippled the Union navy. It is true that three hundred and fifty Southern men remained in the navy and did effective service. Of this number were Farragut and Jenkins. Of the naval officer who threw in his lot with that of the Confederacy, Admiral Semmes truly said:

"His profession was his only fortune; he depended upon it for the means of subsisting himself and family. If he remained where he was, a competency for life, and promotions, and honors, probably awaited him; if he went with the South, a dark, uncertain future was before him; he could not possibly better his condition, and, if the South failed, he would have thrown away the labor of a lifetime. The struggle was hard in other respects."

It is alleged that Union vessels were incapacitated for service in the cause of the North by the fact that Isaac Toucey, of Connecticut, who was Secretary of the Navy under Buchanan, had designedly placed them in far-off seas. But that this was of malice aforethought, done in the interest of secession, there is no positive evidence. On the other hand, it is true that the navy was not so ordered as to protect the interests of the North. Some of the vessels were on the coast

of Africa, and did not reach home until September, 1861. In fact, the United States navy was scattered over the seas in accordance with normal custom in a time of peace, and the only safe conclusion is that, even when secession was threatened, war had not been expected.

The naval resources and manufacturing facilities of the United States at the outbreaking of the Civil War were far from being adequate to the demands made upon them. In point of fact, the government "had not one establishment where a shaft could be made for steamers or a plate for ironclads." There were about six thousand seamen afloat in the United States service. The vessels were greatly inferior to those of European navies. Probably nine-tenths of them would have been quite useless in meeting battle-ships of the same class and tonnage belonging to almost any other nation. Of the ninety vessels belonging to the United States in 1861, no more than forty-two were in commission; there were twenty-seven others available; the rest were unserviceable. Counting those which were immediately put into commission, the United States could muster a fleet of sixty-nine vessels mounting one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three guns. The close of the struggle found the United States, to the alarm of Europe, in possession of five hundred and eighty-eight war-ships, including steamers for coast service and inland purposes, side-wheelers, screw- and sailing-ships. Yet in spite of what

93
89
LONGITUDE WEST
42
37
33
29
16
12
LONGITUDE WEST
NEBRASKA
IOWA
KANSAS
MISSOURI
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
ARKANSAS
LOUISIANA
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
TEXAS
GULF OF MEXICO
TOPEKA
Missouri
Mississippi R.
SPRINGFIELD
St. Louis
JEFFERSON CITY
Gasconade R.
PEA RIDGE
Cairo
Ohio
Wabash R.
West Fork of White R.
East Fork of White R.
INDIANAPOLIS
Salem
Brandenburg
Bardstown
Green R.
Burkesville
Cumberland
FT. HENRY
FT. DONELSON
ISLAND NO. 10
NASHVILLE
Stone R.
FT. PILLOW
Pittsburg Landing
Shiloh
Memphis
Corinth
Holly Springs
Tennessee R.
Lookout
TAHLEQUAH
Arkansas R.
White R.
LITTLE ROCK
Red R.
Vazoo R.
Mississippi R.
Big Black R.
Black Warrior R.
Tallapoosa R.
Tombigby R.
Alabama R.
Flint R.
Washita R.
Canal
JACKSON
Vicksburg
Pt. Gibson
Natchez
Pearl R.
Shreveport
Red R.
Sabine Cross Roads
Pleasant Hill
Sabine R.
Port Hudson
BATON ROUGE
Mobile
Pensacola
FT. PICKENS
FT. ST PHILIP
FT. JACKSON
New Orleans
Galveston

REFERENCE MAP
FOR THE
CIVIL WAR, 1861-65
SCALE OF MILES
0 50 100 200
EXPLANATION
Early Seceding States; thus TEXAS
Later Seceding States; thus VIRGINIA
Blockading Vessels, thus
FROM GREENWICH 81 77
FROM WASHINGTON 4 0
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
DELAWARE
DOVER
HARRISBURG
Philadelphia
Chambersburg
Gettysburg
Sharpsburg
Frederick
Baltimore
WASHINGTON
Harper's Ferry
Manassas
Bull Run
Chancellorsville
Fredericksburg
Stuanton
Yorktown
RICHMOND
FORTRESS MONROE
Hampton Roads
Norfolk
Navy Yard
Petersburg
Appomattox
Greensboro
RALEIGH
Fayetteville
Goldsboro
New Bern
Wilmington
FT. FISHER
Cape Fear
Cape Hatteras
Hatteras Inlet
Albemarle Sound
ROANOKE I.
Pamlico Sound
Salineville
Zanesville
Steubenville
WHEELING
Eagleport
COLUMBUS
Jackson
MORGANS RAID
FRANKFORT
Knoxville
Athens
Atlanta
Augusta
Macon
MILLEDGEVILLE
Savannah
Charleston
Beaufort
Port Royal
FT. PULASKI
FT. SUMTER
TALLAHASSE
Jacksonville
St. Augustine
Cedar Keys
COLUMBIA
SHERMAN'S MARCH
ATLANTIC OCEAN
37
33
29

was actually achieved in the way of constructing a navy, Secretary Welles wrote, as late as 1864: "Our country, whose strength and power must cause her to be identified with and maintained by her navy, and which possesses in such abundance the means of creating and sustaining one, has not, in all the navy-yards combined, the appliances possessed by single establishments in England and France."

It is difficult, without serious consideration, to grasp the extent of the sea-coast which the government of the United States undertook to effectively blockade. Stretching from Alexandria, Virginia, down rivers, bays, the ocean, and the Gulf to the Rio Grande, in Texas, it represented more than three thousand five hundred miles and almost two hundred river and harbor openings.

The government required, in addition to fleets necessary to enforce the blockade, ships to pursue blockade-runners and privateers. This demand created unexampled activity and demonstrated the futility of relying on private shipbuilding. Measures were therefore immediately taken by the government at Washington to purchase everything afloat that could be bought. Immediately there began the construction of war-vessels which were equipped for the service required of them with all the latest devices. Among these was that "immense river fleet, composed of river steamboat rams, ironclads, tinclads, and mortar boats," which did such efficient

service at Donelson, Vicksburg, New Orleans, and Richmond.

Just what the result would have been had California followed the lead of her Congressmen at the beginning of the war and joined the South, it is hard to say. That the position of the South would have been greatly strengthened by her accession cannot be doubted, for the task of the United States navy, as well as its army, would have been tremendously increased. Along the great lakes there was little serious trouble. It is true the representatives of the South in Canada, emulating the example of John Brown and of the engineers of the "underground railroads" of earlier days, made expeditions across the borders, which at St. Albans, Vermont, proved serious; but these operations, on the whole, were by land and not by water. But of course it was necessary to protect the lakes, and towns like Buffalo, at one time seemingly threatened, felt safer by reason of the presence of gunboats on the lakes.

Over against the naval equipment of the Union, what had the Confederacy? The question has been answered thus:

"The Confederate States had at their disposal a small number of trained officers; some of these, like Buchanan, Semmes, Brown, Maffitt, and Brooks, were men of extraordinary professional qualities; but except its officers, the Confederate government had nothing in the shape of a navy. It had not a single ship-of-war. It had no abundant fleet of merchant-vessels in its ports from which to draw reserves. It had no seamen, for its people were not

given to seafaring pursuits. Its only ship-yards were Norfolk and Pensacola. Norfolk, with its immense supplies of ordnance and equipment was indeed valuable; but though the three hundred Dahlgren guns captured in the yard were a permanent acquisition, the yard itself was lost when the war was one-fourth over. The South was without any large force of skilled mechanics, and such as it had were early summoned to the army. . . . Worst of all, there was no raw material, except the timber that was standing in the forests. Under these circumstances, no general plan of naval policy on a large scale could be carried out, and the conflict on the Southern side became a species of partisan, desultory warfare."

Nevertheless, the Confederate States went bravely to work to supply its needs. Secret acts of its Congress were passed on May 11, 1861, following which agents went to England, to the North, and to Canada, with authority to purchase vessels for the South. Only in the first-named country, however, were they successful. Steps were then taken by the Confederate States to construct ironclads, the first result of which was the raising and plating of the renowned "Merrimac" ("Virginia"), which caused such consternation to the North.

When the United States began building gunboats, skilled mechanics were sent from the South with instructions to obtain work on the boats which were under construction in St. Louis. The result was that the Confederate authorities very early obtained accurate information as to the number, strength, and probable destination of the gunboats, and immediately directed the preparation of such defences of the

Mississippi as might cope with the fleet from the northward.

By August 27, 1862, in relation to the criticisms which followed the fall of New Orleans and the destruction of the "Merrimac" in Hampton Roads by her own crew, Secretary Mallory could report that his department had established eighteen yards for building war-vessels, had built twelve war-ships, had purchased or otherwise acquired and converted to war-vessels forty-four, and had then under construction thirty-two.

As the Southern States one after another seceded, their first care was to take possession of the government property situated within their territory. From the stand-point of their belief in the right to withdraw from the Union, this action was perfectly justifiable. The sites on which these properties were situated had been ceded to the central government with the understanding that they should revert to the respective States when no longer used for their protection or benefit. The properties themselves had been created by means of a revenue derived from every part of the Union. Consequently, the South, in dissolving partnership with the Northern States, desired to adjust matters amicably with reference to these public possessions. That there could be no question in the minds of either or both the parties (granting the right to secede) as to the ownership of the sites is shown by many public documents relative to the cession

of such lands. As an example, we will quote an Act of the State of Virginia in reference to Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps:

"WHEREAS, it is shown to the present General Assembly that the government of the United States is solicitous that certain lands at Old Point Comfort, and at the shoals called the Rip Raps, should be, with the right of property and entire jurisdiction thereon, vested in the said United States for the purpose of fortification and other objects of national defence:

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that it shall be lawful and proper for the governor of this Commonwealth, by conveyance or deeds in writing under his hand and seal of the State, to transfer, assign, and make over unto the said United States the right of property and title, as well as all the jurisdiction which this Commonwealth possesses over the lands and shoal at Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps:

"And be it further enacted, That, should the said United States at any time abandon the said lands and shoal, or appropriate them to any other purposes than those indicated in the preamble to this act, that then and in that case, the same shall revert to and revest in this Commonwealth."

The Southern States, on seceding, wished and sought, as we saw in the case of South Carolina, to treat with the Federal government in regard to the equitable adjustment of the value of the public properties situated upon lands thus (as they held) reverting to them. And there is no reason for thinking that this was not done in good faith and, at first, in the belief that such an adjustment might be made. But the position taken by the Republican party of the North prohibited it.

Thereupon the Confederacy seized and appro-

priated to its own use and defence all national properties situated within the bounds of the seceding States. This included the revenue cutter "William Aiken," a boat of ninety tons and armed with one forty-two pounder pivot gun; the revenue cutter "Lewis Cass;" the steamer "Ida;" the "McClellan," carrying five guns; and a few other small and unimportant vessels. The "Fulton," a war steamer carrying three guns, had been wrecked off Pensacola, and was rebuilt by the Southern government. Altogether, the ten vessels seized by the Confederacy, and forming the nucleus of its navy, which soon became so formidable, contained an armament of not more than fifteen guns.

The Confederate States obtained by seizure the munitions of war found in Charleston Harbor and in the other ports and forts on the Southern coast. These in themselves were by no means inconsiderable. But, considering the magnitude of the enterprise upon which the South had entered, the vastly superior preparations of the North, and her stupendous resources, the nucleus of warlike equipment in the hands of the Confederacy in the fall of 1861 was most pitiably small.

Moreover, the industrial organization of the South was in every way unfavorable to the prosecution of her cause. Her staple products were cotton and tobacco. The former, a source of immense wealth though it was, was rendered useless by the effective blockade established by the

North. The whole system of agriculture had to be changed in order that the land might support her army and population. This was but slowly accomplished, because of the fact that the people held to the conviction that the war would be of short duration. Consequently the South was soon in possession of vast stores of her staple product, which could not be turned into money, and at the same time she was suffering for lack of the necessaries of subsistence. This condition was largely influential in the final result.

Then, too, the facilities for transportation were very meagre in the South. The railroads were few in number and were in the habit of depending on Northern foundries and machine-shops for their rails and rolling stock. At the opening of hostilities this supply was, of course, immediately cut off. The skilled employees of the railroads were nearly all Northern men, and the greater part of them left their situations at the commencement of the war.

Never was a country so totally unprepared to fight its battles. And the rapidity with which the South created out of nothing so efficient a military organization as she did is perhaps the most striking feature of the great struggle. It evidenced a courage, a determination, and an absolute devotion to their cause on the part of the people nothing less than marvellous.

The Southern Congress, in retaliatory response to the Act of the North by which the property and estates of all those aiding in

the "insurrection" were confiscated, passed a measure of sequestration. This included the estates and property of all alien enemies. It applied, also, to the debts which had been incurred by Southern people to Northern merchants. The extent to which the South profited by this Act may be seen from the following, which is copied from the *Richmond Despatch* of September 24:

"We have seen it estimated that under the operation of the Sequestration Act of the Confederate Congress, from fifteen to thirty millions of dollars will pass into the custody of the Confederate receivers in Virginia. The estimate strikes us as moderate. It is well known that nearly all the merchants of our cities, towns, and villages were in the habit of purchasing their stock in the North. Even though a small portion of the merchants of the interior laid in their goods in Richmond, still, inasmuch as the Richmond merchants bought the largest portion of their goods from New York, the result was the same as if the country merchants had all gone directly to the city. The war came on in April, just after the season when the merchants had laid in their spring supplies of goods from the North. Very few of these goods were purchased for cash. The custom of trade was to buy on credit, and nearly all these goods were bought on the usual terms of six months' time. Thus the war opened on an indebtedness from Virginia (and doubtless the case was the same with all the Southern States) to the North equal to the total of the spring purchases of her merchants. This indebtedness was augmented by the whole amount of old debts of prior standing, which had resulted from a course of business that had existed for a long train of years. From these considerations we are inclined to put the indebtedness from Virginia to the North on mercantile account at a very high figure. We do not think it can be less than twenty millions. For that portion of the State not overrun by the enemy we suppose it to be at least fifteen millions."

The weakness of the South was its lack of endurance. It placed in the field at the outset an army sufficiently large for the purpose of resisting invasion of short duration. At first there were plenty of volunteers; in fact, the contention among the men of the South in the first year of the war was not as to who should go, but as to who should stay at home. But the South exhausted herself in the outset. It is true a very large proportion of whites were able to take up arms because they could with security leave the slaves to cultivate their fields and care for their homes, but the very eagerness of citizens to volunteer hastened defeat, for the supply of recruits was far from being inexhaustible. Even the North recruited from itself down to the dregs; the fate of the South was determined by its far smaller population.

In regard to the men who led the Confederate army, they are thus characterized by "An English Combatant:"

"Who are our generals, thought I, walking about, and meditating; our men are as brave as steel, but who are to lead them? Our best officers are from the old army, yet none of them held higher rank than that of colonel. R. E. Lee was in the cavalry, and was a lieutenant-colonel; Joseph E. Johnston was quartermaster-general, and ranked as lieutenant-colonel; Beauregard has been major of engineers; Evans, Longstreet, and others did not rank higher than major of cavalry or infantry, and had seen but little service, except on the frontier among the Indians; Bragg was a retired captain of artillery; T. J. Jackson was Professor of Mathematics and of Tactics in the University of Virginia; D. H. Hill was a lawyer; Polk, an Episcopal

bishop in Louisiana, etc. This was all the talent we had, and much of it was only said to be 'promising.' General Lee was at Richmond, acting as Secretary of War; General Cooper was there also as adjutant-general; Bragg and Polk were in Tennessee and Johnston in the Valley; Beauregard was alone at Manassas, having Evans, Ewell, Longstreet, and a few less known names, as subordinates in the approaching struggle."

We may say, in conclusion, therefore, that if the war found the North in a state of unpreparedness, it found the South in an even worse plight. Wholly dependent on agriculture, and obliged to look to the North and Europe for all the necessaries of life, the Confederacy soon found that men are useless unless provided with arms. Accordingly, the one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers who, east and west of the Mississippi River, in the early part of 1861 flocked to the standard of the Confederate States, could not be provided with the simplest means of self-defence, not to mention other munitions of modern warfare; yet, like some of the crusaders of old, they appeared to imagine that all these would be given them by miracle.

But the age of miracles was past, and no one realized the fact more keenly than the more practical leaders of the Southern government. How these men wrought something out of nothing; how they gave to an infantry accoutrements, simple and rude at times, to be sure, but serviceable and well enough adapted to their use to enable the Confederate soldier to win universal admiration; how a cavalry without arms or

Richmond June 30th 1861

Hon P C Johnson
Chm Com

Sir.

In answer to your communicati
of 28th inst, I have the honor to enclose
a statement of the Chief of ordnance
exhibiting the number of arms now
held by the Government of the Confederate
States in store for future issue.
The greater number of arms belonging
to the Government are in the hands
of troops serving in the field.
A large amount of arms and
believed to be within the limits of
several of the States. These it is
hoped will be made available for the
public service, either by transfer to
the Government or by issue to troops
organized within the limits of the State
and generally tendered for the confederate
service. We are in the hope and expectation

LETTER FROM JEFFERSON DAVIS TO P. C. JOHNSON

I receiving an additional supply I asks from the various sources to which I have resorted For obvious reasons I must request that this communication shall be regarded as confidential

I am most
Respectfully
Jefferson Davis

equipment was furnished with these necessaries of war; how the armies of a country with no factories, laboratories, mines, or foundries secured artillery, powder, caps, and bullets; how this government, whose people had few skilled artisans, constructed a fleet; in a word, how, thrown on its own resources, it was able to maintain for four years the greatest war of modern times, is one of the problems of history. It was because these Southern men were Americans—because, after all, they, too, were "Yankees" to the core, inventive, resourceful, courageous — that they were able to do these things.

It is well to remember, also, that at the South, as contrasted with the North, the arsenals had been used as depots, and only the one at Fayetteville, North Carolina, had any machinery at all. The work of preparing war material, with the exception of what was done at Harper's Ferry, had been wholly performed at the North. "Not an arm," says Jefferson Davis, "not a gun, not a gun-carriage, and, except during the Mexican War, scarcely a round of ammunition had been prepared in the Confederate States." ("Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. i. p. 472.) There were no skilled workmen, of course, and consequently no powder, except the coarser sort used in blasting, was produced in the South. It lacked saltpetre, it lacked lead, it lacked copper, it lacked iron, it lacked leather, it lacked money—it lacked everything. And yet in a short time all these were found,—copper for

field artillery; percussion caps; saltpetre for the manufacture of gunpowder; lead for cartridges; iron for guns and machinery; leather for shoes, for harness; and, in fact, everything else that was required to carry on a long struggle was forthcoming.

Until Fort Sumter was fired on, powder was bought at the North; but afterwards the South had to depend upon her own resources or on the precarious methods employed by blockade-runners. Battle-fields were gleaned for lead and small-arms. Soon, however, the Tredegar Iron-Works were turning out artillery at Richmond, and sword-bayonets were being made at Fayetteville, North Carolina. There was, also, a saltpetre refinery at Nashville, Tennessee, which utilized the nitre found there and in the caves of that State. It is true that a lead-mine existed in Virginia, but it was in an unsafe region, as were also the only blast-furnaces south of Richmond, — those in east Tennessee and Virginia. The progress of development, however, appears to have been steady, and soon there were two small powder-mills in South Carolina, one near Raleigh, North Carolina, and a fourth in New Orleans, where powder was manufactured until the fall of that city. Then, again, the government of the Confederacy took the initiative and constructed powder-mills in Augusta, Georgia, and elsewhere. The chemical works of the government were located at Charlotte, North Carolina, and on the Cape Fear River, in the same State,

the Confederacy maintained a fishery in order to procure oil. The chief armories were at Richmond and Fayetteville, but the whole South was organized into districts, each presided over by an ordnance officer, and nitre, old iron, lead, and other material were carefully collected. But in spite of its nitre and mining bureau, in spite of every exertion made to arm and equip the splendid soldiery it sent to the front, the South suffered great hardship—a hardship that is scarcely conceivable. The whole country was a huge Valley Forge.

Much reliance was, of course, placed on the blockade-runners. These vessels were small, low, compactly built craft, using fuel that made little smoke. On account of the dangers of navigation, Albemarle Sound, off the coast of North Carolina, was selected as the base of their operations, and Wilmington as their port. Plying between that point and the West Indies, with depots at Nassau and Havana, the blockade-runners usually carried six or seven hundred bales of cotton and brought back in return munitions of war and other necessaries.

The Confederacy was greatly aided by the above methods. To them ought to be added appropriations made by Several States and the general government itself; cotton loans, paper money, and bonds of the States and the Confederate States, to say nothing of private munificence, for money, plate, personal property—everything owned by private persons—were

freely given for what was considered the general good. Whole regiments were sometimes equipped at private expense, while every soldier was glad to furnish his own horse as well as his own accoutrements. Many took their body servants with them, and these became useful in felling trees and throwing up breastworks, a work that the Federal government sought to interfere with by declaring free all slaves so employed. Just why the blacks were not armed by Southern men can never be satisfactorily explained. It is said that General Lee advised it, but that Davis set his face against the proposition.

In the efforts of the South its women displayed great heroism; by every means they encouraged and supported those who fought for the Stars and Bars. They endured privation; they suffered from bitter want with earnest and uncomplaining courage. Old clothing was turned and returned for the growing children; thorns and pegs were employed as pins; china-berries and persimmon seeds were converted into buttons; substitutes, including rye, were found for tea and coffee; and countless other inventions were created by the necessities of the times. Every loom on the plantation was set to work; shoes, stockings, and clothing were made for those in the field as well as those at home. Every effort was made to aid the cause of the South.

It was this popular devotion to a cause—hesitatingly embraced by the majority of Southerners, but once espoused faithfully adhered to—

that was the life of the Confederacy. The full strength of this enthusiasm was not reached until the Northern armies crossed the Potomac. The whole South flew to arms in defence of home and fireside, and the logic of events proved stronger than any theoretical arguments based on the logic of Constitutional law. War had come. It must be fought until the last man fell in the ditch. Thus, to the Southerner the struggle once entered upon became a fight for life—a resistance to invaders.

X

SOUTHERN SUCCESSES

THE Confederate generals were severely criticised both by contemporary journalists and by historians of the South for not having followed the victory at Bull Run by marching on Washington. Pollard declares that "for days there was nothing to oppose them but an utterly demoralized army intent upon a continuance of their flight at the approach of our forces." He pictures the enemy "still cowed, dispirited, and trembling for his safety in the refuges of Washington." But it is very apparent that this view of the case minimizes the difficulties which were clearly seen by the leaders of the Confederate forces. Had success in such an undertaking appeared to any degree possible, the failure on the part of Johnston and Beauregard to attempt it would be unpardonable from the Southern standpoint; for such a demonstration in the Northern capital would have had, on the combatants and on the rest of the world, a moral effect so great as possibly to have decided the ultimate issue. But Johnston declares that "all the military conditions we knew forbade an attempt on Washington." He cites the facts that the Confederate army was no less disorganized than that of the Union; the raw troops were unprepared for

marching or assailing intrenchments; they were in want of necessary rations and ammunition; moreover, the fortifications to be assailed were manned by undefeated troops, and the Potomac was strongly defended by United States war-vessels. These reasons, which convinced Johnston of the impracticability of the attack, also reassured the Federal generals (though not Secretary Stanton) of the safety of Washington. Cameron telegraphed to New York: "Our works on the south bank of the Potomac are impregnable, being well manned with reinforcements. The capital is safe."

During the rest of the summer the two great armies which faced each other in the valley of Virginia remained inactive, though each employed the time in the drilling of recruits and effective preparations for future work. The Southern side was enlivened by a quarrel between President Davis and General Johnston over a question of precedence affecting the latter. Jealousies and disputes of this nature continued among the Southern leaders, to the great detriment of their cause.

During the period of inactivity between the armies in Virginia a lively little war was being carried on in the valley of the Mississippi. The principal scene of these hostilities was Missouri, where in May a severe political conflict, in which physical force was brought largely into play, was waged for the possession of the State. Governor Jackson's attempt to carry Missouri into

the Confederacy was frustrated by the adroitness and determination of F. P. Blair, Jr., and General Lyon, of the Federal army. On the 13th of June Governor Jackson issued a proclamation calling for fifty thousand volunteers to enter "into the service of the State for the purpose of repelling invasion." The governor was actuated by a determination to insist upon Missouri's right to take her own course in the national dispute. He moved the capital to Boonville, on the south bank of the Missouri River. General Lyon followed him on the 20th of June with seven thousand Federal troops. These were met by a small force of Missourians,—a "barefoot brigade,"—who were defeated, but not until they had shown that they were of good fighting metal.

The first engagement of any importance was that of Carthage. The Federal troops were under the command of General Sigel and General Lyon. The brave and popular General Price led the men of Missouri. Sigel was without cavalry, Price was deficient in artillery. What few cannon the Missourians possessed, they were obliged, for want of better ammunition, to load with trace-chains, bits of iron, and rocks. When Sigel first saw the Missourian troops coming against him, he sneered at their lack of discipline. They came into line like a worm fence. But after a while he exclaimed "Great God, was the like ever seen! Raw recruits, unacquainted with war, standing their ground like veterans, hurling defiance at every discharge of the batteries against

Head Quarters 1st Brigade, 2 Corps A.P.
near Fairfax Station
Sept 26th 1861

Major,

Your letter of the 20th inst has been received, and in reply, I regret to say that Capt Lipscomb's Company has not turned in the Cadet Muskets, and I fear that I will be unable to forward them to the V.M.I. until their place can be supplied with other per cussion Muskets. I am very desirous of having them returned, and have made efforts to effect that object but in vain.

Your most Obdt Servt
T. J. Jackson.
Brig Genl P.A.C.S.

Maj S. Bassett French
Asst Adt Genl to
the Gov of Virginia.

LETTER FROM "STONEWALL" JACKSON TO MAJOR FRENCH

them, and cheering their own batteries whenever discharged. Such material, properly worked up, would constitute the best troops in the world." Victory was with the Missourians; and though the loss of men was not great on either side, what was of more importance, from the spoils of victory they provided themselves with much-needed arms.

By the first of August, 1861, Price had been reinforced by McCulloch with a small division of regular Confederate soldiers, while Lyon and Sigel had made a conjunction. The two armies sought each other, and on the 9th of August they collided at Wilson's Creek. General McCulloch's official report of this engagement says, "No two opposing forces ever fought with greater desperation; inch by inch the enemy gave way, and were driven from their position. Totten's battery fell back; Missourians, Arkansans, Louisianians, and Texans pushed forward; the incessant roll of musketry was deafening and the balls fell thick as hailstones; but still our gallant Southerners pushed onward, and with one wild yell broke upon the enemy, pushing them back and strewing the ground with their dead. Nothing could withstand the impetuosity of our final charge. The enemy fled and could not again be rallied." This was a severe and discouraging blow to the Federal forces. They lost not far from two thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The brave chief-in-command, Major-General Lyon, was among the killed.

The Confederates gained here also large supplies of arms and ammunition.

In the mean time General Frémont had been appointed by the Federal administration to take command of the Missouri department. He resolved to establish a military line from Cape Girardeau, on the Mississippi, through Ironton and Rolla, to Jefferson City on the Missouri. In this work, however, he was hampered by the strong secessionist element which prevailed. Being a radical Republican, and a man not distinguished by any noticeable degree of tact, he resolved on a dictatorial measure which gave the authorities in Washington much trouble and resulted in his own downfall. He issued a proclamation (August 30, 1861) confiscating the property "of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or who shall be directly proved to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field." Their slaves, if they had any, were declared free men. In accordance with this proclamation, he set up a bureau of manumission, and gave papers of freedom to the slaves. How little consideration Frémont gave to the lawfulness and expediency of this action is shown by his letter to Lincoln, in which he says, "In the night I decided upon the proclamation. I wrote it the next morning and printed it the same day. I did it without consultation or advice from any one."

Of course, the abolitionists and the radical Republicans of the North entirely approved of Fré-

mont's action. Lincoln, however, though it was not his habit to insist upon particular regard for the dignity and precedents of his office, was not yet ready to endorse emancipation. Moreover, he was endeavoring to aid the Unionist citizens of Kentucky in retaining the loyalty of that State. He knew that this proclamation would be likely to defeat this object. Therefore, he requested Frémont to modify the objectionable paragraph so as to bring it into accord with the Confiscation Act of Congress, approved August 6. The caution and gentleness with which Lincoln dealt with Frémont's arrogant act is characteristic of the man. Nevertheless, Sumner wrote: "Our President is now dictator, imperator, which you will; but how vain to have the power of a god and not to use it godlike." A terrible dissension arose in the Republican party over this matter. A large and growing number in the North wanted abolition outright and immediate, and were bitterly disappointed that their President did not follow Frémont's lead. George Hoadley, afterwards governor of Ohio, wrote to Secretary Chase:

"Our people are in a state of great consternation and wrath on account of the quarrel between Frémont and the Administration; . . . no word describes popular sentiment but 'fury.' I have found men of sense, such as are called conservative, advocate the wildest steps, such as the impeachment of Mr. Lincoln, the formation of a party to carry on the war irrespective of the President and under Frémont, etc., etc. For myself, I must say that if the letters of Mr. Lincoln to Magoffin and Frémont are any fair indication

of his character and policy, I pray God to forgive my vote for him. Loyal men are giving their lives and means like water to no end, if the imbecility of Buchanan's administration is to be surpassed thus. I cannot, cannot think that your wise head and true antislavery heart have consented to this abasement of the manhood and honor of our nation. Let Mr. Lincoln, while he is conciliating the contemptible State of Kentucky, a State which ought to have been coerced long ago, bear in mind that the free States may want a little conciliation, that they are not wasting their substance to secure the *niggers of traitors*. . . . I have never heard wilder or more furious denunciation than yesterday and day before found expression from the lips of cool men. Three times I was applied to to join in getting up a public meeting to denounce the Administration and support Frémont; and while no such disturbance will be permitted, I am nevertheless certain that there is here a perfect and, I am sorry to say, very angry unanimity in support both of Frémont's proclamation and of his action at St. Louis in other respects, expensive though it may have been. . . . General Frémont is thus far the favorite of the Northwest, because he has come up to the standard. And if the election were next fall, to displace him would be to make him President."

Two months after the issuing of his proclamation Frémont was relieved from his command of the military department of the West. Previous to this, however, he sent Colonel Mulligan to occupy and fortify Lexington, on the Missouri River, with a force of three thousand men and a battery of artillery. In accordance with Frémont's instructions, he confiscated the funds, considerable in amount, in the bank at Lexington. General Price hastened to Lexington and gave battle to the Federals before the plans of fortification could be accomplished. A peculiar feature of the battle of Lexington were the movable

breastworks which General Price constructed out of bales of hemp. After fifty-two hours of continuous fighting, Mulligan was compelled to surrender on September 20. Pollard recounts an anecdote which illustrates the unscientific nature of the Missouri warfare:

"A number of citizens came in from the neighboring country, and fought, as they expressed it, 'on their own hook.' . . . An old man, about sixty years of age, came up daily from his farm, with his walnut stock rifle and a basket of provisions, and went to work just as if he were engaged in hauling rails or some other necessary labor of his farm. He took his position behind a large stump upon the descent of the hill upon which the fortification was constructed, where he fired with deadly aim during each day of the siege."

The Missourians claim to have lost but twenty-five killed and seventy-two wounded. In addition to much larger casualties, the Union forces were depleted by over three thousand prisoners.

Until September Kentucky had considered herself a neutral State. From among her population men were enlisted for both armies. But on the 4th of September General Polk occupied Columbus, near the conjunction of the Missouri and the Mississippi. This he called "The Gibraltar of the West." Kentucky's Unionist Legislature now declared that her neutrality had been invaded by the Confederate forces. The governor was called upon to expel the invaders, and to invoke the aid of the United States government for that purpose. He vetoed these resolutions, but the majority of the people were

against him, and Kentucky was saved to the Union.

Early in November General Grant, under the instructions of Frémont, dropped down the Mississippi with about four thousand men, and landed on the Kentucky shore above Columbus. From thence he crossed over to Belmont. There he attacked General Pillow, who was in command of three regiments of Confederate troops, and cut his way into the enemy's camp. Exulting in their victory, Grant's men dispersed to plunder the enemy, who, meanwhile, was reinforced by General Polk. Grant's generalship was now exemplified by his address in cutting his way out of a perilous position, which he did at a great loss of men and munitions. This, however, ended for a time the war in the Mississippi Valley.

In the mean time the inactivity of the armies on the Potomac was varied by the Federal disaster at Ball's Bluff. This is a spot about thirty miles above Washington, where the banks of the Potomac are steep and high. General Stone had been sent to reconnoitre in that neighborhood upon Confederate troops whose intentions were uncertain. His order said, "Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them." This was leaving a good deal to Stone's discretion. Colonel Devens was sent with a regiment to Harrison's Island, midway in the river between Poolsville Landing and Ball's Bluff. He was later ordered by Stone to

cross to the latter place with five companies of his regiment, to surprise a Confederate camp whose existence had been reported. No such camp was found, and on the morning of the 21st of October Devens was resting his seven hundred men in an exposed clearing on the Bluff. Here he was attacked, and Colonel E. D. Baker, at the moment in command of the brigade, went over to Devens's assistance. They were attacked by a Confederate force from out of the dense surrounding woods. Baker was killed and the Federal troops thrown into terrible confusion. They fled in every direction, many falling or throwing themselves over the steep bluff. Those who attempted to swim across the swift-flowing river were almost all either drowned or shot.

Out of a force of less than two thousand, at least a thousand were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. This disaster, so humiliating to the North, was very evidently the result of a blunder. Somebody must be punished to satisfy public opinion. Stone, who does not seem to have been the one to blame, was incarcerated in Fort Lafayette for six months, and then released without trial or exculpation.

Ball's Bluff, serious as it was, forms an incident in the preliminary sparring with which the two armies occupied themselves, to the intense distrust of the people on both sides, during the summer and autumn of 1861. McClellan, who seemed unable to make up his mind to put into action the organization he was perfecting, was

still disinclined to fight. He magnified Johnston's army of fifty thousand troops to one hundred and fifty thousand. He drilled, and asked of the North patience; this he was given to the utmost limit.

Early in the war the United States found that its blockade of the Southern ports could not be made effective without the possession of some Southern harbors as coaling stations and supply depots. The defence of Charleston, Mobile, and other Southern ports forms a remarkable chapter in the history of modern warfare. On the 29th of October, 1861, there steamed out of Hampton Roads fifty vessels under sealed orders. It was as nondescript an assortment of craft as any modern power had ever formed into a war-fleet. Their destination was Port Royal, South Carolina, where, under Flag-Officer Dupont, the fleet was to concentrate. Though these orders were supposed to be kept a profound secret, Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War, telegraphed Governor Pickens, Columbia, South Carolina, under date of November 1: "I have just received information which I consider entirely reliable, that the enemy's expedition is intended for Port Royal." This harbor is about midway between Savannah and Charleston. The several streams flowing into it form numerous islands, some of which were fortified, the principal forts being Walker and Beauregard, on Hilton Head and Philips Island respectively. The Federal war-ships, headed by the "Wabash"

and the "Susquehanna," circled before these forts for four hours, delivering broadsides until they were reduced. This successful attack gave possession of Port Royal and the adjacent coast to the North.

Shortly before the Port Royal expedition Galveston, Texas, had been bombarded by Commander Allen. In November, 1861, Pensacola, Florida, was bombarded by Fort Pickens and United States war-vessels, while in December of the same year there was a naval engagement at Cape Hatteras. The activity of the naval department of the Federal government was now intense and persistent, and its every energy was bent on increasing the number of available ships. The effort bore fruit early in 1862, when one hundred and twenty-six war-ships, carrying upward of one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, sailed for the South and almost one hundred other ships were in active service.

The Civil War revolutionized sea-fighting. At its close the men-of-war which had theretofore been relied upon by the most advanced nations of the world were rendered useless by naval fighting machines against which they were as vulnerable as card-houses. The Civil War brought in the ironclads and the monitors. The "Merrimac" was the first vessel of this class to come into action. She was built in 1855, and, lying in Elizabeth River at the time when the Norfolk ship-yards were evacuated by the United States, she was sunk so that she might not be of use to

the Confederates. In this, however, the Federal intention seriously miscarried. The Confederates conceived the possibility of converting her into a "shot-proof steam battery." Being raised, they cut her down to within three feet and a half of her water-line. A slanting roof covered with iron four inches thick formed her armor. She carried ten guns. Her armor and plan of armament were designed by Lieutenant John M. Brooke.

From the construction dock the "Merrimac" went immediately into battle, for the need of her by the South was great. On the 8th of March, 1862, under the command of Captain Buchanan, this sea-monster steamed slowly down Elizabeth River on her trial trip, the intent of which was to do deadly work upon any Federal vessels that should come in her way. She was accompanied by the gunboats "Beaufort" and "Raleigh," each with one gun. Later, when going into action, she was joined by the "Jamestown," with two guns, the "Teaser," with one gun, and the "Patrick Henry," with twelve guns. The Federal force, including ships and shore batteries, attacked by this little fleet, mounted three hundred guns. Selecting the "Congress" and the "Cumberland," two frigates lying off Newport News, the "Merrimac" first tried her strength upon them. The latter she struck at right angles with her terrible ram, making such a hole in her side as a "horse and cart might drive through." The "Cumberland" was commanded by Lieu-

tenant Morris, and notwithstanding the loss of life occasioned by the blow and hot fire of the "Merrimac," he gallantly continued fighting until, after thirty-five minutes, his vessel sank "with the American flag flying at the peak."

The "Congress" tried to escape, but she grounded, and her sides were riddled by the "Merrimac" and her accompanying escort until the Federal commander was compelled to display the white flag. Her officers surrendered, but soon afterwards seized an opportunity to escape. The vessel burned until her exploding magazines blew her into fragments. The United States "Minnesota" also stranded, having been so pierced and pounded by the Confederate guns that she would have been helpless in deep water. The "Merrimac," though one hundred guns had been concentrated upon her, sustained no injury other than the demolishing of her smoke stack and the weakening or breaking of her ram.

Darkness preventing further action, the "Merrimac" and the other Confederate vessels retired, with the intention of finishing their work on the morrow. But by the dawn of the 9th a new antagonist had appeared on the scene. News of the construction of the "Merrimac" had reached the North, and Northern ingenuity was set to work to produce a vessel which might cope with the expected monster. John Ericsson had planned and constructed the "Monitor," the first turret-ship which was accepted by the Naval Commission. "A cheese box on a plank" well

describes the appearance of this new fighting craft. She was protected by a still heavier defensive armor than the "Merrimac," but was armed with only two guns.

The details of the duel which took place on the 9th of March, 1862, between these two strange fighting craft is well known. Neither could make any serious impression on the other. But the timely appearance of the "Monitor" not only saved the "Minnesota," but cut short a career for the "Merrimac" that might have rendered the history of the Civil War vastly different from what it is. Which ironclad had the advantage in the struggle it is hard to say. Their commanders considered that further battle between them would be useless, and accordingly each withdrew. On the 10th of May, Johnston having determined to retreat from the Peninsula, the Confederate evacuation of Norfolk became necessary, and the "Merrimac," being both unseaworthy and of too deep draft to ascend the river, was burned. No other vessel of her design was built, but "monitors" were constructed, and henceforth the ironclad became an essential element in naval warfare.

The South continued her active privateering, greatly to the distress of the North. Moncure D. Conway characterizes the latter's feelings regarding this matter in "The Rejected Stone:"

"A cry comes up to the ear of America, a long, piercing cry of amazement and indignation, recognizable as one which can come only when the profoundest emotions of the human

pocket are stirred. The privateers are at large! They have taken away my coffee, and I know not where they have laid it. They have taken my India goods with swords and staves. For my first-class ship they have cast lots.

"Was such depravity ever known before? So long as it was a human soul, launched by God on the eternal sea, that they despoiled; so long as it was only a few million bales of humanity captured; so long as it was but the scuttling of the hearts of mothers and fathers and husbands and wives, we remained patient and resigned; did we not? But coffee and sugar! Good God! What is that blockade about? To seize a poor innocent sloop! Has slavery no bowels? And its helpless family of molasses-barrels! Can hearts be so void of pity? Slavery must end! The spirit of the age demands it. The blood of a dozen captured freights crieth to Heaven in silveriest accents against it. Brothers, there is a laughter that opens into the fountain of tears."

Stock companies were organized in the South for the purpose of making a business of preying upon the enemy's commerce; and large sums of money were subscribed for the purpose of building and fitting out privateers. The *New York Herald* of June 2, 1861, says:

"On the 26th of last month there were under seizure, or as prizes in the port of New Orleans, the following vessels. [Then follows the list.] Of the above vessels some doubt attaches as to the seizure of the "Enoch Train" and "Wilbur Fiske," but the probabilities are that they have been confiscated. The seizures made by the Confederates up to the last accounts may be thus enumerated:

Off the different ports	12
In port	30
Steamers captured on the Mississippi	15
Total	57."

"We are satisfied," the *New York Herald* of August 10, 1861, says, "that already twenty million dollars' worth of

property has been lost in various ways through the operations of these highwaymen of the seas, increasing daily in number, and becoming more and more daring from impunity. The worst effect is not the loss of the vessels and their cargoes, but the destruction of our trade. Our commerce with the West Indies was immense before the pirates commenced their depredations. Now no Northern vessel will get a charter or can be insured for any reasonable premium. English bottoms are taking all our trade. When the 'Great Eastern' was here she could have been filled with cargo if her draft of water were not so great. Thus our shipping interest is literally ruined."

The most famous of the commerce-destroying cruisers was the "Alabama." Captain Bulloch bought her of Liverpool ship-builders for £47,-500. At the ship-yards she was known as "No. 290." That she was designed for Confederate service Minister Adams very well knew. He strongly exerted himself to have her seized by the British authorities. But before the slow-moving English officials had taken action the "Alabama" sailed. On August 24 she was duly commissioned as a Confederate States cruiser, Captain Semmes, commander. She was one thousand and forty tons burden, carried eight guns, and had a steam-propeller. The latter could be lifted out of the water, and then she worked as a sailing vessel of barkentine rig. The record of her success as a commerce-destroyer was phenomenal. One of her earliest successes was the engagement in the Gulf of Mexico, in January, 1862, with the United States gunboat "Hatteras," which she defeated in thirteen minutes. The Atlantic was the scene of her

greatest success, although the Pacific and Indian Oceans were swept by her. After two years of ceaseless activity, by which over ten millions of dollars' worth of ships and their cargoes were captured or destroyed, the "Alabama" put in at Cherbourg, France, to refit. On June 19 she came from the harbor and engaged the United States sloop of war "Kearsarge," which was of somewhat heavier metal and in much better condition to fight. In less than two hours the "Alabama" was a sunken wreck. Her crew was rescued by the English yacht "Deerhound."

The "Florida" was another Confederate vessel bargained for and built in England. In the shipyard she went under the name "Oreto," and sailed with English officers and crew. Her armament was placed aboard after she got to sea, and then, having taken the name "Florida," and command of her being assumed by Captain J. N. Maffitt, she proceeded to make prizes until October 7, 1863, when she was compelled to surrender to the United States "Wachusett" at Bahia, Brazil. This capture was in most flagrant contradiction to international law. Brazil made demand that she be returned with her crew. But though this was agreed to by the United States, it was never carried out, for while lying in Hampton Roads an army transport struck her under the pretence of accident, and very soon thereafter she sank at her mooring, those in charge of the ship having opened the water-cocks in her hull.

The "Georgia" took but nine prizes, and after a year was sold. The "Shenandoah" cruised with considerable success in the Northern Pacific.

On November 8, 1861, occurred the seizure on board the British steamer "Trent" of the Southern commissioners, Mason and Slidell, by Captain Wilkes, of the United States war-ship "San Jacinto." This infringement of international law produced such an effect that for a time there was danger that England would declare war against the United States. The people of the North were carried away with thoughtless enthusiasm over the bold action of Captain Wilkes. Even Secretary of the Navy Welles declared officialy that "the prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes on this occasion merited and received the emphatic approval of the Department." In England warlike preparations were made, and troops were sent on shipboard ready for transportation to Canada. But fortunately the United States had in Charles Francis Adams the right man at the British Court. England was satisfied with an apology and the release of the prisoners. The *Spectator* said:

"Mr. Seward has for once made a hit. In his recent correspondence with Lord Lyons he has developed, possibly from a novel consciousness of being in the right, an unexpected self-restraint, and, writing like a gentleman, is victorious as a diplomatist."

The *Times* said of Mason and Slidell:

"Impartial as the British public is in the matter, it certainly has no prejudice in favor of slavery, which, if anything, these gentlemen represent. They must not suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their own negroes, and, had that been the object of the rescue, the swarthy Pompey and Cæsar would have had just the same right to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason and Slidell. So please, British public, let's have none of these things."

England's seeming duplicity in her attitude towards the contending parties was the result of a contradiction between her moral sentiment and her mercantile interests. She was opposed to slavery, but she needed cotton. On the other hand, she was willing to see the nation across the Atlantic, which threatened commercial rivalry, weakened by disruption; but that was putting a future prospect over against a present and pressing need. England's haste in proclaiming neutrality was actuated by President Davis's course in regard to privateers. Had not neutrality been proclaimed, she would have seemed to the Confederates as taking sides with their adversary, and her own maritime interests would have suffered. Again, England was not unwilling to see American bottoms, which at that time had a due share of the world's carrying trade, preyed upon and driven off the high seas. The North was greatly annoyed at England's haste, and much jingoism was displayed. Seward even represented this sentiment in his despatches to the British government. But fortunately, Charles

Francis Adams was, by his birth and training, as well as by the natural qualities of his mind, especially fitted to safeguard the interests of the North at the court of St. James, and he translated the Secretary of State's reckless language into the suave terms of diplomacy. But it was with difficulty that he convinced the members of the British Cabinet of the injustice of an immediate recognition of the Confederacy.

Lord Palmerston fully expressed the English mind on the matter when he said, "We do not like slavery, but we want cotton, and we dislike very much your moral tariff." *Punch* gave the same idea in words calculated to please the public ear. It printed "The National Hymn of the Confederate States:"

"When first the South, to fury fanned,
Arose and broke the Union's chain,
This was the Charter, the Charter of the land,
And Mr. Davis sang the strain;
Rule Slavonia, Slavonia rules and raves,
Christians ever, ever, ever, have had slaves."

Another effusion of the same character was the following:

"Though with the North we sympathize,
It must not be forgotten
That with the South we've stronger ties,
Which are composed of cotton.
Whereof our imports mount unto
A sum of many figures;
And where would be our calico
Without the toil of niggers?

"The South enslaves those fellow-men,
Whom we love all so dearly;
The North keeps commerce bound again,
Which touches us more nearly.
Thus a divided duty we
Perceive in this hard matter:
Free-trade, or sable brothers free?
Oh, won't we choose the latter!"

France, untrue to her traditions, was with England on this occasion; she, also, believed that the attempt of the Confederates to destroy the American Union would be beneficial to her interests.

It was absolutely necessary, in view of the circumstances, that the United States should at once demonstrate her ability to cope successfully with the rebellion. This she was not doing. McClellan remained quiet on the Potomac. Such battles as were being fought were, with deadly monotony, favorable to the Southern cause. Affairs looked black for the North at the end of the year 1861. Yet President Lincoln, in his message of December 3 to Congress, asserted that the cause of the Union was "advancing steadily and certainly southward." It was cheering to the North that she had an optimist for President.

XI

THE WAR IN THE WEST

THE first year of the war was in a great measure a preliminary skirmish, during which both sides learned that the struggle was to be no child's play, but a duel that was to call forth every element of human strength. So marked is the difference henceforth in the nature of the conflict that in a sense one enters on an entirely different period of history from that in which the disruption of the Union occurred. In point of fact, however, the struggle is the same as that of the year before,—aye, the same that had been going on since Colonial days; it only reaches a whiter heat. Hitherto, kindly sentiments and the alluring charm of past associations had veiled in part the hatred that lurked in the shadows on both sides of the Potomac; but now the fiercer passions of war had thrown aside their masks, and the two peoples, old and young, men and women, glared at each other with murderous hearts.

The year 1862 did not open with much promise to either side. The South had won the most considerable battles, and the North had at least come to realize something of the task which was before her. The advantages she had gained consisted in the retention in the Union of Ken-

tucky, Missouri, and West Virginia; the possession of Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal, Fort Monroe and Fort Pickens; also, the establishment of the blockade of the whole Southern ports. The plan of attack was now developed, and its general features, as earlier outlined, was consistently followed to the end of the war. Broadly speaking, its purpose was to compress the Confederacy from all sides, cutting off supplies by means of the blockade; to deal deathblows by driving expeditions through its heart. This latter end necessitated the breaking through of the Southern defence of the East and West Railway. The key of this defence consisted in the possession of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.

The only weakness in the position of the North was in her military organization. The immense army which had been gathered was weakened and rendered inefficient by disharmony and friction at head-quarters, and by jealous rivalry of ambitious officers. Men were forthcoming in numbers greater than the State needed or could use. There is this evidence of the enthusiasm of the North. On the other hand, it is clearly apparent that the war was made, by many men high in position, simply an occasion for pushing their own private fortunes. Towards the end of the first year Mr. Chase wrote to Secretary of War Cameron:

"The want of success of our armies and the difficulties of our financial operations have not been in consequence of a

want or excess of men, but for want of systematic administration. If the lack of economy and the absence of accountability are allowed to prevail in the future as in the past, bankruptcy and the success of the rebellion will be necessary consequences."

Cameron himself was probably innocent of using his position for pecuniary advantage; but it is equally certain that he allowed himself to be led into the signing of contracts by persons who were ready to rob the government to the fullest extent of possibility. On November 13 Senator Grimes wrote to Fessenden: "We are going to destruction as fast as imbecility, corruption, and the wheels of time can carry us." Later he declares that a flood of corruption "is sweeping over the land and perverting the moral sense of the people. The army is in most inextricable confusion, and is becoming worse and worse every day." The House of Representatives, April 30, 1862, passed a vote of censure upon Cameron, who in January had been dismissed from the Cabinet by President Lincoln and sent as minister to Russia. Edward M. Stanton was appointed Secretary of War, and proved a striking illustration of the imbecility of the political system which appoints men to positions for which they have no fitness either by nature or by training.

The grand army of the Potomac was still drilling. Early in the year McClellan was taken sick; his army must remain inactive until he recovered. On January 10, 1862, Lincoln said before

a council of war at the White House, "I am in great distress. If something is not done soon the bottom will be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan does not want to use the army I would like to borrow it, provided I could see how it could be made to do something." On the 27th of January, 1862, Lincoln, with a dependence on sentiment which was not unusual with him, issued the remarkable order that there should be "a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces on the 22d of February." This order was issued more for the sake of its effect on the minds of the Confederates than on the movements of the Union forces. It inaugurated one campaign, however, which was successful; the result was the breaking of the Confederate line of defence which extended from Bowling Green to Columbus. At this time Buell was at Louisville. There was a force of Confederates at Mill Springs on the Cumberland River, under General Zollicoffer. General Thomas was sent against the Confederates and a battle was fought, which resulted in the death of Zollicoffer and in the opening of the way for an attack on the centre of the Confederate line of defence. Albert Sidney Johnston, at that period the most able general of the Confederacy, was in command of the forces in that part of the country. After some trouble General Grant induced Halleck to permit him to go against the forts on the Cumberland and the Tennessee, supported

by gunboats under the command of Flag-Officer Foote. On the 6th of February the troops and gunboats advanced to the assault of Fort Henry. The Confederates, numbering less than three thousand men, were under the command of Colonel Tilghman. He sent all of his force save sixty-six men to Fort Donelson. With the handful of troops that remained he held the fort until on the third day of the investment he was forced to surrender. The taking of Fort Donelson was an operation of a different character. It brought out in Grant those qualities of generalship, especially his tenacity of purpose and his capacity for adapting his plans to the special character of the circumstances which confronted him, which distinguished his after career and gave him success. Fort Donelson was under the command of John B. Floyd, who had been Secretary of War under Buchanan. Grant understood Floyd's character, knew that he was a man entirely devoid of courage, and planned the attack accordingly. He strung his army of nearly thirty thousand men over eight miles of country. There were about twenty thousand men in the fort. Had Floyd made a sally before Grant strengthened his thin line by sending to Fort Henry for Lew Wallace, it might have been successful. But Grant's calculation of the safety of taking the chances was justified. The assault was made on the evening of the 15th, and during the night following the besieged generals determined to surrender.

Lew Wallace, who, as we have seen, was on the ground, thus describes the charge led by General Smith:

"Taking Lauman's brigade, General Smith began the advance. They were under fire instantly. The guns in the fort joined in with the infantry, who were at the time in the rifle-pits, the great body of the Confederate right wing being with General Buckner. The defence was greatly favored by the ground, which subjected the assailants to a double fire from the beginning of the abatis. The men have said that 'it looked too thick for a rabbit to get through.' General Smith, on his horse, took position in the front and centre of the line. Occasionally he turned in the saddle to see how the alignment was kept. For the most part, however, he held his face steadily towards the enemy. He was, of course, a conspicuous object for the sharp-shooters in the rifle-pits. The air around him twittered with minie bullets. Erect as if on review, he rode on, timing the gait of his horse with the movement of his colors. A soldier said, 'I was nearly scared to death, but I saw the old man's white moustache over his shoulder, and went on.'

"On to the abatis the regiments moved without hesitation, leaving a trail of dead and wounded behind. There the fire seemed to get trebly hot, and some of the men halted, whereupon, seeing the hesitation, General Smith put his cap on the point of his sword, held it aloft, and called out, 'No flinching now, my lads! Here—this is the way! Come on!' He picked a path through the jagged limbs of the trees, holding his cap all the time in sight; and the effect was magical. The men swarmed in after him, and got through in the best order they could—not all of them, alas! On the other side of the obstruction they took the semblance of reformation and charged in after their chief, who found himself then between the two fires. Up the ascent he rode; up they followed. At the last moment the keepers of the rifle-pits clambered out and fled. The four regiments engaged in the feat planted their colors on the breastwork. Later in the day Buckner came back with his division, but all his efforts to dislodge Smith were in vain."

The fort was practically won, as was well understood by its defenders. Floyd, and also General Pillow, the second in command, had more than sufficient reasons for not desiring to fall into the hands of the Union officials; they feared they would be hanged. The manner in which these officers decided on their surrender is interestingly picturesque, and is thus described by Jefferson Davis:

"The decision to surrender having been made, it remained to determine by whom it should be made. Generals Floyd and Pillow declared they would not surrender and become prisoners; the duty was therefore allotted to General Buckner. Floyd said, 'General Buckner, if I place you in command, will you allow me to draw out my brigade?' General Buckner replied, 'Yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon my communication.' Floyd said, 'General Pillow, I turn over the command.' General Pillow, regarding this as a mere technical form by which the command was to be conveyed to Buckner, then said, 'I pass it.' Buckner assumed the command, sent for a bugler to sound the parley, for pen, ink, and paper, and opened the negotiations for surrender."

All the world knows Grant's reply to Buckner's demand for terms,—"No terms, except an immediate and unconditional surrender, can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."

By the capture of Fort Donelson Grant depleted the Southern forces to the extent of from twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners; also, he took forty pieces of artillery and a large amount of stores, etc. But more than all, by the manner in which he had broken into the Southern de-

fence he had proved himself to be the coming man. On the morning of February 17 the North heard her first really important and cheering news from the war. Grant's name was on everybody's lips. "Who is this U. S. Grant?" people asked. "Unconditional Surrender Grant, I suppose," was the answer made by characteristic American humor.

The fall of Fort Donelson was a severe discouragement to the South. It resulted in pushing the Confederate line of defence two hundred miles to the southward. It secured Kentucky and Tennessee to the Union.

Who and what was the man who had thus so effectually changed the face of the situation, and was eventually to bring complete victory to the Northern arms? At this time forty years of age, his life had hitherto been a complete failure. Born in Clermont County, Ohio, of poor parents, he received no education but such as the scanty opportunities of the common schools afforded, until he was appointed to West Point. His standing there was not high. He was graduated in 1843 twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine. He served with honor during the Mexican War. In 1852, being then a first-lieutenant, he was sent with his regiment to the Pacific coast. Here, separated from his family, he fell into dissipated habits. In 1854 he was practically forced to resign his commission, which was then that of a captain, and went back to St. Louis, where he unsuccessfully endeavored to make a living on

his wife's farm. Then he tried real estate business, and made a failure. At the age of thirty-eight we find him looking to his father and his younger brother for assistance. The latter put him in charge of a hardware store in Galena, Illinois. Grant at this time was still under the influence of habits of intemperance. Acquaintances would cross the street to avoid meeting him and being importuned for loans. His army comrades were at this time under the impression that the life of U. S. Grant was completely wrecked.

But the nation's emergency was Grant's opportunity. He was a fighter, a military leader, and nothing more. In May of 1861, he applied to the adjutant-general of the army for a regiment, and was totally ignored. He went to Cincinnati, where McClellan had his head-quarters of the Department of the Ohio, but was not received. Before the year was over, however, such was the need of the nation that his past was overlooked and he was appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers. Grant had sagacity for generalship; he possessed a natural *savoir faire*. He was endowed with a courage which was marvellous; not alone personal coolness in the face of danger, but also that which enabled him to take the gravest chances as a general. He schooled himself in the idea that the enemy was just as much afraid of him as he was of the enemy.

February 22, 1861, was the day appointed for

the change from a provisional to a permanent Confederate government. On this occasion Jefferson Davis voiced the sentiment of the South: "After a series of successes and victories which covered our arms with glory, we have recently met with serious disasters. But in the heart of a people resolved to be free these disasters tend but to stimulate to increased resistance."

A. S. Johnston had by this time concentrated his forces at Nashville. He was selected by the people as the one to blame for the reverses to the Confederate arms. The Senators and Representatives from Tennessee waited on Davis and demanded his removal. The President's answer was, "If Sidney Johnston is not a general, the Confederacy has none to give you."

Johnston was compelled by the appearance of Buell to evacuate Nashville. He marched back to Pittsburg Landing, whither Grant brought his forces from Donelson, planning a junction with Buell. Johnston, foreseeing that Corinth would be the centre of attack, was making every effort to protect that point. Bragg thus describes Johnston's army:

"It consisted of such levies as could be hastily raised, all badly armed and equipped. . . . It was a heterogeneous mass, in which there was more enthusiasm than discipline, more capacity than knowledge, more valor than instruction. Rifles, rifled and smooth-bore muskets,—some of them originally percussion, others hastily altered from flint-locks by Yankee contractors, many with the old flint and steel,—and shot-guns of all sizes and patterns held place in the same regiments."

This army was organized in four divisions under Polk, Bragg, Hardee, and Breckenridge.

Johnston knew that Buell was expected, and determined to give battle before Grant was thus reinforced. The latter seems to have displayed an over-confidence on this occasion. He had neglected to sufficiently fortify himself; and it is more than probable that he was not aware of the strength of Johnston. Early on the morning of the 6th of April a reconnoitring party from the Union army engaged Johnston's pickets, and the famous battle of Shiloh was on. Grant was some distance away at the Landing, looking for tidings of Buell. His army was engaged before he could return to make dispositions. The day's fighting resulted in a success for the Confederates. But they lost Johnston, who was killed. This event resulted in the complete turn of fortune which occurred on the following day. General Beauregard thus describes the first day's victory:

"Like an Alpine avalanche our troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy, until after six P.M., when we were in possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but one; nearly all his field-artillery, about thirty flags, colors and standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division commander (General Prentiss), and several brigade commanders, thousands of small-arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation,—all the substantial fruits of a complete victory,—such, indeed, as rarely have followed the most successful battles, for never was an army so well provided as that of our enemy.

"The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the

shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, admirably provided cantonments, after our twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by the sustained onset of all the men we could bring into action."

Note that the Confederate army was in possession of all Grant's encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but one. That one gave a landing for Buell's reinforcements, which, on the following day, turned the victory. In the evening, as Bragg was about to head a final charge, which would have completely swept the field, he received an order from Beauregard to stop the pursuit, lest the men be exposed to the gunboat firing. Beauregard thought "the victory was sufficiently complete." "Is a victory ever sufficiently complete?" angrily exclaimed Bragg. But he obeyed the order, and the Confederate army went into camp.

Grant's army was beaten. If the Confederates had pressed on and gained full possession of the water-front, and thus prevented Buell's landing, leaving out of the consideration other exigencies which might have affected the final result of the war, and looking at the history as it really was, the battle of Shiloh would in all probability have given the victory to the South. Jefferson Davis says that after this, "Grant's army being beaten, the next step of General Johnston's programme should have followed,—the defeat of Jewell's and Mitchell's forces as they successively came up,

and the return by our victorious army through Tennessee and Kentucky. . . . What great consequences would have ensued must be matters of conjecture; but that the people of Kentucky and Missouri generously sympathized with the South was then commonly admitted."

On the following morning Grant had twenty-five thousand fresh troops. He himself commenced the attack. The Confederates were dispirited by the loss of Johnston. Point by point they were driven back, until at the close of the day Beauregard admitted his defeat and turned towards Corinth. Thus ended the battle of Shiloh—one of the strongest, most indescribable, and unscientific fights of the whole war. Grant had unnecessarily exposed his men. General Buell says:

"Of the army of not less than fifty thousand effective men, which Grant had on the west bank of the Tennessee River, not more than five thousand were in ranks and available on the battle-field at nightfall on the sixth, exclusive of Lew Wallace's division, say eight thousand five hundred men, that only came up during the night. The rest were either killed, captured, or scattered in inextricable and hopeless confusion for miles along the banks of the river."

The slaughter had been terrific. Grant had enemies at Washington,—men who were bitterly opposed to him through jealousy of his position; for the moving spirit in the North was not wholly an emulation as to who best could serve. There was a large element of greed for office. Great pressure was brought to bear upon Lin-

coln to have him removed. But the President had begun to feel his way towards the men in whom he could place reliance. Probably having McClellan in mind, he said, "I can't spare this man; he fights."

Halleck went to Pittsburg Landing and took command there April 11. He called in General Pope, who had just succeeded in capturing Island Number Ten, a strong fortress in a commanding position on the Mississippi. Grant was second in command; but as this gave him no division, he felt that he was being shelved, and had it not been for the influence of Sherman he would have retired. Halleck marched on Corinth, which Beauregard vacated, and the Union army continued almost to Chattanooga. Here the policy of caution and consequent delay again prevailed. This gave Bragg the opportunity to slip past the left flank of the Union army and again turn northward. He made for Louisville, with Buell in close pursuit, though on a different line of march. The Union general arrived first; but instead of attacking the enemy, he waited to organize, and Bragg, having nothing further to gain, swept the country for the means of subsistence and started back southward with an immense train of plunder.

The Civil War was won by the Union navy. It was prolonged by the Southern. What Grant and Sherman did to bring the struggle to a successful issue was made possible by the operations of Farragut and Foote. The gunboats on

the Mississippi and Cumberland Rivers rendered effective access by the Federal forces to Forts Henry and Donelson. The former river remained barred to the Union until Foote broke through from the North and Farragut took New Orleans. The blockade of the Atlantic ports, by preventing the Confederacy from recuperating itself by means of European commerce, made possible that sapping of its strength without which its defeat could not have been accomplished. Sherman's "March to the Sea" was a deadly blow, which could not have been delivered had it not been that there was a friendly fleet off the Atlantic coast to which he could look for support.

The Mississippi, above Vicksburg, was now in possession of the Union. It was in accordance with the general plan to start from the other end also. Said Secretary Stanton, "Why can't New Orleans be taken?" "It can," laconically replied General Benjamin Butler, to whom the question was addressed. A fleet of war-vessels was despatched under the command of Farragut, aided by mortar-boats under David B. Porter.

David G. Farragut was a Southerner, having been born in Tennessee. In his ninth year he entered the service of the United States navy as midshipman, and was on board the "Essex" in the war of 1812. Thus for fifty years he had sailed and fought and commanded under the Stars and Stripes. It is no wonder then that, though bound to the South by intimate ties,—his wife was a Norfolk lady,—he could not en-

tertain the thought of deserting the old flag. He was in Norfolk when the war broke out. Importuned by his friends to give his services to the Confederacy, he replied, "I would see every man of you damned before I would raise my hand against that flag." Still it was with some hesitancy that the authorities intrusted so momentous and difficult an undertaking as the attack on New Orleans to a Southerner. But there was no other man so well fitted for the work.

On reaching the mouth of the Mississippi, it was found that, owing to the shallow water at the bar, it was impossible to take the largest vessels across; thus the most effective part of Farragut's fleet was rendered useless. The defences of New Orleans were extremely formidable. Ninety miles below the city were the two forts, St. Philip and Jackson, commanding the passage from either side. Besides these the Confederates had on the lower river a fleet of gunboats and ironclads, the principal ones being the ironclad ram "Manassas"—a most formidable craft, owing to her almost impenetrable protection—and the "Louisiana," which was not quite completed. The river was also blocked by rafts and chains of schooners.

Farragut began his attack by a bombardment from his fleet of mortar-boats on April 18. This was kept up for five days with no effect on the forts, though in that time over sixteen hundred shells had been fired by the Union mortar-boats.

Farragut determined to take his wooden ships past the forts,—an heroic measure, but he considered that it was the first thing which he was sent there to do. At two o'clock on the morning of April 24 the mortar-boats under David B. Porter opened fire, which drew a furious response from the forts. To the accompaniment of this music Farragut started his procession of ships. As soon as the Confederates surmised the purpose of the Union fleet huge fires were lighted on the river banks, and fire rafts of pine-knots were sent down-stream. These lighted up the river, so that, until obscured by the clouds of smoke, the ships were in plain sight of the forts. So they passed up, firing at and receiving the fire of the forts as they went. Farragut's flagship, the "Hartford," in trying to escape a drifting fire-raft, ran aground. Pacing his deck, the commander cried, "Don't flinch from that fire, boys! There's a hotter fire for those who don't do their duty." It was a terrific scene, of which a detailed account as gathered from the reports of the participating officers causes one to wonder how any of those wooden vessels lived through it. But after much damage was given and received, the foremost of the Union ships reached Chalmette at five o'clock in the morning. The loss in this river engagement was thirty-seven killed and one hundred and forty-seven wounded on the Union side, and certainly not less among the Confederates. But the chief gain to the former lay in the fact that Farragut had forestalled

such increased defences as would have perhaps rendered the attack a failure. "Had they succeeded," he said, "in getting any one of those on the Mississippi finished before our arrival, it would have proved a most formidable adversary." Admiral Porter says that if New Orleans had "been left three months longer to perfect its defences and its works of offence, our wooden fleet would have been driven North, and the entire Southern coast would have been sealed against us. The blockade would have been raised, and the independence of the South recognized by the powers of Europe."

The city being unprotected by any adequate troops, its capture was immediately accomplished; not, however, before its inhabitants had performed an act of loyalty to the Confederate cause in the destruction of an immense quantity of cotton, which they burned to prevent its becoming of advantage to the North. On May 1, 1862, General Butler entered the city with two thousand five hundred troops. He was not welcomed. Military rule was established, and it was such a rule as will ever be remembered to the disgrace of the man. Butler's regulations cannot be condoned with justice, or excused by any consideration of the necessities of war. It is true that the women of New Orleans had no love for his officers or his men. But his order of May 15, that if any female should insult in any manner a Union officer or soldier, "she should be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman

of the town plying her vocation," warrants Lord Palmerston's denunciation of it in the House of Commons as infamous. The *Saturday Review* said of the proclamation, "The bloodiest savages could do nothing crueller; the most loathsome Yahoo of fiction could do nothing filthier." Seward did well in bringing about the recall of Butler.

Contrary to the usual custom of historians, we will continue our narrative of the campaign in the West, leaving the contemporary Virginian war for a future chapter. In the mean time, however, it is pertinent to ask, How was the war affecting the status of those on whose account it was being fought? It had been believed by the abolitionists that immediately on the breaking out of the war the slaves would make a stampede for freedom. This, however, had not been fulfilled. The majority of the slaves had no conception of what the war was about, nor did they suspect that it had any personal interest for them. They remained faithfully and devotedly on the plantations and in the homes while their masters were fighting against those who would set them free. Many were directly employed in services pertaining to the war, such as body-servants of Southern officers and laborers at work on the fortifications. On the 6th of August, 1861, Congress had passed a bill freeing such slaves as were employed for insurrectionary purposes. On the 16th of April, 1862, another bill was passed abolishing slavery in the District of

Columbia. On the 6th of March, 1862, President Lincoln sent to Congress a special message, in which he said:

"I recommend the adoption of a joint resolution by your honorable bodies which shall be substantially as follows:

"*Resolved,* That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt general abolishment of slavery; etc."

This Act was passed on the 2d of April. But no slave State claimed the advantage conferred by it; they could not see that for slavery the hour of doom had struck.

Notwithstanding the strictures to which Grant had been subjected after the battle of Shiloh, the people saw that he was the man of the hour. So great was the dissatisfaction with his supersedure that, in the early part of July, Halleck was called to Washington to take the chief command of the army, thus leaving Grant at the head of the Department of the West. But the principal burden of the offensive operations in that section was cast upon Buell, who was depended upon for the capture of Chattanooga, the principal strategic position of the West. He was outgeneralled, however, by Bragg, who passed to his rear, thus cutting off Buell's line of communication between Nashville and Louisville, compelling him to retreat to the latter place. Washington became impatient. Halleck said:

"The President and Secretary of War are greatly displeased with the slow movements of General Buell. Unless he does something very soon, I think he will be removed.

Indeed, it would have been done before if I had not begged to give him a little more time. There must be more energy and activity in Kentucky and Tennessee, and the one who first does something brilliant will get the entire command. . . . The government seems determined to apply the guillotine to all unsuccessful generals."

Buell was not able to accomplish anything brilliant. He was defeated at Perryville, October 8, and was immediately thereupon superseded by General Rosecrans. This change was brought about through the influence of Oliver P. Morton, governor of Indiana, who had a private grudge against Buell. The latter seems to have been an able general, and would have done better probably had he not been hampered by the administration. But he had a faculty for making enemies of those who were on his own side. Lincoln realized the necessity of retaining popular support; and for it he was willing to see his generals officially beheaded.

Bragg went into winter quarters at Murfreesborough, Tennessee. On the 26th of December Rosecrans moved to attack him. The sanguinary battle of Stone River followed on January 1, 1863. There was a series of engagements around Murfreesborough. The historians of both sides claim the victory. General Bragg, hearing that reinforcements were on the way to Rosecrans, fell back on Tullahoma, carrying with him, it is claimed by the Southern historians, six thousand prisoners and thirty pieces of captured artillery. Nevertheless, the President telegraphed to Rosecrans, "God bless you." The

North at this period needed to make the most of her victories.

Grant was now attempting to clear the Mississippi. The only remaining obstacle was Vicksburg. In January, 1863, Grant undertook the expedition against this point. The main difficulty in the attack was to get possession of the high ground on the east bank of the river, so that the city might be besieged from the rear. In order that he might get his transports past Vicksburg without exposing them to the batteries of the defence, he labored to construct a canal across the peninsula opposite the city. This, however, was beyond the skill of his engineers. Two months were spent in ineffective operations, while sickness resulting from the climate made great havoc among his men. The North became impatient. Stories were circulated accusing Grant of indulging at this time in gross intemperance, and these were believed by Halleck. When this charge was repeated to Lincoln, he replied, "If I knew what brand of whiskey he drinks, I would send a barrel or so to some other generals." The fact is that at this time Grant was not drinking at all. Much of the dissatisfaction with Grant resulted from the treachery of McClernand, one of his corps commanders, who was actuated by jealousy. But Grant had the full confidence of Lincoln, who caused a despatch to be sent to him giving him "full and absolute authority to enforce his own commands."

By April 16 Grant was ready to act on his characteristic policy of going "forward to a decisive victory." He determined on a complete investiture of Vicksburg. Admiral Porter was in command of the gunboats, and was ready to co-operate heartily in Grant's plan. It was necessary to move the transports carrying supplies to a point below the cities. This could be done only by running past the batteries. During the night of April 16 this project was successfully carried out. Six steamers towing twelve barges started in the darkness to run the gauntlet. But the river was soon illuminated by the burning houses which the Confederates set on fire for that purpose. The batteries opened fire with shot and shell, which was heartily responded to by the seven ironclad gunboats. All the vessels succeeded in getting past with the exception of the "Henry Clay," which was set on fire by the bursting of a shell and was burned to the water's edge.

Vicksburg was under the command of General Pemberton, who had with him about thirty-one thousand troops. Grant's force, including Sherman's corps, was ultimately about seventy-five thousand. Joe Johnston, however, was at Jackson with some eleven thousand Confederates. Grant turned, met Johnston, and forced him to retreat. On the 16th of May Pemberton was defeated at Champion's Hill, about midway between Vicksburg and Jackson. On the 17th he was engaged at Big Black River and again

MAP OF THE
VICINITY OF
VICKSBURG,
ILLUSTRATING OPERATIONS OF
Gen. Grant's Army
April-May, 1863.
Routes of Union Troops.
U. S. Forces
Confederate Forces
SCALE OF MILES.
0 1 2 4 6 8 10
LOUISIANA
MADISON
MISSISSIPPI
WARREN
HINDS
CLAIBORNE
Vicksburg
Mississippi River
Yazoo R.
Walnut Hills
MAJ.GEN.GRANT'S HEAD QUARTERS
MAJ.GEN.MC PHERSON 17TH ARMY CORPS
MAJ.GEN.ORD 13TH ARMY CORPS
GEN.LAUMAN'S DIVISION
GEN.HERRON'S DIVISION
Battle of Big Black River Bridge May 17th, 1863.
Battle of Champions Hill, May 16th, 1863.
Battle of Raymond, May 12th, 1863.
Battle of Port Gibson, May 1st, 1863.
GEN. SHERMAN
Jackson
Clinton
Raymond
Bolton Depot
Edwards Station
Bridgeport
Warrenton
Richmond
Grand Gulf
Port Gibson
Willow Springs P.O.
Cayuga
Utica
Auburn
New Auburn
Cooperville
Burtonton
Brownsville
CHOCTAW BOUNDARY LINE, TREATY OF 1801
Big Black R.
Wreck of the Indianola
Palmyra I.
New Carthage
Hard Times
Thompson's Bluff
Hankinsons Ferry
Hall's Ferry
Baldwins Ferry
Shreveport
Milliken's Bend
Youngs Pt.
Duckport

beaten. He then retired within the defences at Vicksburg. These operations gave Grant his long-sought opportunity to reach the heights on the north overlooking Vicksburg. On the 22d of May he made an effort to take the city by assault, but failed, suffering a loss of over three thousand. It was evident that Vicksburg could be reduced only by regular siege.

The inhabitants were now subjected to the horrible experiences of continual bombardment and starvation. Caves were dug in the ground for the protection of the women and children; rats were sold in the butchers' stores. The siege continued until the end of June. By that time Pemberton's troops were ready for mutiny. They said, "If you can't feed us, you had better surrender us, horrible as the idea is, than suffer this noble army to disgrace themselves by desertion."

On the 4th of July Grant telegraphed: "The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war." The number of prisoners was over thirty thousand. One hundred and seventy-two cannon were captured, and upward of fifty thousand muskets, which were a welcome addition to the Northern armament, as they were of the improved pattern and made in Europe.

Lincoln could now say, "The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea." The joy of the North at this victory was intense, and she was ready to reward the man by whose genius and

determination it was won. Grant's enemies were silenced. Even Halleck was convinced of his ability; and immediately the commission of a major-general in the regular army was conferred upon him.

Pollard, arguing on his belief that the destitution of the army and inhabitants of Vicksburg was not so great as Pemberton described, says:

"There appears, then, to have been no immediate occasion for the surrender of Vicksburg other than Pemberton's desire 'to save the further effusion of blood.' The explanation of his motives for selecting the Fourth of July as the day of surrender implies a singular humiliation of the Confederacy, as he was willing to give this dramatic gratification to the vanity of the enemy in the hope of thus conciliating the ambition of Grant and soliciting the generosity of the Yankees. He says, 'If it should be asked why the Fourth of July was selected as the day for the surrender, the answer is obvious: I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foes, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the Fourth of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time.' Such an incident of humiliation was alone wanting to complete the disaster and shame of Vicksburg."

Success had also attended the Northern arms to the west of the Mississippi, in Missouri and Arkansas. General Price, the Confederate leader, was at Springfield in January, 1862. He was intrenched with ten thousand men, but when General S. R. Curtis moved against him from Rolla with an army of twelve thousand, Price abandoned his works and retreated into Arkansas. He was there reinforced, and Curtis in turn

concluded that his own safe course was to retire to the Ozark hills. On the 7th of March the Confederates were endeavoring to cut the Union connection with Springfield. Curtis occupied a position on the ridge between Sugar Creek Valley and Cross Timber Hollows. Here was fought what is known as the battle of Pea Ridge. The result of the first day's fighting was that the Confederates succeeded in getting between the Union army and Springfield; consequently Curtis was compelled to cut his way out or accept the only alternative,—surrender his army. On the 8th, by a gallant movement in which he succeeded in planting his guns on hills from which he could rake the Confederates by cross-firing, he extricated himself from his perilous position, won a decisive victory, and prevented the further invasion of Missouri.

The battle of Pea Ridge had an extremely unpleasant feature connected with it, the record of which is a blot on the history of the South. One brigade of the Confederate force consisted of Indians. General Curtis, in his report, declares that they tomahawked and scalped his men. It was clearly an employment of savages and methods of fighting contrary to the ethics of modern warfare. The only plea—and it is a strong one —with which the South can answer this accusation is that the Indian brigade was organized and commanded by Albert Pike, a Boston man and a graduate of Harvard. But giving that fact all due consideration, the employment of these In-

dians to a certain degree offsets the complaints which the South made against the arming of the negro by the North. In fact, both expedients were reprehensible, looking at them any way we will.

After the battle of Stone River Rosecrans seemed to have been taking a leaf out of McClellan's book. Six months were spent in recuperation and organizing. His only success was of an argumentative character, by which he convinced the authorities at Washington of the desirability of leaving him to his own devices. In June, however, he began a series of manœuvres by which he drew Bragg out of middle Tennessee and shut him up in Chattanooga. There he hoped to repeat Grant's exploit of Vicksburg. But Bragg was not the man to be thus handled; he succeeded in getting out and moved to the southward. Rosecrans, in pursuit, so extended his line that Bragg, who was now reinforced, saw his opportunity and turned to strike. This was on the 19th of September. On the following day was fought the battle of Chickamauga, the bloodiest field of the West, and a disastrous one for the Union. The left division of the Federal army was under General Thomas. Rosecrans, owing to the excessive strain to which he had been subjected for many days previous, was in no condition to command. His men agree that he was whipped before he commenced to fight. During the day a mistake was made in withdrawing a brigade from the centre; and Bragg, seeing his

Head Quarters, Dept. of the Tenn.
Vicksburg, Miss. July 10th 1863

Surgeon J. Moore
Medical Director.

Sir:

Gen. Smith C.S.A.
complains that the prisoners in hospitals, in many cases have not received proper supplies of either medicine or food. In some cases the sick have only had hard bread and pork although requisitions have been sent to the Medical Purveyor for articles required.

I wish you would have this matter enquired into as soon as possible and have everything necessary for the health and comfort of

LETTER FROM GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT

those confined in hospital supplies?
Let me know the facts about
these supplies being furnished as
soon as you can.

Very respectfully
U. S. Grant
Maj. Gen.

chance, poured in his troops, and thus divided the Union army. The right, under the command of Rosecrans, was swept from the field, and fled in precipitation to Chattanooga, whence Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, telegraphed to Washington: "Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run." General Thomas, "The Rock of Chickamauga," however, had held his ground, and at night returned to Chattanooga, bringing with him five hundred prisoners.

The tables were now turned. Rosecrans was in Chattanooga, and Bragg was the besieger. Hooker was sent with a detachment from the army of the Potomac; Sherman came through from the Mississippi; and Grant, who had gone to New Orleans, came up to take the command. This last move was essential, as Rosecrans had entirely lost control. Grant replaced Rosecrans by Thomas, putting the latter in command of the Army of the Cumberland, and telegraphing him from Louisville to hold Chattanooga under all circumstances. On the other hand, President Davis, entirely misapprehending Bragg's position, depleted his strength by ordering fifteen thousand of his men to Knoxville to engage Burnside.

Chattanooga is surrounded by hills. The Confederates lay in a line twelve miles long between Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain. Grant's plan was for Hooker to attack the latter and Sherman the former, believing that this

would cause Bragg to weaken his centre to help these points, whereupon he himself would strike the Confederate centre with his main army. The plan succeeded even beyond his anticipations, owing to the dash and spirit shown by the men who assaulted the hills. Sherman gained the Ridge on the 23d; Hooker won the battle of Lookout Mountain on the 24th. The storming of Missionary Ridge was one of the most brilliant charges made during the whole war. An account of it is best given in the words of Dana, who was an eye-witness:

"The storming of the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that eighteen thousand men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a visible interposition of God. Neither Grant nor Thomas intended it. Their orders were to carry the rifle-pits along the base of the ridge, and capture their occupants; but when this was accomplished the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily up those impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits on the crest, and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully. The order to storm seems to have been given simultaneously by Generals Sheridan and Wood, because the men were not to be held back, dangerous as the attempt appeared to military prudence. Besides, the generals had caught the inspiration of the men, and were ready themselves to undertake impossibilities."

After successes like these, Grant's work on the third day was easy. A terrible enfilading fire to the right and left soon threw the Confederates into a panic. They had inflicted great slaughter on the Federal army; but these points of van-

tage being gained, Bragg had nothing to do but retreat. Sherman immediately went to the relief of Burnside, who was besieged by Longstreet's corps at Knoxville. The raising of this siege and the victory of Chattanooga put eastern Tennessee in the power of the Union, and opened the way to Alabama, Georgia, and the Carolinas.

XII

THE WAR IN VIRGINIA

After the battle of Bull Run the Confederates moved their outposts from Centreville, Virginia, almost to the banks of the Potomac. Thus their flag was in plain view from Washington. They erected batteries on the Virginia side of the river, and thus effectually blockaded the water-communication of the Federal capital. In view of this state of things, it is a marvel beyond comprehension that the North should have endured McClellan's inactivity for so long a time. The patience of the President and the people, however, had a limit. McClellan writes: "About the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that *excessive anxiety* for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the administration." As we have seen, Lincoln ordered a general movement of all the armies to be made on the 22d of February, 1862. His plan for the Army of the Potomac was that it should move upon Manassas. McClellan had a plan of his own, which for a long time he was very unwilling to divulge. In brief, it was to change his base of operations to the lower Chesapeake, and thence to threaten Richmond. It was with difficulty that Lincoln could be brought to agree

to this. He saw that it was more important for the Federal army to protect Washington than it was for that of the Confederate government to protect their capital. Nevertheless, at this time he either had not lost confidence in McClellan, or he did not feel strong enough to remove him. But it was necessary that the grand army of the Potomac should be put to some active use. Lincoln gave permission for the adoption of McClellan's plan.

That Lincoln's view was the true one is shown by the fact that on the 7th of March, 1862, General Joseph E. Johnston began to retreat from Manassas, destroying a great quantity of stores which the Confederate government had improvidently accumulated at his head-quarters. When the Union army occupied this position they found that the strength which McClellan had feared was nothing but a shadow. Not only was Johnston much weaker than McClellan had believed, but, being short of artillery, he had "made rough imitations of guns," and mounted them "near the embrasures in readiness for exhibition." As Hawthorne said, "It was as if General McClellan had thrust his sword into a gigantic enemy, and, beholding him suddenly collapse, had discovered to himself and the world that he had merely punctured an enormously swollen bladder. . . . The whole business takes on a tinge of the ludicrous. The vast preparation of men and warlike material; the majestic patience and docility with which the people

waited through those weary and dreary months; the martial skill, courage, and caution with which our movement was ultimately made; and, at last, the tremendous shock with which we were brought up suddenly against nothing at all! The Southerners show little sense of humor nowadays, but I think they must have meant to provoke a laugh at our expense when they planted those Quaker guns. At all events, no other rebel artillery has played upon us with such overwhelming effect." It speaks as unfavorably of the Federal Secret Service as it does of the capacity of McClellan. If the latter had obeyed the President's order and had engaged the Confederate army at Manassas on February 22, he must have gained an easy victory and an almost unimpeded march to Richmond. The only conclusion to which one is forced is that McClellan did not wish to fight. He was either a coward or disloyal; that he was the former cannot be established.

He was compelled to move at last, however; and his own plan was accepted as the most feasible,—namely, to take Fort Monroe as a base, and move upon Richmond up the Peninsula formed by the James and York Rivers. This plan, at that time, was well devised. But it was carried out neither with promptness nor with ability. McClellan, instead of piercing the Confederate line, as he might have done, sat down to a scientific siege of Yorktown. This delay gave the Confederates the opportunity to increase their

Camp Fred^k 25 March '63

Genl

Your letters of the 21st have been rec^d. The information given by Mr Drummond may be correct, but it is easier for Councils of War to pass resolutions to reinforce points with 30,000 men than to get the troops. I presume the men encamped at Hud Ports news are intended for service in that region & when the time arrives for operations, they will be used. You must therefore keep a bright look-out on all their movements. I do not know the advantages of Suffolk for delivering battle, or how you could advantageously cross the Blackwater, & should think it better to draw them farther from their base & get them scattered if possible. But as stated in a former letter when you see a good opportunity, do not let it pass. I know of no body of the enemy in N. C. & you could therefore concentrate your forces in that state for a blow.

I am very glad to hear that Genl Jenkins has damaged them & shall be glad to get the official report.

As regards the Batt^n of Art^y which you observed were transported from Richmond on the Cars, It was

LETTER FROM GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE TO GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET

a portion of the troops in the fortifications around that City, armed as Inf^y, which I had ordered up to guard the bridges over the Annas & our depots on the R. R. against the attacks of the enemy's Cav^y which had forced a passage over the Rapp^n at Kelly's ford, & I feared might damage our lines of Commun^n. The R. R. can convey but a small number of troops & a large body can march up sooner than to wait for transp^n —

Very truly yours

R E Lee
Genl

Genl J. Longstreet

P. S. The enemy's Cav^y were prepared with pack mules freighted with provisions, rats, C & the prisoners report their object was to break up Fred^s & Central R. Roads, burn our depots & cut us up generally. Under cover of this operation their Inf^y was to cross at U. S. Mines ford. Their Inf^y appeared there, but found our men in position & as their Cav^y retrograded they stood firm. The Cav^y fight was a hard one. Fitz Lee had only 700 men & Stuart estimates the enemy at 3000 in the saddle besides their dismounts & Stoneman, Averill & I forget his name were said to be on the field. They did not get more than 2 miles from Kelly's — R E L

army, by warrant of a conscription law which had just been passed, though in the face of bitter resistance, which not seldom resulted in men being dragged to war in chains. Extensive reorganization was accomplished and energetic preparations were made for the defence of Richmond. The Southern force at Yorktown was under the command of Magruder. He had under him less than twelve thousand men, yet with them he managed to hold McClellan at bay for a month,—long enough to enable the Confederates to concentrate before Richmond, under the general command of Joseph E. Johnston.

The latter had left a strong force at Williamsburg, in the centre of the Peninsula, to guard his baggage-train. On the 5th of May this was engaged by the Federal advance under Hooker, and a sharp battle of nine hours ensued. The North claimed a victory. But inasmuch as the enemy fought for no other purpose than that of giving their baggage-train time to get away, and as that was accomplished, the claim does not seem to be well founded. Johnston says he was not pursued, and that he inflicted a loss twice as great as that he suffered.

But matters looked serious for Richmond. Its people were not so greatly worried over the approach of McClellan, for they had long ere this learned to despise his generalship; but the "Monitor," after her successful encounter with the "Merrimac" had opened to the Federal fleet the James River. On May 15 the "Monitor,"

with several gunboats, ascended the river to Drewry's Bluff, eight miles below Richmond. This threw the city, and especially the Confederate executive, into a panic. Congress adjourned, in spite of the appeal of the people that they should continue their session. The city was almost entirely unfortified, the authorities having failed even to protect the approach by the river, there being on it no obstacle to the enemy except the half-finished fort at Drewry's Bluff, on which there were but four guns in position.

But the feeling at Richmond was not unanimous. While many of the inhabitants were evincing signs of pusillanimity, and showed disloyalty to their government, congratulating themselves that they were not so committed as to incur the enemy's resentment; and while the effects of the government were already packed ready for shipment to Columbia, South Carolina, the majority were determined on resistance to the very uttermost; the Legislature of Virginia passed resolutions imploring the Confederate authorities to hold Richmond at the cost of its destruction rather than to surrender. They desired that "the President be assured that whatever destruction or loss of property of the State or individuals shall thereby result will be cheerfully submitted to." This encouraged the administration. Every effort was now made to block the water approach. The works at Drewry's Bluff were finished and armed. The

river was filled with sunken obstructions; and just as these latter were completed by the sinking of a schooner the Federal gunboats "Galena" and "Aristook," with the "Monitor," appeared. When the first sounds of the bombardment were heard, a public meeting was being held at the City Hall. The occasion was improved by the delivery of impromptu and enthusiastic addresses from the governor of Virginia and the mayor of Richmond. They pledged their word that rather than surrender the city they would devote it to the flames, and in this they were upheld by the citizens whose homes and property were at stake. Governor Letcher declared that if he were given the alternative to be shelled or surrender, he should reply, "Bombard and be damned."

During the day of the 15th an artillery duel went on between the Federal gunboats and the fort, with the result that the former were beaten off. Seventeen shots struck the "Galena," killing and wounding thirty of her crew. On another boat seventeen were killed. The fleet was convinced of the impracticability of taking Richmond by the river.

During this time McClellan was doing nothing but planning, teasing the administration at Washington for reinforcements, and writing to his wife of successes which had no existence except in his own mind. "I think," he said in one letter, "that the blows the rebels are now receiving and have lately received ought to break

them up." In the mean time Lincoln was urging him to take Richmond, "or give up the job."

The Federal forces were dotted about in the Shenandoah Valley and in western Virginia, without any pretence of concentration either as to plan or command. In this Stonewall Jackson saw his opportunity. By an expedition into the Shenandoah Valley, thus threatening Washington, he might give the Federal government something to think about besides the capture of Richmond. Leaving Ewell at Swift Run Gap to hold in check General Banks, who had an army in the valley, he made a rapid and circuitous march (picking up reinforcements by the way) to McDowell, where Milroy was in command of the Federals. On May 8 Jackson sent this despatch to Richmond: "God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday." He now went after Banks, and found him at Winchester on May 25. Owing to egregious mistakes on the part of the War Department at Washington, Banks had not been reinforced, nor had there been any concentration of the armies that might have assisted him. He was defeated by Jackson at Winchester on May 25, and, had not the Potomac River and means of crossing it been at hand, Banks's whole command would have been destroyed.

McClellan wrote to his wife at this time: "I have this moment received a despatch from the President, who is terribly scared about Washington, and talks about the necessity of my re-

turning in order to save it. Heaven save a country governed by such counsels! Banks has been soundly thrashed, and they are terribly alarmed in Washington. A scare will do them good and may bring them to their senses." Was there ever such fatuitous egotism!

Washington was scared. The administration saw visions of Stonewall Jackson swooping down with an immense force. Stanton was panic-stricken, — a condition of mind into which he was always easily thrown. On hearing news of the "Merrimac's" exploits in Hampton Roads, he looked out of the windows expecting to behold the monster already threatening Washington. On the present occasion he telegraphed to the governors of the Northern States to immediately organize and forward all the militia and volunteer force at their command. McDowell's regiments, which were on their way to reinforce McClellan, were recalled. Had it not been for Jackson's brilliant campaign, the Federal army before Richmond would have been strengthened by forty thousand men. With a force of seventeen thousand he confused and deluded sixty thousand Union troops, gave Washington the greatest alarm it ever suffered, won several battles, prevented the capture of Richmond, and returned with a great quantity of spoil and a large number of prisoners.

Very slowly McClellan advanced, though he encountered no opposition worth speaking of, until, on the 30th of May, he was at Fair Oaks,

about eight miles from Richmond. The object of Northern desire was then almost within his grasp. It now seemed reasonable for the administration to expect that something would happen. Lincoln had in many despatches expressed an "excessive anxiety" to hear of some cheering victory. The general had hitherto had nothing to say except to make demands for more troops and excuse his delay by the muddiness of the roads. Lincoln was provoked to say, "McClellan seemed to think, in defiance of Scripture, that Heaven sent its rain only on the just and not on the unjust."

In the mean time Johnston had forced McClellan to activity. On the 31st of May, owing to the flooded condition of the rivers, the Union army lay divided into two parts. Seizing the opportunity afforded by this temporary weakness of position, Johnston made an attack on General Casey, who was in command of the troops on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy. This was the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines. Until five o'clock in the afternoon the advantage was decidedly with the Confederates, though Kearney saved the Union troops from an utter rout; but at that time Sumner crossed the river on log bridges at the head of two divisions, and after being thus strengthened, the Federals turned defeat into victory, though it was far from a decisive one. The principal mishap to the Confederates was the disabling of Johnston, who was struck by a piece of bursting shell and borne un-


MAP OF THE
Theatre of War in
VIRGINIA
SCALE OF MILES.
0 5 10 20 30
Williamsport
Union Br.
Westminster
Havre de Grace
Martinsburg
Sharpsburg
Frederick City
Freedom
Magnolia
Monocacy
Urbana
Damascus
Ellicotts Mills
Baltimore
Harpers Ferry
Charlestown
Point of Rocks
Clarksburg
Relay
Winchester & Potomac R.
Leesburg
Berryville
Poolesville
Brookeville
Junction
Dawsonville
Laurel
Rockville
Shenandoah River
Goose Creek
Gunpowder River
Leesboro
Annapolis
Aldie
Blladensburg
Chantilly
Front Royal
Rectortown
Fairfax C.H.
Washington
Falls Church
Upper Marlboro
Centreville
Fairfax Sta.
Alexandria
Sandy Hook
N. Baltimore
Manassas Jc.
Washington
Bristow
Placataway
Warrenton
Catletts Sta.
Occoquan
Lower Marlboro
Sperryville
Liberty
Rixeyville
Jefferson
Beacon Sta.
Dumfries
Port Tobacco
Pt. Frederick
White Ridge
Morrisville
Benedict
Hazel R.
Brandy
Grove C.H.
Culpeper C.H.
Stevensburg
Hartwood
Stafford C.H.
Richardsville
Germanna
Madison C.H.
Mitchell Sta.
Rapidan R.
Chancellorsville
Fredericksburg
Lancaster C.H.
Wilderness
King George
Old Verdiersville
Port Conway
Orange C.H.
Spottsylvania C.H.
Port Royal
Potomac River
Gordonsville
Guineys
Trevillian's Sta.
New Market
Bowling Green
Montross
Louisa C.H.
Fredericksburg
Rappahannock R.
Rappahannock River
Fancerville
Beaverdam Sta.
Newtown
Warsaw
Tappahannock
Heathsville
Palmyra
Shannon
Goods Junction
Clarksville
Thompsons X Roads
Columbia
Hanover C.H.
Miller's
Lancaster C.H.
Walkertown
Ashland
King William C.H.
Matthias
Goochland C.H.
Atlee's Sta.
Hanover Jc.
Urbanna
Cartersville
Hungary
Mechanicsville
King & Queen C.H.
Mt. Pleasant
Dover Mills
Richmond
White House
Scottsville
Cumberland
West Pt.
Centerville
Cold Harbor
Seven Pines
New Kent C.H.
Scuffletown
Powhatan
Mathews C.H.
Cumberland C.H.
Dover Hill
Chesterfield
Charles City C.H.
Gwynnsville
Yorktown
Palmsville
Bermuda Hundred
Williamsburg
Amelia C.H.
Petersburg
Fort Powhatan
Burkesville
Prince George C.H.
Jamestown
Yorktown
Sutherlands Sta.
Fort's Sta.
Warwick C.H.
Halifax C.H.
Dinwiddie C.H.
Beam's Station
Bacon Castle
Fortress Monroe
Stony C. Sta.
Wakefield
Ballysville
Smithfield
Isle of Wight C.H.
Norfolk
Nottoway R.
Sussex C.H.
Zuni
Portsmouth
Hicksford
Jerusalem
Franklin
Suffolk
Newsoms

conscious from the field. McClellan was not on the scene of battle during the whole day; he remained at his head-quarters under the excuse of illness. His indisposition was not such as would have deterred a spirited commander.

Lee was now in personal command of the Confederate army, taking charge at the end of the second day of fighting. McClellan was still asking for reinforcements, and in response General McCall was sent to him. He had at this time one hundred and five thousand troops to Lee's sixty-four thousand. But all discouragement had vanished from the minds of the Confederates. They now knew their enemy, and Jefferson Davis wrote: "With God's help we will beat him as soon as we can get at him." Several minor engagements, with varying results, led to the battle of Gaines Mill, which was fought on June 27. McClellan was in the process of changing his base from the York to the James River. While making this move, Lee attacked his right at Mechanicsville, to the north of Richmond. This was on June 26. The Confederates were repulsed with considerable loss. General Porter, who was in command of this division, was ordered by McClellan to fall back on Gaines Mill near the bridge across the Chickahominy, which it was necessary to protect, owing to the fact that Jackson was threatening from the north. On the next day Porter sent to request reinforcements, but his messenger failed to reach McClellan. The Federal troops numbered

twenty-five thousand men; against them were combined Longstreet, Jackson, and the two Hills, with more than twice that strength. While these two armies were engaged, Magruder, with twenty-five thousand men, occupied a position between the Union left wing and Richmond. This was a magnificent opportunity for McClellan, who, with an unengaged force nearly double that of Magruder, might easily have overpowered him and cleared the way to Richmond; but his habit of magnifying the strength of his opponents prevented him. Porter held his position with great courage and discipline; but towards night a general assault from the combined forces of Lee and Jackson overwhelmed the Federals, driving them to the river, where there would have been a panic had it not been for timely help which served only to cover Porter's retreat. McClellan despatched the news to Washington in the following words:

"I have lost this battle because my force was too small. . . . I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

From now on the story of McClellan's Peninsular campaign is that of a retreat. There was fighting continuously for seven days, from June 25 to July 1. Lee saw that McClellan's plan was

to get back to the James River, whence his retreat down the Peninsula might be covered by Federal gunboats. He sent Magruder around by a line of march which struck the Federal rear; Hill and Longstreet also attacked them at Frayser's Farm; but owing to the splendid discipline of the Union army these assaults were ineffective. It was this discipline, that Lee did not accurately estimate, which led to his defeat in the general attack at Malvern Hill on July 1. The plan of this attack was one of Lee's few mistakes.

Malvern Hill is a high plateau of oblong shape about a mile and a half in length. At the top it is bare of timber; its front is hollow and rises in terraces. On the slopes of this hollow the Federal troops planted sixty cannon, and the summit was occupied by ten thousand infantry. Lee thought he could take this position and capture the Union army. The thing was manifestly impossible. As soon as the Confederate troops began to cross the half-mile of meadow at the foot of the hill, they became exposed to a tremendous fire of both cannon and artillery, which converged upon them as they approached. And yet charge after charge Lee and Jackson ordered against that impregnable position, only desisting at nightfall. One colonel, on receiving the command to advance, protested, " My men will be annihilated. Nothing in the world can live there." Jackson replied, with a heartlessness and unwisdom not customary with him, " I take care of my

wounded and bury my dead." The Confederates fell by thousands. Hill said it was not war, but murder. This blunder on the part of Lee and Jackson gave McClellan his only important and decisive victory, though he had taken no part in the battle himself, being at that time on a gunboat on the James River. It would seem as if, with an enemy so weakened and dispirited, McClellan's grand opportunity had arrived. Lee was in no condition to protect Richmond. But the Federal commander said, "To have left our position would have endangered our communications and removed us from the protection of our gunboats." He determined to continue the retreat. His troops were weary; but General Kearney expressed the sentiment which must have been held by the majority of the officers, when he said, "I, Philip Kearney, an old soldier, enter my solemn protest against this retreat. In full view of the responsibilities of such a declaration, I say to you that such an order can be prompted only by cowardice—or treason." The retreat as a retrograde movement was a great tactical success, but it was a pitiful sequel to the months of preparation; in it McClellan manifested his superb ability to move an army. It is a remarkable fact that throughout the Peninsular campaign McClellan was not present on the field during any serious engagement.

When the news of the failure of the Peninsular campaign was known in London, it greatly strengthened the belief of a large and influential

party that the North's conquest of the South was impossible. Gladstone said that if the South were set upon separation, she would gain her end. And he reasoned that the English people should be careful not to alienate the good-will of the cotton-producing section. The *Times* declared, "The war can only end in one way. Why not accept the facts and let the South be gone?" Palmerston's sympathy was wholly with the Confederacy. Nevertheless, the English government maintained its position of neutrality, though not with extreme care. Englishmen were now growing to think that the sooner the war was ended by the success of the South the better.

Changes were now brought about in the officering of the Union army. Halleck was made commander-in-chief, and Pope was called from the West to take command of the newly organized Army of Virginia, which was created out of the corps of McDowell, Frémont, and Banks. McClellan was still at Harrison's Landing. Much pressure was being brought upon the authorities to have him replaced. This came especially from those who were eager for radical measures in relation to slavery. McClellan was notably conservative in regard to this question, a fact which served to strengthen rumors of his disloyalty that were in the air. Chase and Stanton strongly urged the President to place Pope at the head of the army on the James. Lincoln was unwilling to do this, but he did offer the command to Burnside, by whom it was declined. On August 3

McClellan was ordered to remove his army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. Against this the General earnestly protested, and it seems as if his arguments were sound:

"Here directly in front of this army is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance I'll swear should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true defence of Washington. It is here on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union should be decided. I entreat that this order may be rescinded."

Possibly, if the Army of the Potomac had been strongly reinforced, and a capable and fighting general placed at its head, results might have been different. But at that time the Union authorities knew of no man on whom they could place such reliance. On the other hand, it is also possible that a concentration of Federal troops before Richmond would have led Lee to abandon that capital to its fate for the sake of the more effective measure of threatening Washington. When, two years later, Grant carried out what was practically McClellan's plan, the greatly weakened Southern army under Lee could not help itself by threatening Washington, as that city was well taken care of by an abundance of Union troops.

Lee now learned that to Pope's Army of Virginia was to be intrusted the advance on Rich-

mond. Pope was now, in the popular estimation, the rival of McClellan. Unfortunately for himself, he began with a lamentable lack of tact which made him unpopular with his own officers. Said he, in an address to his men:

"We have always seen our enemies' backs in the West; I come from an army which sought its enemy and beat him when found; whose policy has not been defence, but attack."

The railroad south to Richmond starts at Gordonsville. There Pope's army lay, watched by Jackson. Lee determined to proceed thither himself. Before he could do so, however, the battle of Cedar Mountain had been fought (August 9, 1862.) Jackson's army numbered over twenty-two thousand; Banks had at his command not more than a third of that number. The latter, ignorant of the fact that he was faced by such odds (many of Jackson's troops being concealed in the woods), determined on the attack. Such was the courage of the Federal troops on this occasion that they almost gained the victory, notwithstanding the overwhelming odds. At nightfall, though each side had in turn been driven back, the Federals were standing bravely. Banks in this fight atoned for the dismal defeat he had previously suffered under Jackson on the banks of the Potomac.

When it became known among the Confederates that the Army of the Potomac was leaving Harrison's Landing, Lee determined to give his

attention to Pope. He sent Jackson to Pope's rear, and that dashing general started down the Shenandoah Valley with thirty-five regiments and undertook a manœuvre which entirely surprised the Federals by its audacity. Turning to the east after reaching Salem, he slipped through Thoroughfare Gap and made a raid on Manassas Junction, where the Federals had large subsistence stores. After allowing his soldiers to help themselves to what they needed (and Confederate troops were always in need), he burned the remainder. When Jackson's whereabouts became known to Pope the latter saw that he had his enemy in a trap, and laid every preparation to catch him. That is, he made every preparation except closing the door of the trap. Not that Jackson was exceedingly anxious to get out, but the fact that Pope failed to detail a force to guard Thoroughfare Gap allowed Longstreet to march through. When Jackson saw that he would have to fight Pope, he chose Bull Run, where he previously had done famous service, as the battle-field. He took a position west of the Warrenton Road, where he could be easily met by Longstreet, who was expected in accordance with a prearranged plan. Pope's army appeared on the 27th, and Jackson attacked him during the afternoon. A battle was fought which lasted until nine o'clock, when the Federals gave way. During the next day Jackson's army was so concealed by the wooded and hilly condition of the country that Pope, though

he was anxious to engage Jackson before the latter could be reinforced, was not able to find him. In the mean time Longstreet appeared, and on the morning of the 29th, finding a battle in progress between Jackson and Pope, came upon the field in the latter's rear. Jackson was protected in front by an embankment of a railroad which was in process of construction. This the Federals gallantly and repeatedly charged under the command of General Glover. It was a terrific and bloody fight, and would have succeeded if Glover had been sustained. Kearney charged the other end of the Confederate line, forcing back the enemy until it was reinforced by Longstreet's troops. At the end of the day the Federals had been compelled to retire, though Pope was under the impression that he had won the battle, and sent a despatch to Washington to that effect. But on the following day Longstreet and Jackson were still retaining their position. The greater part of the day was taken up with skirmishing and an artillery duel. But at three o'clock Pope attacked Jackson with his main force. Longstreet was in the best position to assist Jackson, which he did by directing a tremendous fire upon the Federal support. A general advance, anticipated by Longstreet, drove the Union army from one position to another until, with great slaughter and in confusion, it was forced from the field; and the second great victory for the Confederates was recorded at Bull Run. Pope endeavored to cast the blame for

this disastrous defeat on Fitzjohn Porter, who was convicted by court-martial, but finally exonerated. He was to have made an attack on the left unless opposed by Longstreet. Instead of engaging, he manœuvred in the attempt to prevent Longstreet's attack, which was entirely in accordance with his orders. Pope was now in great need of reinforcements. McClellan, who was at Alexandria, was ordered to send men under Franklin and Coxe; but instead of doing this he argued with Halleck, counselling that Pope be left "to get out of his scrape and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." This caused Lincoln to say, "McClellan has acted badly towards Pope; he really wanted him to fail."

XIII

LEE'S INVASIONS

After the whole summer's campaign the situation as it concerned the North showed no signs of improvement. It is true that advantages were being gained in the West; there the Confederacy was being weakened by the work of Grant and Sherman; but the war must be won or lost in Virginia. That was the heart and the head of the Confederacy. And in Virginia matters looked better for the South than they had done at any time since the first battle of Manassas. In Washington there was corresponding discouragement. Indeed, after Pope's defeat the Northern capital was in a condition closely resembling panic. All the employees of the civil departments were armed for the defence of Washington. The Army of Virginia was called within the fortifications and consolidated with that of the Potomac, McClellan being again placed at the head.

At the beginning of September Lee was at Chantilli, where the Union army suffered a severe loss in the death of General Philip Kearney.

The Confederate commander now had it in his power to excite in Washington the gravest alarm. His army, it is true, was poorly equipped. The troops were entirely destitute of stores,

without the means of subsistence, ragged and shoeless. Yet, notwithstanding this, Lee determined to cut himself off from the base of supplies. He could not afford to be idle; to go forward meant the invasion of Maryland. No other plan was so likely to harass and annoy the enemy. Then, too, it was hoped that the natural sympathy which subsisted between Maryland and the South would, in the event of the victorious presence of the Confederate army, lead to an uprising. Lee and Davis thought that a decisive victory on Federal ground would bring the North to a willingness to discuss terms of peace. On the 4th of December General Lee wrote to President Davis from Leesburg: "I shall proceed to make the movement at once, unless you should signify your disapprobation." But he did not wait for a reply. Indeed, he was across the Potomac before the President could have received his despatch. The Confederate army, forty-five thousand strong, marched forward, singing "Maryland, my Maryland," and on the 6th occupied the city of Frederick. The advance was led by Jackson, and gave the occasion for Whittier's poem concerning Barbara Frietchie, in which veracity is entirely subordinated to the picturesque. Strict search of all records will show that these verses which have been so many times recited in every schoolhouse in the North were not "founded on fact." Stonewall Jackson was not the man to wantonly fire on the Union flag. Later, as he

was marching through Middletown on his way to Harper's Ferry, two girls waved miniature Union flags in the sight of his men. Jackson raised his hat and bowed, saying to his staff, "We evidently have no friends in this town." While at Frederick, Lee issued a proclamation to the people of Maryland, making known the motives and purposes of his invasion of the State.

But the people of Maryland did not seem disposed to rise. In fact, Lee was received by them with remarkable coldness. He was obliged to subsist on the country; but was willing to pay for his supplies. His only money, however, was Confederate paper currency, for which the Maryland farmers would not give up their provisions. Lee was reduced to the necessity of taking possession of Harper's Ferry, at the head of the Shenandoah Valley, in order to keep open his line of communication. This obliged him to divide his army, sending Jackson to Harper's Ferry, while he continued his march into Maryland. The fact of this division became known at the Federal head-quarters, owing to an order received by D. H. Hill being found in his camp after he had vacated it. McClellan saw the opportunity, and for once made haste to avail himself of it; not such haste, however, as he might. He overtook Lee's rear at South Mountain, and in an engagement there gained a distinct advantage. Lee retired to the other side of Antietam Creek, near the town of Sharpesburg. Lee was now in a most precarious position. His army

being depleted by twenty-five thousand in Jackson's division, everything depended upon the latter general returning in time to take part in the battle which was imminent. Jackson was successful at Harper's Ferry. The garrison was in no position to help itself; and he received the surrender of its twelve thousand five hundred men and large stores of supplies without a fight.

If McClellan had engaged Lee on September 15, he could have overwhelmed him with his greatly superior force before Jackson's return. He did not commence his movement, however, until the afternoon of the 16th, by which time Lee's army was reunited. At two o'clock Hooker crossed the Antietam and engaged the Confederate left. But there was not much done on that day except to give each commander opportunity to find his position for the battle which was to follow. At dawn on the 17th, under cover of their artillery fire, the Federals under Hooker attacked Jackson's division. After an obstinate fight and great loss the latter was compelled to fall back. But being supported by Hood, and afterwards by General Walker, the ground was regained. French and Richardson, with their two divisions of Sumner's corps, attacked the Confederate centre. At this point occurred the greatest carnage of the battle. Here was "Bloody Lane," a sunken road which was the scene of a terrific struggle. Burnside was ordered to capture the bridge across the

Antietam, which has since been called by his name. He was successful only after three hours of severe fighting. This advantage being gained, the village of Sharpsburg, which was the key of Lee's position, would have been carried had it not been for the timely appearance of A. P. Hill's division, returning from Harper's Ferry.

Colonel Taylor, of the Confederate army, gives the following comprehensive account of the second day's battle:

"When the issue was first joined, on the afternoon of the 16th, General Lee had with him less than eighteen thousand men, consisting of the commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, the two divisions of Jackson, and two brigades under Walker. Couriers were sent to the rear to hurry up the divisions of A. P. Hill, Anderson, and McLaws, hastening from Harper's Ferry, and these several commands, as they reached the front at intervals during the day, on the 17th, were immediately deployed and put to work. Every man was engaged. We had no reserve.

"The fighting was heaviest and most continuous on the Confederate left. It is established by Federal evidence that the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner were completely shattered in the repeated but fruitless efforts to turn this flank, and two of these corps were rendered useless for further aggressive movements. The aggregate strength of the attacking column at this point reached forty thousand men, not counting the two divisions of Franklin's corps, sent at a late hour in the day to rescue the Federal right from the impending danger of being itself destroyed; while the Confederates, from first to last, had less than fourteen thousand men on this flank, consisting of Jackson's two divisions, McLaws's division, and the two small divisions, of two brigades each, under Hood and Walker, with which to resist their fierce and oft-repeated assaults. The disproportion in the centre and on our right was as great as, or even more decided than, on our left."

The battle of Antietam was indecisive. The Federal loss was twelve thousand four hundred and ten; the Confederate, eleven thousand one hundred and seventy-two. It has been a subject of great controversy as to which side the honor of the battle should be given. Naturally, McClellan claimed, in writing to his wife, "a great success." But judging it according to "points," and making allowances for the handicap due to Lee on account of his weaker force, he should be given the decision. Nevertheless, in another sense it was a Northern victory. It put an end to the Maryland invasion. Lee was compelled to recross the Potomac into Virginia. Six weeks afterwards he was followed by the Army of the Potomac; but the pursuit was so dilatory that at last the patience of Lincoln and Stanton was worn out, and McClellan was dismissed. (November 5, 1862.)

Our view of McClellan's character and ability leads us to believe that his removal was justified. He had done great things for the organization of the army, but he had proved conclusively, and at an enormous expense of means and opportunity, that he was not able to use the machine he had created. Nevertheless, the plea of his friends that the animus against him at Washington was based less on his failures than on his politics is perhaps not possible of refutation. There were men in high position — Lincoln always excepted—who were not anxious for decisive victories at the hands of Democratic gen-

erals. There were men who did not want the destruction of the Confederacy to come before the overthrow of slavery. It is our own conviction that a close and intimate understanding of the effect of Northern administrative politics in the conduct of the war reveals a perfidious betrayal of the lives of men and the welfare of the nation.

Every one remembers Lee's humorous saying on the occasion, that he regretted parting with McClellan "because we understood each other so well. I fear if they keep on changing generals, they may get one that I don't understand." Indirectly, the battle of Antietam meant much for the Union cause. The November elections were close at hand, and it is fairly certain that had Lee won a decisive victory, it would have had such effect on the returns from those elections that the Northern administration would have found great difficulty in continuing the war.

Moreover, Lincoln had determined that the setting back of the Maryland invasion should be a signal to him for the announcement of his Emancipation Proclamation. For many months this had been a subject of serious questioning in Lincoln's mind. Much pressure was brought to bear upon him from both sides in the North. He was hounded by the radicals, who considered that the war was being fought wholly for the freedom of the negro. He was persuaded by the conservatives, who had respect to the Constitution. On April 25, 1862, Major-General Hunter,

who was commanding at Hilton Head, South Carolina, issued an order declaring the States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina under the operation of martial law; and on May 9 he proclaimed "the persons held as slaves in those States to be forever free." Lincoln, however, on May 19, issued a counter-proclamation nullifying that of Hunter. In this he said:

"I further make known that, whether it be competent for me as commander-in-chief of the army and navy to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether at any time or in any case it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government to examine such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field."

In August, 1862, Horace Greeley published a letter addressed to the President, entitled "The Prayer of Twenty Millions." In this he said, "On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the rebellion and at the same time uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile." Lincoln replied to this on August 22. His words are eminently characteristic of the man, of his wisdom, and unity of purpose:

"If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could

save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause."

But for some time after he had reached the determination that emancipation must come he deferred action, awaiting the opportune moment. On the 22d of September Lincoln summoned his Cabinet. As they assembled they found the President alleviating the stress of his mind by reading Artemus Ward. He finished the chapter by reading it aloud, all being amused with the exception of Stanton. Then Lincoln's manner took a graver tone. He said, "When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland to issue a Proclamation of Emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and (hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question." He then read his proclamation, which was published the following day. It was to

take effect on the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three.

What did Lincoln expect to gain by this measure? That it would weaken the South by stirring up the negroes to seek the realization of their freedom? Its slight result in this respect was owing to the elemental dissimilarity between the mind of the negro and that of the Caucasian, the existence of which the abolitionists would not admit. The proclamation invited the free negroes to take arms in the Union service. Before the end of the year Lincoln could say, "Of those who were slaves at the beginning of the rebellion, full one hundred thousand are now in the United States' military service, about one-half of which number actually bear arms in the ranks, thus giving the double advantage of taking so much labor from the insurgent cause and supplying the places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men. So far as tested, it is difficult to say they are not as good soldiers as any." This was a bitter blow to the South. It hurt her pride, as well as her prospects, to face as free combatants the men who had been her chattels. It must also be confessed that it was not far from bordering on that barbarity which the law of civilized nations discountenances to arm those who were in many cases not more than a generation removed from the savagery of the African jungle.

The main purpose of the Emancipation Proclamation was, however, to affect European sym-

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

From a photograph by Brady

pathy, and to revive the enthusiasm of the disaffected radicals of the North. It is worthy of notice, however, that on September 13, only nine days previous to the Cabinet meeting, President Lincoln thus answered the delegation of clergymen from Chicago:

"What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world would see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. And suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me to throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them? How can we feed and care for such a multitude? . . .

"If, now, the pressure of the war should call off our forces from New Orleans to defend some other point, what is to prevent the masters from reducing the blacks to slavery again? . . . Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire? I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement."

Lincoln proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves by virtue of the war power vested in him as President. The argument for the constitutionality of the act was based on the idea that the slaves were property, and that it was right to convert the property of the enemy to the ad-

vantage of the Union. He said, "Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel."

That there was at this time an increasing element of discontent in the North is shown by the returns of the November elections of 1862. New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, States which had in 1860 voted for Lincoln, now gave Democratic majorities. New York City alone recorded its discontent by a change of forty-eight thousand votes, making a Democratic majority of that year of thirty-one thousand. The general result in the North was so markedly unfavorable to the administration that the *New York Times* claimed it to be equal to a "vote of want of confidence." This, however, we believe was brought about not so much by the proclamation as by the lack of success on the battle-field. The people were growing tired of the war. The key-note of the Democratic platforms was, "The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was." The people did not enjoy seeing the Constitution trampled on as it was—perhaps unnecessarily—in those days. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was a usurpation of power on the part of the Executive which came as a shock to liberty-loving Americans. New offences were created, such as the

discouraging of enlistment, which seemed like a direct infringement of the freedom of expressing opinion. By virtue of such proceedings many seemingly tyrannical arrests were made.

After Burnside's supersession of McClellan he at once proceeded to disturb the quiet which, since Antietam, had been maintained on the Potomac. But Burnside quickly proved that he was not the man which the Northern cause needed. Brave to the highest degree, and successful as a subordinate commander, he was entirely lacking in the capacity to plan a comprehensive strategy and to utilize an army like that of the Potomac. It is to his credit that he had no desire for the position.

His plan was to take Fredericksburg as his base for an advance on Richmond. He had hoped to surprise Lee. But during the several days spent in gathering pontoon bridges for crossing the Rappahannock the Confederate general became fully aware of Burnside's plan, and arranged his own to counteract it. The Union army was organized into three divisions, under Hooker, Franklin, and Sumner. On the 11th of December Franklin and Sumner effected a landing on the east side of the river under cover of the Federal artillery. Owing to this bombardment, it went hard with the inhabitants of Fredericksburg. They were forced from their homes in search of places of safety; many found no secure shelter, and were exposed to the elements and destitute of food.

The Confederate army occupied the bluffs between which and the river the town lay. Immediately opposite Fredericksburg is Marye's Heights. This eminence was crowned with artillery and lined with infantry fortified with rifle pits and a stone wall. Burnside was determined to take this impregnable position by direct assault. Division after division was led against it, but before they could get near the foot of the hill the deadly fire would rake them, and their broken columns were forced back. Hooker begged Burnside to desist from this foolish and suicidal attempt, but he obstinately ordered the charge to go on. Humphreys led forty-five thousand men against the position and lost a thousand. It could no longer be endured. The regiments retreated in confusion, and the battle was lost. The dead lay in heaps at the foot of Marye's Heights. There was nothing indecisive about this battle (December 13, 1862). The Federal loss was more than three times that of the Confederate, and Burnside was driven back across the river. He had uselessly sacrificed his men, who had now lost all confidence in him. The army, rank and file, was completely demoralized.

Lee here certainly lost an opportunity. Burnside did not recross the Rappahannock until the day following his defeat. He had nothing to cross on except inadequate pontoon bridges. Had Lee pressed the pursuit, he could have annihilated the Union army. But he did not know

the extent of his success, nor was he ever good at following up a victory.

The prospects of the North were now at a very low ebb. Her best army was defeated, indeed had never brilliantly won; the confidence of the people was falling away from the administration. Meigs wrote to Burnside: "I begin to doubt the possibility of maintaining the contest beyond this winter unless the popular heart is encouraged by victory on the Rappahannock." There was no unity of purpose among Stanton, Halleck, and Burnside. The general was anxious to repair his loss in another attempt across the river; he also expressed his willingness to retire to private life. He could not place his pontoon bridges, and he blamed his ill success to his division commanders, and wished to replace them. It ended in his own retirement and Hooker being given the chief command.

In Lincoln's Cabinet affairs at this time were far from satisfactory. Seward was not giving satisfaction to the radical Republicans. They were convinced that he was hampering the President by his conservatism. In view of this feeling, Seward resigned in December. Chase also, who had passed open strictures on the President's policy, resigned on the 20th. But Lincoln could not afford to lose these men, and induced them to reconsider. There never was a chief magistrate who was so humble under criticism, and yet so firm in his own purpose. Moreover, it was an axiom with him "not to swop horses

while crossing the stream." Lincoln's manner and habits were totally misleading. Undoubtedly Richard H. Dana's estimate of him was shared by many at this time. He wrote to Charles F. Adams:

"As to the politics of Washington, the most striking thing is the absence of personal loyalty to the President. It does not exist. He has no admirers, no enthusiastic supporters, none to bet on his head. If a Republican convention were to be held to-morrow, he would not get the vote of a State. He does not act, or talk, or feel like the ruler of a great empire in a great crisis. This is felt by all, and has got down through all the layers of society. It has a disastrous effect on all departments and classes of officials, as well as on the public. He seems to me to be fonder of details than of principles, of tithing the mint, anise, and cummin of patronage, and personal questions, than of the weightier matters of empire. He likes rather to talk and tell stories with all sorts of persons who come to him for all sorts of purposes than to give his mind to the noble and manly duties of his great post. It is difficult to detect that this is the feeling of his Cabinet. He has a kind of shrewdness and common sense, mother wit, and slipshod, low-levelled honesty, that made him a good Western jury lawyer. But he is an unutterable calamity to us where he is. Only the army can save us. Congress is not a council of state. It is a mere district representation of men of district reputations. It has passed some good laws to enable the President to do the work, but the nation does not look up to it for counsel or lead."

After the bloody reverses of 1862 it became increasingly difficult to replenish the Union ranks by volunteers. As early as April 16, 1862, the Confederate Congress had passed a Conscription Act, including all white males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Those who had

already enlisted, though for but one or two years, were held to the service of the Southern government to the end of the war. In March, 1863, the Federal government followed this lead. An Act was passed placing at the disposal of the Executive all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. This included aliens who had declared their intention of becoming citizens. It declared any man drafted and not reporting for service a deserter. Service was to be commuted by the payment of three hundred dollars. This bill was a strict party measure. In the House, the Democrats, forty-nine against one hundred and fifteen, voted against it; in the Senate it was passed by thirty-five Republicans, opposed by eleven Democrats.

At the period of which we are writing, opposition to the war was daily increasing. Of course, it was almost entirely confined to the Democrats, though it is very far from the truth to say that all Democrats took this position. Those who desired to see the Union fail in the struggle with the South—and they were neither few nor unimportant—became known as "Copperheads." It was considered a term of reproach by the loyal, but of it those to whom it was rightly applied were not ashamed. Noteworthy among these was Robert C. Winthrop, of Boston. But the most famous Copperhead was Clement L. Vallandigham, of Ohio, who boldly denounced and resisted the administration in its conduct of the war. On December 5, 1862, he offered a

series of resolutions in which he declared "that, as the war was originally waged for the purpose of defending and maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution and the preservation of the Union, . . . whosoever should attempt to pervert the same to a war of subjugation, and for overthrowing or interfering with the rights of the States, and to abolish slavery, would be guilty of a crime against the Constitution and the Union." After his term in Congress expired, in March, 1863, he returned to Ohio and organized a political attack on the administration. The idea of Vallandigham, and the many who sided with him, was that the North should stop the fighting and accept foreign mediation; it being then generally understood that France was on the point of offering such mediation. Burnside was at that time commander of the Department of the Ohio. He issued an order declaring that persons within the lines found committing certain specified acts calculated to aid and comfort the enemy should be arrested and capitally punished. Under this order, on May 4, a company of soldiers broke into Vallandigham's house at half-past two in the morning and arrested him. He was placed in the military prison in Cincinnati. He was tried before a military commission, which found him guilty of "publicly expressing, in violation of General Orders Number 38 (Burnside's), sympathy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with

NEW ENGLAND FANATICISM

WHO ARE THE REAL DISUNIONISTS?

In a Speech at Framingham, Massachusetts, July 4th, 1863, WENDELL PHILLIPS, now the great Apostle of Abolitionism, said,

"The Union without liberty [to the negroes,] is tenfold to-day more accursed than it was any time the last quarter of a century. Union without liberty I spit upon, as the subjection of the North and the eclipse of the nineteenth century."

"Remember this, the youngest of you: that on the 4th day of July, 1863, you heard a man say, that in the light of all history, in virtue of every page he ever read, he was an amalgamationist to the utmost extent. (Applause.) I have no hope for the future, as this country has no past and Europe has no past. BUT IN THAT SUBLIME MINGLING OF RACES, WHICH IS GOD'S OWN METHOD OF CIVILIZING AND ELEVATING THE WORLD."

This is the man, who for thirty years has so despised the Union, that he has never voted under its laws; and yet is the honored and feted guest of the President and Vice-President.

The Rev. Dr. TYNG, at a Meeting of the Freedmen's Relief Society, New York, November 9th, 1863, said,

"No gradual emancipation now. No compensated emancipation now. Now put the axe to the root of the tree, and down with it—down with it."

"In all that elevates the human character, black men and black women have shown themselves as exalted and glorious as any white men and white women in the land. The time has come when we should take them cordially by the hand, and say of each one of them, it is my brother, it is my sister, it is my fellow citizen. The very rights which I have, he shall have. The respect which I demand, he shall receive. The countenance which I require, I will myself impart to him. The time has come when the distinction between black and white, as a distinction of reciprocal respect and regard, shall be one of those hateful things which we have buried beneath the pyramid under which copperheadism is interred till it rots for an eternity."

HORACE GREELY, before any State had attempted to go out of the Union, said,

"If the Cotton States, unitedly and earnestly, wish to withdraw peacefully from the Union, we think they should and would be allowed to do so. Any attempt to compel them by force to remain, would be contrary to the principles enunciated in the immortal Declaration of Independence—contrary to the fundamental ideas on which human liberty is based."—*N. Y. Tribune*, Nov. 26, 1860.

"If it (the Declaration of Independence) justified the secession from the British empire of three millions of colonists, in 1776, we do not see why it would not justify the secession of five millions of Southrons from the Union in 1861."—*New York Tribune*, Dec. 17, 1860.

In "HELPER'S IMPENDING CRISIS," published in 1860, a book that was recommended by the present Secretary of State, will be found (pages 155-6,) these words:

"No Union with slaveholders; ineligibility of slaveholders to office; no recognition of pro-slavery men, except as *ruffians, outlaws*, and *criminals*."

1864

ANTI-ABOLITION PLACARD

the object and purpose of weakening the power of government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion." He was sentenced to imprisonment during the continuance of the war. This, however, the President commuted to banishment, and ordered that Vallandigham be sent beyond the military lines into the Southern Confederacy (May 25). This was putting him where it was supposed he belonged. But there can be no question that the whole proceeding was entirely illegal. This arbitrary creation of political offences, and the many arrests and imprisonments resulting therefrom, was a mistaken policy on the part of Lincoln and his administration, and did much to foster in the North opposition to the government.

During the summer of 1863 several riots occurred in different Northern cities when the Federal authorities proceeded to enforce the new levy for soldiers called for in the preceding April. The most serious of these popular uprisings was that which in July caused a reign of terror in New York. In the tenement districts opposition to the draft or conscription of men was especially serious, as advantage had been taken of Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania to inflame public hatred against the national authorities as well as against the negroes. Incendiary placards, not to mention questionable editorials in one or two Democratic newspapers of the city, brought discord to the highest pitch.

Negroes were attacked and murdered in the

streets; the Colored Orphan Asylum in Fifth Avenue and Forty-fourth Street was sacked and burned; and the soldiers and police were defied by thousands of foreigners, reinforced by the dangerous element of the native population, who had robbed armories and gun-shops of fire-arms. More than one thousand rioters were killed, together with many citizens and soldiers. Among the latter was Colonel Henry J. O'Brien, a gallant member of the Eleventh New York Volunteers.

There can be little doubt that the rioters, in spite of their excesses, had a real grievance; and had the wise counsel of Horatio Seymour, then governor of the State, to Lincoln been followed, much of the trouble might have been averted. Seymour came in for much undeserved criticism, however, and there was some talk of treating him as Vallandigham, Bright, and other Democratic chiefs had been treated.

Seymour, in his inaugural address, took occasion to say that while he had sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, he had also sworn to support that of the State of New York. After the riots some correspondence took place between him and Lincoln (Appleton's Annual, 1863), in which Seymour claimed that under the provision of the Enrolment Act the law required that the quotas should be so assigned as to equalize the number of men among the districts of the several States, allowance being made for those already furnished as well as for the time

of service. It was claimed, with apparent justice, that New York had hitherto furnished a surplus, and was entitled to credit, but the statement of the Federal provost marshal did not agree with the records of the Adjutant-General of the State. Seymour sought to have a comparison made of the records of the two officers, and said it was believed "by at least one-half of the people of the loyal States that the Conscription Act was in itself a violation of the Supreme Constitution."

Lincoln, while earnestly declaring in reply that the government would interpose "no obstacles to the earliest practical decision upon this point," made it clear that he would not consent to a suspension of the draft in New York City, because, among other things, time was too important. The President did not object to referring the controversy to the Federal Supreme Court, and Seymour urged that "the action of the administration will determine in the minds of more than one-half the people of the loyal States whether this war is waged to put down rebellion at the South or to destroy free institutions at the North." The restoration of authority and the settlement of the difference between the local and national governments prevented further trouble.

When Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac, he found it in an extremely demoralized condition. The men had become disheartened and sulky. Desertions were alarm-

ingly numerous. Hooker himself testified that "so anxious were parents, wives, brothers, and sisters to relieve their kindred that they filled the express trains to the army with packages of citizen clothing to assist them in escaping." But the new commander's talent for organization corrected these evils, and by April he had determined to take an offensive attitude.

Lee was at Fredericksburg with sixty thousand troops. Hooker had an available one hundred and thirty thousand. The cry, "On to Richmond," was again raised. The Union general's plan was that Sedgwick should make a feint at Fredericksburg, while he himself, with the greater part of the army, would cross the Rappahannock above Chancellorsville and attack the Confederate rear. This part of the programme was carried out. But instead of making the attack as soon as he reached a favorable position Hooker fell back into the Wilderness, a wild country in which the movements of cavalry and artillery were seriously retarded. Lee was not outwitted. He turned to face Hooker, and in the mean time sent Jackson—noted for his wonderful celerity in flank movements—to make a fifteen-mile detour with twenty thousand men who were to fall on Hooker's rear, while Lee made the attack in front. Jackson was successful in this movement, and surprised the Federals while at supper. His troops were seen while on the march, but the Federals supposed they were retreating. The consequence was a complete

rout of the Eleventh Corps of Hooker's army. But this victory was won at the cost of Jackson's life, and the Confederates might far better have lost the battle. While reconnoitring in the darkness, Jackson was fired on and wounded by his own men. Pneumonia setting in, he died eight days afterwards, with these last words on his lips: "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees."

In the mean time Sedgwick had taken Fredericksburg and was marching on Lee's rear. The latter turned quickly and beat him back across the Rappahannock. Here was Hooker's opportunity, but he did not realize it. By the time his army emerged from the Wilderness, on May 1, Lee was back and ready to face him. After a short engagement the Federal general ordered his regiments to fall back, much to the disgust of his commanders. They had reached an open country in which fighting was possible. "My God!" exclaimed Meade; "if we can't hold the top of the hill, we certainly cannot hold the bottom of it." This mistake and Jackson's success in flanking settled the battle of Chancellorsville. Jackson's command devolved upon Stuart, the famous Confederate cavalry officer. With his men uttering, for a war-cry, "Remember Jackson," he seized Hazel Grove, which permitted a concentration of the whole Confederate force in attack. Generals Sickles and Slocum bore the whole brunt of this, while over thirty thousand troops remained idle, a fact which in itself indi-

cates that the battle of Chancellorsville was lost entirely through bad generalship. On the morning of May 6 the entire army of the Potomac had recrossed the Rappahannock. The Federal loss in this battle was over seventeen thousand; that of the South was twelve thousand five hundred.

After Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville the South was led to think that her cause was nearly won. There was great elation among the Confederates. The authorities thought that a successful offensive movement would quickly bring the North to terms. Lee, though not entirely convinced of the wisdom of the plan proposed, yielded to the pressure. He had made a requisition for rations. The South could supply enthusiasm, and at this time volunteers and drafted men in fair numbers were forthcoming; but sustenance was a different matter. The country was drained of supplies. The commissary-general at Richmond wrote on Lee's letter, "If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania." Lee reorganized his army into three corps,—Longstreet keeping the command of his old division; Ewell succeeded Jackson; and A. P. Hill was appointed to the command of the third. On the 3d of June this army of eighty thousand seasoned and well-armed troops began the march to the northward. Reconnoissances in the direction of Culpeper brought on several cavalry engagements. The chief of these, and what was probably the greatest cavalry fight of the war, occurred at

Philadelphia Post Office, June 16th, 1863.

I have just received the following dispatch from the Governor of this State, with a request it be conspicuously posted in the City.

C. A. WALBORN, P. M.

Harrisburg, half-past 1, P. M., June 16th, 1863.

THE ENEMY

IS

APPROACHING!

I MUST RELY UPON THE PEOPLE FOR THE

DEFENCE OF THE STATE!

AND HAVE

CALLED THE MILITIA

FOR THAT PURPOSE.

the term of service will only be while the danger to the State is imminent.

Send forward Companies

AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Signed, **ANDREW G. CURTIN.**

PLACARD ISSUED BY GOVERNOR CURTIN, OF PENNSYLVANIA, CALLING FOR VOLUNTEERS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE STATE, JUNE, 1863

Brandy Station on the 8th. In this the Confederates were successful, and the principal result was the effective screening of Lee's movements from Federal knowledge.

On the 13th General Ewell marched on Winchester, and, on the following day, captured the town with its fortifications in brilliant fashion. Lee's line was now drawn out to a length of one hundred miles. Lincoln, by this time, had learned enough of the trade of war to see the opportunity. He wrote to Hooker, "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?" But instead, Hooker went off towards Manassas. With Stuart and his cavalry guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge, Lee continued his advance, Hooker following, but to the east, in order to guard Washington.

On the 27th Lee was at Chambersburg with Longstreet and Hill's corps, while Ewell's division was yet farther north at Carlisle. From this latter place Ewell sent Early to capture York. The town was formally surrendered by its authorities, and the Confederates used their advantage to clothe themselves at the merchants' expense.

At this time Halleck and Hooker were acrimoniously disputing. Hooker complained that the commanding general at Washington paid no attention to his requisitions; and Halleck was

angry because Hooker complained over his head. There is no question that the general in the field was most seriously hampered by Halleck's interference.

On the 28th of June General Hooker wished to operate against Lee's rear by means of the garrison at Harper's Ferry reinforced by Slocum's corps. But Halleck refused to allow him to take the troops from Harper's Ferry. Thereupon the general wrote that if he were not allowed to manage the campaign in his own way he preferred to be relieved from the command of the army. He was relieved, and his place filled by Major-General George G. Meade. At the same date Lee discovered that his communication with Richmond was threatened by the Union army at his rear. For the purpose of diverting his enemy, Lee proceeded to threaten Baltimore, and inaugurated this strategy by moving his entire army on Gettysburg.

The battle of Gettysburg (July 1 to 3, 1863) was not premeditated. Neither Meade nor Lee was looking for a general engagement. But while the former's cavalry, under Buford, were reconnoitring on July 1, they came in contact with Hill's advance corps just west of the town. The Federals were forced back, and it was here that General Reynolds, who came to the support of Buford, was killed. When this preliminary fighting ceased at nightfall the advantage was with the Confederates. During the night each side brought up its rear forces and marshalled

them by the light of the moon. Lee should have begun the fighting on the 2d at sunrise, but for some reason, too much controverted to be clear, it was delayed until the afternoon. By this time the Federal forces had taken their position on Round Top, from which they wrought the greatest devastation on the Confederates.

The armies now facing each other lay along two ranges of hills to the south of the town of Gettysburg, the Federals on Cemetery Ridge, and the Confederates on Seminary Ridge. The former is a convex and the latter a concave line, giving the Union army a much better vantage of defence.

Lee began the attack on the afternoon of the 2d. His work lay directly before him; it was to carry Round Top and plant his artillery so that it would rake the crest of Cemetery Ridge. The Confederates gained some ground; but night came, ending a tremendous slaughter, and Meade still held his position intact.

On the third day of the battle Lee again determined to charge the Federal centre, though much against Longstreet's advice. Meade's First and Eleventh Corps had been badly used up on the previous day, and the Federal generals were by no means confident, though determined "to stay and fight it out." Stuart's cavalry were now on the field, and Lee sent them around to attack the Union rear. He prepared for the main attack, under Longstreet, by ordering forward the two divisions led by Pickett and Pettigrew.

One hundred and thirty-five cannon were to play on the Federal centre. Stuart, however, was met by Union cavalry under Gregg and by a brigade under Custer, and accomplished nothing. Pickett's charge was a magnificent example of desperate determination. The Union batteries swept the ground over which he charged with terrible effect, but his men went on. They came within musketry range. Hancock was in command of the Union forces at this position. His infantry met the charging masses with a tempest of musketry fire. They were encouraged by the brave Hancock, and made splendid resistance. But the Confederate advance was irresistible. Pickett's troops gained the ridge and captured the guns. Kemper and Armistead planted their banners on the crest. But Pettigrew had not been able to lead his men to Pickett's support, no other reinforcements were available, and the latter was soon overwhelmed by numbers and compelled to retreat. This lost the battle for Lee. It also ended the invasion.

XIV

SHERMAN'S MARCH

LINCOLN'S message to Congress in December, 1863, was characterized by a hopeful and confident tone which would hardly have found a harmonious response in the heart of the North the year before. While no very marked progress had been made in forcing the recalcitrant States to obedience, it was apparent that the North could and would continue the war until the South had passed beneath the yoke. Her great resources stood by her in sufficient stead, and the South was being worn out. It was like a battle between a giant and a more active, perhaps more scientific, but weaker antagonist. Unless the smaller combatant could early deal a blow that would reach a vital spot, his chances of victory were slight. Lee had failed to strike such a blow. His invasion of the North resulted in failure. While so far the South had waged the more brilliant warfare and had earned the greater honors, she was becoming exhausted, and the North was still hammering her army with unabated vigor.

Lincoln said:

"When Congress assembled a year ago, the war had already lasted nearly twenty months, and there had been many conflicts on both land and sea with varying results.

The rebellion had been pressed back into reduced limits; yet the tone of public feeling and opinion, at home and abroad, was not satisfactory. With other signs, the popular elections, then just passed, indicated uneasiness among ourselves, while amid much that was cold and menacing, the kindest words coming from Europe were uttered in accents of pity that we were too blind to surrender a hopeless cause. . . . The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September, was running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month later the final proclamation came, including the announcement that colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war service. The policy of emancipation and of employing black soldiers gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt contended in uncertain conflict. Eleven months having now passed, we are permitted to take another review. The rebel borders are pressed still farther back, and, by the complete opening of the Mississippi, the country dominated by the rebellion is divided into distinct parts, with no practical communication between them. Tennessee and Arkansas have been substantially cleared of insurgent control. . . . Of those States not included in the Emancipation Proclamation, Maryland and Missouri, neither of which, three years ago, would tolerate any restraint upon the extension of slavery into new Territories, only dispute now as to the best mode of removing it within their own limits. . . . The crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past."

Antislavery feeling had made an immense gain in the North. The abolitionists had won. At the firing on Sumter Lincoln could not have raised an army worth considering, if the war had had as its avowed object the extinction of slavery. Now the opinion was general that for the sake of ending the war it was expedient to destroy the institution. It cannot, however, be argued that there was any growing love of the negro. His

emancipation was accepted by the majority as an expedient, right in itself, but of questionable constitutionality.

On the other hand, a situation of affairs forgotten by, if not unknown to, the present generation, must be noted. The United States prisons were full of political prisoners. For the expression of opinions condemnatory of the action of the United States government, men were being arrested without judicial warrant and incarcerated without trial by jury. Free speech was prohibited. Freedom of thought was debarred of expression. Even the right of being represented by counsel, which is guaranteed by the Constitution, was denied these "political prisoners." The Habeas Corpus Act was in operation. The North was in the hands of the despotism of expediency.

Yet the whole heart of the North was very far from being with the administration. The minority was becoming more active and insistent, despite repression and persecution. This fact is substantiated by the continued falling off of the supply of volunteers. Enthusiasm for military service became less and less. It had been most fearfully demonstrated that war was an unhealthful business. Moreover, the supplying of the needs of the army and the depletion of the ranks of industry by the thousands who were enlisted gave unusual opportunities for gain to those who remained at home. Even the conscription, of itself, was not sufficient to bring out the

requisite number of men. Experience had demonstrated the hatred of the people towards the expedient, and therefore it was not deemed advisable to enforce it with overmuch rigor, for fear that opposition and agitation might reduce Republican majorities. The expedient of bounties was resorted to. The government, the State, and the country, offered bounties; the aggregate obtainable by a bounty man was frequently six or seven hundred dollars, sometimes much more. This, of course, was a bonus in addition to the regular soldier's pay. The system had a vicious effect. It created a new criminal industry,—namely, that of "bounty jumping." It attracted, from the lowest moral strata, men who would enlist to obtain the bounty, take the first opportunity to desert, and forthwith repeat the performance in some other part of the country. One man confessed to jumping the bounty thirty-two times. There were also brokers who made a lucrative business of supplying such recruits, and also substitutes for drafted men unwilling to go to war and able to escape service by purchasing exemption through a man engaged to take their place.

Nevertheless, the efficiency of the Northern army was greatly improved. The veterans had received the best possible training. The lesson had been learned that the war could not be won with officers whose chief qualifications consisted in their political connections. Gradually there had come to the fore a set of generals who were

not only skilled in the science of warfare, but whose achievements warranted the trust reposed in them. The administration ceased to interfere with them. This was true of both sides. Grant was opposed by Lee; Sherman was matched by Johnston, who had succeeded Bragg. Sheridan, in command of the army in the Shenandoah, had his rival in Early.

At last the right man had been found to take supreme command of the Union forces. On February 29, 1864, Congress revived the rank of lieutenant-general; and the President, who had been empowered to confer that rank on whom he would and during his pleasure, at once named Grant. The conqueror of Vicksburg was thought to be the only man who could save the Union cause. Lincoln said to him:

"The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

It was a plain, honest, able man calling to his side a man equally unostentatious, able, and sincere. With Grant there were no brass and feathers. He cared nothing whatever for the dignity of office. His whole thought was for the best way of doing the work before him. He is described at the time as having "rather the look

of a man who did, or once did, take a little too much to drink. But the ordinary, scrubby-looking man, with the slightly seedy look, as if he was out of office and on half-pay, and nothing to do but hang round the entry of Willard's, cigar in mouth, had a clear blue eye and a look of resolution, as if he could not be trifled with, and an entire indifference to the crowd about him."

It is a remarkable fact that at this time the unassuming lieutenant-general had much more of the confidence of the people than had the President who appointed him. But then many men had discovered by experience that it was a terrific task to command the armies, but every one still had liberty to think he could better fill the Presidency than did Lincoln. Chase was seeking, by every means, to undermine his chief's prospects in order that his own might be secured. He coveted the highest magisterial office of the Union. When Lincoln was compelled so to act that certain persons were disappointed or offended, the Secretary of the Treasury took pains to let it be known that he would have done otherwise. He had an influential following, and consented to allow his name to be presented to the people. The people, however, had no use for it. Nothing more strikingly shows the patriotic magnanimity of Lincoln than the way in which he endured Chase's thwartings and annoyances, simply because the President thought that the Secretary of the Treasury was the best available man for the office.

If Lincoln, at the beginning of the fourth year of the war, saw reasons for hope and confidence, the South also was no less encouraged. Her people, despite the fearful drain upon her resources and the terrific punishment she had received, still believed in the certainty of establishing their independence. The late successes had been mostly in favor of the Confederacy. The Union arms had in reality achieved but little except in the way of wearing out the South in a test of endurance. Banks had proposed the conquest of the Trans-Mississippi; it had resulted in the Red River campaigns, in which the Confederacy gained the distinct advantage. Sherman had said of his army, with which he had expected to do great things in the Southwest, half "went to Memphis and half went to hell." The Mississippi was not secure to the Federalists with Forrest and his Confederate troops ravaging its shores. The opinion at Richmond was that this would be the last year of the war. If the Confederacy could withstand the grand attack now to be made, it was believed that the North would be forced by the intervention of Europe to desist in her attempt to coerce, if not through sheer inability to maintain the offensive.

Grant's campaign, destined completely to overthrow the hope of the South, was planned with the extreme simplicity which pertained to the man. Lee's army was between him and Richmond, the front of the rebellion. He would attack Richmond, and either capture or demolish

it. In the mean time a fatal stroke might be given the enemy by an expedition led by Sherman to Atlanta and the Southern seaboard. In this would be encountered Johnston's army, which Sherman must either capture or destroy. By May 5, 1864, the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Rapidan and was encamped in the Wilderness. Its site was of evil augury to the North, since Hooker had met his disaster there. Grant did not desire to risk an engagement here; but Lee, knowing the ground to be extremely unfavorable for defence, decided on pushing the attack. Grant saw that it would be necessary to fight his way out of this perilous position. Lee began the attack in the morning, and the battle raged all day. There were times when each side seemed inclined to take panic and run. But at night, when the struggle was ended, it was found that the Union army had suffered by far the greater loss in men and had gained no advantage; in fact, the honors of the day, though both sides had fought with great vigor and bravery, rested with the Confederates. A correspondent of the *London Herald* wrote from the scene:

"The results to the enemy in some parts of the field cannot be described by any word less forcible than massacre."

He estimated that the Federal killed could be positively shown to be not less than three thousand. Probably Grant lost in the Wilderness, in killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing, not far from thirty thousand men.

Grant now turned towards Richmond by way of Spottsylvania, where Lee, with his usual sagacity, anticipated him. Desultory fighting continued for several days. It was at this time—in fact, May 11—that Grant wrote to Halleck: "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." It was an expensive line, and one Grant was unable to follow directly, but it was the only course to decisive victory. It meant defeat by attrition, and the Union army was able to last the longer and thus conquer in the end.

On the 17th the principal battle of the ten days' fighting in the Wilderness, that of Spottsylvania, was waged. The Federals attacked an angle of earthworks held by the Confederates. It was a surprise, and resulted in the capture of the works and nearly the whole of a division commanded by General Johnson. It was here that General Lee gave such a marked exhibition of his devotion as well as personal courage. When the Confederates were on the point of suffering a complete disaster, Lee rode in front of the line, and there, in the midst of the battle, sat bareheaded on his horse, an example of dauntlessness to the troops. These shouted, "Go back, General Lee; go back!" and as his horse was being led to the rear, they went to the charge with courage that could not be withstood.

With Grant now started on that wholesale life-sacrificing campaign which was to end at Appo-

mattox, and which we will study in a later chapter, we will turn to Sherman, who was getting his army in shape for his memorable expedition through Georgia. Sherman's task was no less difficult than that of Grant. It required that he swing away from his base and practically abandon any attempt at keeping open a line of communication. Moreover, it was necessary that he traverse a wild country which was admirably adapted to the concealment and protection of the enemy. Before entering upon this decisive campaign, however, Sherman made an expedition against Meridian in Mississippi and Selma in Alabama, in order to destroy the means of transportation in the centre of the Confederacy. Here Polk was in command of about twenty thousand troops, the cavalry being under the command of Forrest. Meridian was destroyed, in accordance with Sherman's programme, with little resistance. Forrest then, after an unsuccessful invasion of Kentucky, made an attack upon Fort Pillow. This was defended by Majors Booth and Bradford and about five hundred men, half of whom were negroes. Forrest demanded a surrender, which was refused. He then carried the fort by storm. No quarter was given. The slaughter approached a massacre. A few of the garrison escaped to the Federal gunboats in the Mississippi.

After sending Generals Banks and A. J. Smith to the west of the lower Mississippi on an expedition which ended disastrously, they being de-

feated by Generals Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor with an inferior force, Sherman set about the great Georgian campaign. His army of nearly ninety-nine thousand men was thus organized: The Army of the Cumberland, under Major-General Thomas; the Army of Tennessee, commanded by McPherson; the Army of the Ohio, under Schofield. Against this invasion Johnston could muster thirty-six thousand infantry and artillery and less than seven thousand cavalry. The disproportion was great, but was in a measure counterbalanced by the fact that the Southern force was upon the defensive.

Sherman telegraphed:

"We intend to fight Joseph Johnston until he is satisfied, and I hope he will not attempt to escape. If he does, my bridges are down and we will be after him."

Johnston had no intention of attempting to escape; he was there to dispute every inch of the way. But he did not, like Lee, court a general engagement. The Confederate army was intrenched at Dalton, but, finding that Sherman was seeking to turn his position by marching on Resaca, Johnston evacuated Dalton on the 12th. The Confederate commander had a wholesome respect for Northern soldiers. He had had experiences with them, both as their leader and as their enemy; and, as he himself declares, the estimation in which they were held by Southern editors and political speakers was not sufficiently well founded for the purpose of forming a judg-

ment as to how and when it would be well to give battle. He therefore confined his operations to skirmishing and protecting his communications. On May 20 Sherman held a line of advance which extended through Rome, Kingston, and Cassville, running east and west. Johnston was disposed to hazard an engagement, believing that a favorable opportunity was presented. But Generals Polk and Hood expressing their conviction that neither of them could hold his position, Johnston, knowing that this discouragement would communicate itself to the men, abandoned the project. He later confessed his error in giving way to the judgment of his generals.

Sherman was now within fifty miles of Atlanta. So long as he could keep the enemy before him, he was secure. He wrote:

"The long and single line of railroad to my rear is the delicate point of my game, as also the fact that all of Georgia, except the cleared bottoms, is densely wooded, with few roads, and at any point an enterprising enemy can, in a few hours, with axes and spades, make across our path formidable works, whilst his sharp-shooters, spies, and scouts, in the guise of peaceable farmers, can hang around us and kill our wagon men, messengers, and couriers. It is a big Indian war; still thus far I have won four strong positions, advanced a hundred miles, and am in possession of a large wheat-growing region and all the iron-mines and works of Georgia."

On May 25 Sherman left the line of railroad, not desiring to contend the strong position at Allatoona Pass. He bore to the east, and Hooker's division came in contact with the Confederates the two following days. But Sherman

made the detour and again reached the railroad at Allatoona. Johnston did no more than retard the Federal movement; though he made a gallant resistance, Sherman slowly but surely pressed on. A detailed history of these manœuvres for position is of interest only to the military strategist and those who still wish to refresh their memories of personal experiences.

On the 13th of June occurred one event which was a great loss to the Confederate cause. This was the death of Lieutenant-General Polk, who combined the qualities (rarely related in modern times) of an eminent bishop and a gallant soldier. This happened at Pine Hill, where he had gone with a small reconnoitring party. As they stood together, a good mark was presented for a Federal battery distant some six or seven hundred yards. The third shot passed through General Polk's chest.

Sherman's despatch of June 23 gives a good idea of the nature of the fighting which was going on.

"Our lines are now in close contact, and the fighting incessant, with a good deal of artillery. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better, and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and, notwithstanding the repeated breaks of the road in our rear, supplies are ample."

It was a continual sparring, with Johnston constantly but with dogged slowness falling back,

Sherman's policy was not to risk a general engagement. He preferred saving his men by a slow, zigzag progress, to risking the direct attack. He departed from his method, however, at Kenesaw Mountain, and thereby proved the wisdom of the other course. He ordered the attack on the morning of June 27. It was repulsed at every part of the Confederate line. The Federal troops held to the assault with courage and tenacity, and in consequence suffered great and disproportionate loss. Many were found dead, lying against the Confederate breastworks, thus showing the spirit in which the assault had been made. Reports show that while the Southerners lost only eight hundred, Sherman's loss was not far from three thousand. Sherman, confessing it was a failure, said, "I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly."

General Thomas, however, did not consider such game as this worth playing. When asked by his chief, "Are you willing to risk the move on Dalton, cutting loose from our railroad?" he replied, "If with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised."

Sherman had no great opinion of the Army of the Cumberland. He complained of it as being too slow, and that Thomas did not seem to realize that the work of the Federal army

was offensive rather than defensive. He said of Thomas's division: "A fresh furrow in a ploughed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench." After the defeat at Kenesaw, he again resorted to manœuvring, and, turning to the right, took possession of the Chattahoochee River. He was now within eight miles of Atlanta.

The South was greatly disappointed at Johnston's falling back to Atlanta and thus surrendering a large and rich part of Georgia. But, though constantly on the retreat, the Confederates had not waged an unsuccessful warfare. It had been, in fact, a brilliant example of generalship, providing it be conceded that Johnston's policy of not giving a general engagement was the true one. He had inflicted great losses on his enemy, probably five times as many as his own. He thus justifies his policy:

"At Dalton the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the chances of battle much against us; and, even if beaten, they had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold and in the fortress of Chattanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Atlanta, one hundred miles off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore, victory for us could have been indecisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his falling into them; while defeat would have been our ruin."

There was now a lull in the campaigns, both that which we have been following and Grant's

in Virginia. The interest in the North was largely taken with the approaching Presidential election. The question of the hour was: Had the people enough confidence in the Illinois "rail-splitter" to continue him in his position of tremendous responsibility? Opinions differed. James Russell Lowell asked what would have been the condition of affairs had a weak or unwise man been elected in his stead. Yet there were many men of influence who, perhaps conscientiously, hoped to defeat Lincoln's nomination. There was a scheme to postpone the convention. Greeley was distinctly opposed to Lincoln. He thought that Frémont, Butler, or Grant would do as well. Much was made by him and others of the custom, which had for years prevailed, of restricting the Presidency to one term. At this late date, the idea of preferring Frémont or Butler to Lincoln seems too ridiculous to be possible. But a man is never judged as a whole in his own time. He is estimated by the last happening which may be laid to his responsibility. The Union arms had not given the satisfaction which the North had anticipated, and the failures were laid at Lincoln's door. Said an editor to Thaddeus Stevens, "Introduce me to some member of Congress friendly to Mr. Lincoln's renomination." Stevens went to Arnold, of Chicago, a close friend of the President, and said, "Here is a man who wants to find a Lincoln member of Congress. You are the only one I know, and I have come over to introduce my

friend to you." This was, of course, an exaggeration; but the fact that such a thing could happen indicates the strength of the opposition to Lincoln.

A convention consisting of a few hundred men gathered at Cleveland, May 31, 1864, and nominated Frémont for the Presidency, and John Cochrane, of New York, for the Vice-Presidency. Lincoln turned the whole proceedings to ridicule, and furnished a new political metaphor by reading from the Bible to his friends the following incident from the life of David:

"And every one that was in distress, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him; and he became a captain over them: and there were with him about four hundred men."

At this time the mind of the North was not decided as to whether her arms were meeting success or defeat. True, Grant was winning battles; but at what cost! Chase said:

"The people are crazy, or I am. I don't see the recent military successes. Most earnestly do I pray that we may see them hereafter. All, under God, depends on Grant. So far he has achieved very little, and that little has cost beyond computation. Still, my hope is in him. He seems the ablest and most persistent man we have. Sherman has done well and apparently more than Grant."

Serious as were the trials of the North at this time, there were those who were willing to take advantage of public depression for stock-jobbing exploits. On May 18 a bogus proclamation was published which caused great, though brief, con-

sternation. It was a clever forgery which purported to come from Lincoln, and appointed a day for humiliation, fasting, and prayer,—an acknowledgment, on the part of the administration, of Grant's failure. It was published in two Democratic papers, the *Journal of Commerce* and the *New York World.* Though, on discovering the fact that it was a canard, the editors endeavored to rectify their mistake, by order of the President they were arrested and their journals suppressed under military authority.

In the mean time some efforts were being put forth to bring about an understanding as to the basis upon which negotiations for peace might be carried on. Early in the summer a manifesto was published by the Confederate Congress, setting forth the demands of the Confederacy. It had not receded from its position held before the war, except that now there was no express mention of slavery in the Territories. Immunity from internal interference must be insured.

"Let them forbear aggressions upon us, and the war is at an end. If there be questions which require adjustment by negotiations, we have ever been willing, and are still willing, to enter into communication with our adversaries in a spirit of peace, of equity, and manly frankness."

In 1863 Vice-President Stephens offered his services as a commissioner, and attempted to make the journey to Washington; but the authorities there refused to allow him to pass their lines or to hold any sort of communication with them. In July, 1864, Messrs. C. C. Clay and

Jacob Thompson were at Niagara Falls, whence they sent a letter to Horace Greeley, soliciting a safe-conduct to Washington, where, as Southern commissioners, they were to endeavor to ascertain on what basis, if any, peace could be negotiated. Lincoln contented himself with replying "to whom it may concern" that the Union and the complete abolition of slavery were the *sine qua non* of peace. It is said that Lee cloaked any interest he might have had in this letter with the remark that it concerned no one. Many Northern newspapers were discussing the possibility of ending the war by an agreement, and many held that it could and ought to be done. The *Tribune* said:

"We feel certain that two-thirds of the American people on either side of the dividing line anxiously, absorbingly, desire peace, and are ready to make all needful sacrifices to secure it. Then why shall it be long withheld? Let us know, as soon as may be, the most that the rebel chiefs will do to secure peace; let us know what is the 'ultimatum' on our side. We have no sympathy with the shuddering dread that our government may, by listening to propositions from the rebels, virtually acknowledge their independence. Etiquette is the disease of little minds, great souls are never troubled by it."

But the Union authorities never could bring themselves to treat with the Confederacy openly and above board, although the Jaquess-Gilmore Peace Mission was tacitly though unofficially recognized by the Federal administration.

On the 29th of August the Democratic Convention met at Chicago. August Belmont, in

calling the Convention to order, said that "four years of misrule by a sectional, fanatical, and corrupt party had brought our country to the verge of ruin. The past and present are sufficient warnings of the disastrous consequence which would befall us if Mr. Lincoln's re-election should be made possible by our want of patriotism and unity." Horatio Seymour, governor of New York, and the permanent chairman of the convention, said:

"They [the party in power] were animated by intolerance and fanaticism, and blinded by an ignorance of the spirit of our institutions, the character of our people, and the condition of our land. Step by step they have marched on to results from which at the onset they would have shrunk with horror; and even now, when war has desolated our land, has laid its heavy burden upon labor, and when bankruptcy and ruin overhang us, they will not have the Union restored unless upon conditions unknown to the Constitution. . . . They will not even listen to a proposal for peace which does not offer what this government has no right to ask."

The platform adopted was similar in its purport. Seymour would have been the nominee had he not emphatically refused to allow his name to be used. The choice fell on George B. McClellan, who met with little opposition.

The Republican Convention had met at Baltimore, June 7. Lincoln, whose nomination had for some time been practically certain, explained the confidence of his party thus:

"I do not allow myself to suppose that either the convention or the league have concluded to decide that I am either the greatest or best man in America, but rather they have

concluded it is not best to swop horses while crossing the river, and have further concluded that I am not so poor a horse that they might not make a botch of it in trying to swop."

Andrew Johnson was nominated for the Vice-Presidency by the Republican party, though he was a Democrat and a Southerner, because, like many others in East Tennessee, he supported the Union and had a peculiar and strong following whose support was earnestly desired by the managers of the Republican campaign.

Farragut's brilliant victory in Mobile Bay contributed immensely to the restored confidence of the people in the present administration. It was a direct contradiction of the popular abbreviation of the Democratic platform: "Resolved, the war is a failure." From the beginning Mobile had been a source of trouble to the Federal government, in that it afforded especially favorable facilities for blockade-runners. The Confederate authorities knew that sooner or later it would be made the point of a determined attack, therefore they brought the defences up to the highest possible state of perfection.

It was on August 5, 1864, that Farragut determined to run the gauntlet of the fortress and enter the torpedo-protected harbor. In a letter written just before the battle he said, "I am going into Mobile Bay in the morning if 'God is my leader,' as I hope he is." It was a terrific fight. The ironclad "Tecumseh" went ahead to grapple with the formidable ram "Tennessee,"

but before the duel had fairly begun the Union men saw their best ship throw her stern out of the water and plunge bow foremost to the bottom. She had been blown up by a torpedo. For a while the fate of the battle hung in the balance. The Federal ships were huddled before Fort Morgan and were being raked with deadly effect. The flagship "Hartford" could not go on because the "Brooklyn" lay in her way. "Tell the admiral there is a heavy line of torpedoes ahead," signalled the latter. "Damn the torpedoes!" shouted Farragut from the rigging. "Go ahead, Captain Drayton! Four bells." The "Hartford" steered to the West and crossed the line in safety. Such "lofty courage and stern determination plucked victory out of the very jaws of defeat; the battle of Mobile Bay was to the career of Farragut what the battle of Copenhagen was to that of Nelson."

We return now to Georgia, where we left the contesting parties before Atlanta. Pollard attributes the capture of that city by Sherman to the unaccountable replacement of Johnston by Hood, saying that, though the latter had a heart like a lion, his head was a block of wood. The reason given for the supersession of Johnston was his failure to check the advance of the enemy and also because he expressed "no confidence that he could defeat or expel him." The latter reason is singular. To it Johnston simply replied, "Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competence."

Davis never had any love for Johnston, and, while obliged to use him, on more than one occasion took the opportunity to humiliate him.

Hood took the command with the understanding that his government wished to see some fighting. He satisfied that desire. On the 20th of July he attacked Sherman's right at Peachtree Creek. Though some prisoners were taken and the retreat was made in good order, yet it was a repulse. On the 22d occurred another battle near the same spot; and on this occasion the Confederates captured two thousand prisoners and six pieces of artillery. Hood made another attack on the 23d. He came out of Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road. He had, however, made a miscalculation which cost him fifteen hundred men, according to his own statement.

Sherman was now regularly besieging Atlanta. Bombardment did not seem to effect much, and for weeks the Union general waited his opportunity. On the 31st of August he found the Confederate army divided into two parts, twenty-two miles away from each other. Hood had also sent his cavalry under Wheeler to intercept Sherman's line of communication. On this, the Federals moved to a commanding position near Jonesboro, from which Hood was unable to dislodge them. On the 1st of September Hardee's Corps was defeated with great loss. Hood now found himself outflanked, cut off from his supplies, and his army divided, cut in two by the Federals. Thereupon, he determined that At-

lanta was no longer tenable. He destroyed his supplies, which it was found impossible to remove, blew up the magazines, and marched out. Just at the moment when the weary North was beginning to look with consideration on the Chicago platform, the news came from Sherman: "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won. Since the 5th of May we have been in one continual battle or skirmish, and need rest."

The administration of the North needed such news as this. It came just in the nick of time. The people were almost ready to vote the affirmative on "Resolved, the war is a failure." But now came successes. Farragut had achieved his victory in Mobile Bay. Sheridan also had defeated Early at Winchester and Fisher's Hill. These victories, to use Seward's language, "knocked the bottom out of the Chicago nominations." By October, Chase, who in the interval had been dropped from the Cabinet and, after much sullenness, had been reconciled to Lincoln, could write:

> "There is not, now, the slightest uncertainty about the re-election of Mr. Lincoln. The only question is by what popular and what electoral majority. God grant that both may be so decisive as to turn every hope of rebellion to despair."

Atlanta was formally surrendered to Sherman by the mayor of the city. The former promised that the lives and property of non-combatants should be respected. He did not keep his promise. Before his occupation he had ordered all

civilians, male and female, to leave the city within five days. When Hood endeavored to intercede for the city he could not protect, the answer he received from the Federal commander was, "Talk thus to the marines, and not to me." To the mayor he replied, "I give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case."

There was a movement on foot at this time to have Georgia withdraw from the Confederacy and treat with the North for peace. It was felt that the State had not received the consideration and protection due from the authorities at Richmond. But to overtures of this nature Governor Brown replied:

"Whatever may be the opinion of her people as to the injustice done her by the Confederate administration, Georgia will triumph with her Confederate sisters, or she will sink with them in common ruin."

The Confederate administration and generals were now apprehensive and uncertain as to Sherman's next move. Hood finally determined to fall back towards Tennessee on the Federal line of communication, with the hope that he could thus draw Sherman out of Georgia. But Thomas was in Tennessee, and, having received reinforcements, he was competent to take care of Hood. Sherman, now left with no effective opposition, determined on his famous "march to

the sea." Thus the two armies which had been engaged in so many weeks of continual fighting were now marching away from each other.

Before leaving Atlanta, Sherman crowned his relentless methods by destroying the city by fire. This destruction of the property of non-combatants, the means of subsistence of women and children, may have been an effective method of causing the people to tire of rebellion, but it was not consistent with the principles of civilized warfare.

On November 16 Sherman divided his army into two bodies and marched out of Atlanta. One division took a route which led through central Georgia and Milledgeville; the other followed the railroad in the direction of Augusta. There was no opposition, except from Wheeler's cavalry and a home-guard militia. The people did their best to remove all provisions out of the Federal way, a precaution which was necessary not only on the ground of ill-will, but for the saving of their property. The Federal troops had a great respect for the goods of the people whose homes they invaded. They preserved everything they could carry with them. It must be confessed that in this respect the Federal soldiers, not excluding officers, showed a vandalism far from creditable to an army that was fighting for a great moral purpose.

While speaking of Northern barbarities such as these, we are reminded of the question of the treatment of prisoners. The sympathies of

Northern people have never ceased to be affected by the stories of suffering in Andersonville and Libby Prisons. But it ought to be remembered that up to July, 1863, the South had captured the more prisoners and was at her wits' end to provide for them, despite great efforts to do so. After the balance of prisoners shifted the North, always unwilling to abide by its cartel of exchange, became yet more averse to doing so. It is a fact that the men who pined and died of hunger and disease in Southern prisons were abandoned by their government, which refused to make adequate arrangements for the exchange of prisoners. Many were exchanged under a plan by which the Federal government could pretend to know nothing about it, and thus avoid a recognition of the belligerent status of the Confederacy; but the Confederate authorities were prepared to exchange man for man, to the fullest extent. One excuse which the North made for its failure to exchange prisoners was the fact that the South objected to giving up their recaptured slaves for their white soldiers,—a very natural objection, considering the grounds on which they were fighting. But in November, 1864, Colonel Ould, the Southern commissioner on exchange, wrote to his Secretary of War:

"My own firm conviction is that, even if we were to agree to the unjust demands of the enemy in this respect, we would not secure a general exchange. . . . I think it very doubtful whether they would agree to a general exchange

even if we consented to treat recaptured slaves as prisoners of war, and delivered those whose term of service had not expired. I am satisfied their course is the result of a conviction forced upon them by the events of the war, that a Confederate soldier is more valuable than a Federal."

This is a pardonable supposition; but it is more likely that the Northern authorities considered their prisoners more valuable because their places could not be filled from the drained Southern population. They chose to allow their own men to languish in prison rather than return soldiers to the thinning ranks of the Confederacy.

By the 10th of December, 1864, Sherman was at Savannah. As soon as the consequent bombardment began, Hardee, knowing he could not successfully defend the city, formally surrendered it on the 21st of December, after destroying the navy-yard and a great store of ammunition. Sherman wrote to President Lincoln:

"I beg to present you, as a Christmas-gift, the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton."

Thus ended Sherman's memorable Georgian expedition.

Late in January, 1865, Sherman's army, singing "John Brown's Body," crossed the Savannah River and entered South Carolina, filled with the desire to wreak vengeance on the State that had first taken the step to withdraw from the Union.

The South Carolinians soon learned that the soul of the border ruffian was indeed marching forward. Along the path of the invading hosts, churches, private residences, and personal property were destroyed with utter disregard of the rules of war; and what was not burned was often wantonly injured. Not since the days of "Bloody Bill" Cunningham, the Tory leader during the Revolutionary War, had Sherman's equal been known.

According to Sherman's theory, the Southern people had "lost all title to property, and can lose nothing not already forfeited." ("Conduct of the War," Supplement, Part 7, p. 350.) It is true, he went through the farcical proceeding of notifying his subordinates that while they had a right to forage on the enemy, wanton waste and pillage should be discouraged "for the sake of discipline." The crowning infamy of the famous march was the burning of Columbia, February 17. Sherman at first endeavored to fasten the blame on Wade Hampton, the Southern cavalry leader, but subsequently admitted that he had lied in order to weaken Hampton's influence in the State.

And while it can never be proved that Sherman directly ordered the destruction of the city, —perhaps he never did,—its annihilation was unquestionably due to a lack of discipline on the part of his men, for which he was entirely responsible. His whole conduct was that of a braggart. Before crossing the Savannah he wrote Grant,

"If you can hold Lee, and if Thomas can continue as he did on the 18th, I could go on and smash South Carolina all to pieces." (Ibid., 286.) Then again, in a communication to Halleck, Chief of Staff at Washington, he declared, December 24, 1864, "The truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that is in store for her." (Ibid., 291.)

Charleston held a prominence in the Confederacy second only to that of Richmond. It was the birthplace of secession. Sherman made a feint against it. Hardee knew that the effort to protect the city was not worth the sacrifice, which must certainly in the end be useless. He evacuated the city, after destroying all property which could be of use to the Federal army led by General Gillmore. An accidental explosion of gunpowder, destroying much life and starting a devastating conflagration, gave a peculiar horror to the fall of Charleston.

After the burning of Columbia, Sherman continued his march northward, the army despoiling and burning as it went. Sherman's march through the Carolinas was marked by a trail of ruin. His troops plundered and abused the inhabitants without let or hinderance. Jewelry was even taken forcibly from the persons of women. If the soldiers left anything, it was cleaned up by "Sherman's bummers," the prisoners of war who had escaped from the various prisons. By the

20th of March, 1865, Sherman was at Goldsboro, North Carolina, where he was again in close communication with Grant, who was but one hundred and fifty miles away. The noose was now ready to be drawn which would strangle the last hopes of the Southern Confederacy.

XV

GRANT ENDS THE STRUGGLE

THE most important of the several attempts made during the course of the war to institute negotiations for the suspension of hostilities was that of F. P. Blair. He obtained, in December, 1864, a card from President Lincoln with the words, "Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go South, and return." He went South and proposed to Jefferson Davis that he suspend hostilities on the plea that Louis Napoleon's schemes in Mexico should be frustrated by an immediate declaration of war with that country. The result was that unofficially, and through the medium of Blair, a commission, consisting of A. H. Stephens, John A. Campbell, and R. M. T. Hunter, was met by Lincoln and Seward on February 3, 1865, on board a steamer at Hampton Roads. A four hours' discussion ensued. This was resultless, as the commissioners from the Confederate States were unable to concede the conditions imposed by Lincoln as precedent to peace. These included the restoration of the Union, the abolishment of slavery, and the disarming of the South.

We left Grant in Eastern Virginia immediately after his costly and indecisive fight at Spottsylvania, when in May he found Lee immovably

barring his way to Richmond. Butler was on the James River, and was able to creep up to City Point and Bermuda Hundred. He had there a capital opportunity to operate with probable success against Richmond, or, at least, Petersburg. But Butler was never brilliant in generalship, and Beauregard soon had his army, to borrow Grant's language, completely bottled up.

In the mean time Grant, owing to Lee's illness, had made such progress southward—though he had to fight for it all the way—that by the 2d of June he was on the ground occupied by McClellan in June, 1862. He was near Gaines Mill. Lee was intrenched at Cold Harbor. Here Grant's direct method got him into trouble, and illustrated the fact that good generalship includes manœuvring to get around an enemy that holds an impregnable position. The Federal army was ordered to assault Lee's position in front,—a hopeless effort, as every officer and man well knew. Many of the former, knowing overnight the work that was cut out for them on the morrow, wrote their names and addresses on paper, which they pinned to the backs of their coats, so that their dead bodies might be identified and the news of their death sent to their friends. The Federal army, however, went bravely to the assault on the morning of the 3d. The charges were characterized by stupendous exhibitions of courage on the part of the attacking columns and the defenders alike. But it was quickly decided that the position could not be

taken. The waste of life was terrific; the slaughter was wholesale; it was not war, but murder. The losses of the Union army are estimated at seven thousand. It was an awful mistake on the part of Grant. The battle of Cold Harbor more than any other exemplifies Grant's utter lack of feeling in regard to the sacrifice of human life. He never studied to save men. His policy was to bear on the enemy with such obstinate and continuous force that the enemy must sooner or later be broken. So long as this end was achieved, it mattered little what damage resulted to his own side. He was calm in the confidence that he could stand it longest. This won in the end; but it was an indefensible policy at Cold Harbor. This Grant himself afterwards acknowledged. He was now compelled to move his army south of the James River.

Petersburg was now in the way. If Butler had performed his part in the programme arranged by Grant, this city would soon have been in Federal possession. But Butler delayed, and Beauregard made good use of the time to scrape together an army for the defence of this gateway to Richmond. By the 16th of June the Confederate commander was ready to receive the Federal advance. During that day and the two following, determined assaults on the front were made by the Union army, but they resulted only in a loss of nearly ten thousand men. While the main army was resting, detachments were sent to the southward to raid the Weldon Railroad; but

these were defeated, leaving many prisoners and large quantities of supplies in the hands of the Confederates. Sheridan also, who was to close in on Richmond from the west, was not having better success, having come in contact with General Morgan.

Matters again looked exceedingly gloomy for the North. She had an enormous army in the field, commanded by the ablest general who had hitherto appeared. He had attempted what was unquestionably his best; and yet the stronghold of the Confederacy still laughed at Federal assaults. There is a hint that even Grant's stout heart was discouraged. But a study of the war leads one to believe that he never lost confidence in the result if allowed to persist in his own way. One serious drawback with which he now had to contend was the character of his troops. Many were "bounty men," many were of the lowest order morally and physically. Doubtless, if Grant at this time had had the army commanded by McClellan in 1862, he would have made short work of his task. One supposed proof of his depression is the probable fact that he was again drinking. But the main thing we see in him is the grim determination to hold on. If he had any misgiving, it could only have been that the North might rebel against his costly methods and that he would be thwarted or even superseded. This probably explains the strange episode in relation to Butler. The Massachusetts general was no soldier; he was only a politician.

But he retained his position in the army, incompetent as he proved himself, by means of some hold which he had upon Grant. The latter asked for Butler's removal for the good of the cause. Halleck wrote Grant a letter recognizing Butler's "total unfitness to command in the field." But for political reasons it was necessary to take care of him. Grant suggested that he be given local command of a department. This was agreed to in Washington, and an order was sent to Grant to this effect, and transferring Butler's command to "Baldy" Smith. Thereupon Grant was visited by Butler, and on the following day he telegraphed to Washington that he had suspended the order for which he had expressly asked. Smith was relieved of his command and sent to New York. Evidently Butler had some means by which he was enabled to make Grant "back down."

While the campaigns were going on in Virginia and Georgia, the Confederates were endeavoring to disturb these plans by certain offensive operations, particularly the invasion of Maryland by Early. In June this general started up the valley on an expedition which gave to the authorities at Washington a serious time for a while. The lower valley had been occupied by Sigel. He had been defeated in May by Breckenridge and Imboden, and was therefore superseded by General Hunter with a larger force. Hunter proceeded to a campaign on property. He turned the Valley of Virginia, his native

State, into a wilderness. Nothing was spared, neither public buildings nor private residences. Hunter and Early arrived at Lynchburg together on the 17th. When the Confederates were expecting the former to attack he was preparing a retreat, in which he was followed until driven beyond the field upon which he could hinder Early's plans.

On July 2 Early was at Winchester. He crossed the Potomac on the 6th, and, determined that the expedition should at least pay its own expenses, collected from Hagerstown and Frederick City two hundred and twenty thousand dollars. On the 9th Lew Wallace made an attempt to stay the Confederate progress at Monocacy Bridge. A brief but severe engagement followed. Though it lasted but two hours, the Confederates lost from six to seven hundred men, and the Union army more than twice that number and also seven hundred prisoners. Wallace was defeated; but the fact that he had delayed Early probably saved Washington from assault.

The Northern capital was never in greater peril than at this time. The news that it had been taken was even spread through the Union. Baltimore and Washington were not too well defended. For the sake of the latter Lincoln was compelled to refuse urgently requested aid to the former. His words, "I hope neither Baltimore nor Washington will be taken," are good evidence of the seriousness of the situation.

It seems that a part of the plan arranged between Lee and Early for the capture of Washington was that the latter should reinforce himself by the release of the Confederate prisoners at Point Lookout. A detachment of cavalry was sent for this purpose. Early proceeded to the fortifications by the Seventh Street road on the 11th. It seems likely that a prompt and vigorous attack would have put him in possession of the city, for it was defended principally by invalids and one hundred days' men, with no one of any ability in command. But the Confederate general was unaware of the real situation, and delayed, thus giving time for reinforcements to arrive.

The opportunity was again lost by the usual inability of the Southern commanders to reap the fruits of their prowess. By the middle of July Early was recrossing the Potomac, having accomplished nothing but to scare the North, capture an immense quantity of supplies, cattle, etc., and hinder Grant's projects by diverting from him portions of his army before Richmond. Grant might have put himself at the head of the forces which followed Early out of Maryland; but he neglected to do so, and consequently the Confederate had things all his own way.

Grant, however, proceeded to compensate for this error of judgment by sending Sheridan to the Shenandoah Valley. This commander furnished successes which were sorely needed to stir the flagging Union zeal and enable the North to

believe that her vast armies were worth supporting. On the 19th Sheridan won a well-earned victory over Early at Winchester. In his despatch he says, "After a most stubborn and sanguinary engagement, which lasted from early in the morning until five o'clock in the evening, I completely defeated him, and, driving him through Winchester, captured about two thousand five hundred prisoners, five pieces of artillery, nine army flags, and most of their wounded." Then followed the battle of Fisher's Hill. At this place the Confederates were strongly intrenched; but Sheridan succeeded in flanking them, and Early's army, being thus confused, was easily defeated. This was on the 23d of September. From that time to the 18th of October, when the battle of Cedar Creek finished Early's Shenandoah career, Sheridan employed his army in laying waste the country. The harvests were stored in the barns and mills. These were burned in every direction, and the country was so completely cleared of the means of subsistence that, "if a crow should fly over it, he would have to take his provender with him."

The battle of Cedar Creek was one of those picturesque events which historians always sufficiently dwell upon. Early surprised the two corps of Sheridan's army at Cedar Creek in their camp on the 18th of October. It was a complete rout, and would have ended as a most disastrous defeat for the Northern arms had not the Confederates stopped to plunder the camp.

The Federal leaders succeeded in rallying their fleeing corps and driving them back to their duty, and, the Confederate ranks having been thinned by the absence of the plunderers, the reorganized Union men quickly turned what had been a decisive defeat into a victory which ended the campaign. After the overthrow of Early in the Shenandoah Valley all important movements in that portion of Virginia were at an end, and both sides concentrated their attention on Petersburg and Richmond.

If the successes of Sherman and Sheridan did not wholly secure the re-election of President Lincoln, at least to them must be accounted his tremendous majorities. The people of the North and the South were now fast drifting to exactly opposite states of mind. The latter were beginning to lose all confidence in the success of their cause. They were thinking, "If a disastrous end is to come, it had better come quickly." They had no faith in their Executive. Davis's predictions of sweeping the enemy off the Southern soil could no longer delude them. There was neither sympathy nor co-operation between the President and his Cabinet and Congress. Davis was stigmatized in the Southern Senate as "an amalgam of malice and mediocrity." On the other hand, the Northern people had come to see that victory was well-nigh in the hands of Lincoln. He had gained their complete confidence. They had, however, done all they wished to do for the Union. There were no more volunteers.

They were weary of the war, and yearned inexpressibly for its close. But there was now little of the "peace-at-any-price" sentiment. The Union was winning. Lincoln was winning. He now had the right generals, at least as good as there were. He was re-elected by twenty-two States out of twenty-five, receiving two hundred and thirteen votes to McClellan's twenty-one. The States that voted for Mr. Lincoln in 1864 and gave him a majority of 494,567, in 1860 cast a popular vote against him of one hundred thousand. Since the election of 1860 three States had been admitted to the Union, which raised the number to thirty-six, but eleven claimed to have seceded from the Union. Accordingly, the Electoral College represented only twenty-five, or a little more than two-thirds of the States.

It was a vote that the war must go on. Early in the summer there had been plenty in the North who would have sacrificed the Union for peace. Now it must be a fight to the finish; the South must be subjected. This, however, considered solely in relation to natural conditions, was still an almost impossible task. At its adjournment in the spring of 1865 — its last adjournment—the Confederate Congress published an address to the people. Among other things it set forth the practical impossibility of subjugation. Its reasoning was sound.

After Hood's repulse at Atlanta he withdrew his forces from that section and, early in Novem-

ber, 1864, marched into Tennessee for the purpose of capturing Sherman's base of supplies. But the Confederates were fighting a losing battle now in the West. The Mississippi River, as well as a large part of Kentucky, Tennessee, and neighboring States, had passed out of their hands forever. On November 30 Hood attacked Schofield about twenty miles out of Nashville, but was defeated, notwithstanding his superior numerical strength, and allowed Schofield to join Thomas in Nashville. Two weeks later came the battle of Nashville, one of the most disastrous for the South during the war, when Hood's army was almost destroyed and its remnants pursued for several hundred miles.

The Confederacy had already received its death-blow. Still, however, the struggle was kept up, partly by reason of the obstinacy of Davis, partly because of the alluring hope of gaining recognition abroad, and, lastly, the fight was prolonged through the pride and indomitable will of the Southern people. But, noteworthy enough, this prolongation of the conflict only served to intensify the bitterness at the North, which bore ill fruit during the period of reconstruction.

The successful operation of the general Federal plan was now almost completed. The Confederacy had been surrounded by a band of fire. Her ports were wrested from her, thus preventing what traffic had been carried on notwithstanding the blockade. Her Western outposts

had been constantly driven in, all approach—except inimical—to her territory being cut off by the Federal possession of the great Western water-way. Sherman had dealt a deadly blow in his destructive march through Georgia and the Carolinas. Sheridan had raided the rich Virginia Valley time and again. Grant was now hammering at the gate of the capital with a force and persistency which must ultimately break through. Should Richmond be taken the Confederacy might yet live; but it would be under a fugitive government which could no longer pretend to a dignified place among the nations of men. Moreover, the people had neither the cause which impels to win or the spirit to uphold a guerilla warfare. It was a foregone conclusion, though not publicly admitted by the authorities or the generals, that with the fall of Richmond the war would be ended.

But the siege of the Southern capital was a long and weary affair. Through a whole summer and a winter the Army of the Potomac waited, manœuvring and skirmishing around Petersburg and Richmond. Grant tried every possible avenue of approach; but Lee's army was ever before him and so intrenched that even Grant's recklessness of blood and life at last flinched at the assault. Every expedient was tried; but the Confederates repulsed the besiegers. Other armies harassed the country and menaced important points; but Lee could not be induced to leave his charge. Nor was he drawn

into a pitched battle; his army was far too inferior in numbers and equipment.

Throughout the winter the two armies did little but watch and "feel" each other. Two or three undecisive engagements occurred, such as that of Hatcher's Run, on February 6, 1865, and Hare's Hill, on March 25. The latter was an attack by Lee, under the immediate command of General Gordon, on Grant's works south of the Appomattox. To capture these would have given him the command of Grant's military road. Though the Federals were surprised, the success was short-lived and the Confederates were repulsed with much loss to themselves, though they made many prisoners and captured some artillery, which they spiked and left on the ground.

On the 29th of March Grant again took the offensive with vigor and determination. Sheridan, with his own and Crook's cavalry, went to Dinwiddie Court-House, two corps of infantry following on a parallel road. The object was the possession of the Weldon Railroad. But this movement was met and repulsed by Generals Fitzhugh Lee and Pickett. Grant immediately moved forward reinforcements, and Sheridan's brilliant battle of Five Forks ensued on March 31, in which Lee's right was turned and several thousand Confederates taken prisoners. It was this battle that made Appomattox possible, and it required the dash and skill of a Sheridan.

Grant was now in a position where he could

THE BATTLE OF THE CRATER

strike effectively the thin Confederate lines before Petersburg. He did this, and pierced Lee's line in three places; but the Southern troops forded the river and fell back within the inner intrenchments of the city. Among their losses was General A. P. Hill, who had done conspicuous service for the Confederate cause around Richmond during the campaign of McClellan in 1862.

This battle was practically the ending of the war. On the 2d of April, which fell on a Sunday, President Davis received a telegram from Lee stating that his lines had been broken, and advising the evacuation of Richmond that night, providing he could not regain his position. The evacuation took place. The gallant defender of the Confederacy could do no more; the persistent courage of his able antagonist, aided by overpowering numbers, had won. Richmond, so long planned for, fought for, hoped for by the North, was now her prize. It fell into Federal hands with all the traditional confusion and terror which accompany the taking of a city. The military authorities before the evacuation ordered the burning of the great tobacco warehouse. This came near involving the whole city in a general conflagration. Everybody tried to flee. The streets were blocked by the inhabitants seeking to escape with their belongings. The commissary depot was thrown open in order that the inhabitants might help themselves to the supplies, and retain them if they could.

On the morning of April 3 the Stars and Stripes were waving over the Capitol. Weitzel, with a small force, had been left within the lines of the North side. He was instructed to make as much noise as possible, so as to make a show of numbers. This he did, but at midnight, hearing explosions in the city, he rightly judged that Richmond was being evacuated. At the earliest dawn his troops marched into the city and went into the Capitol, over which they placed the Union flag. The city was an awful spectacle. Buildings were on fire in every direction. The people were fleeing in terror inspired equally by the conflagration and the Northern soldiers. The city was at once placed under martial law, and the troops were forbidden to annoy the inhabitants or molest their property. On the following day there was rejoicing in every Northern city, town, and hamlet.

How would the fall of Richmond affect the Confederacy? was the question asked in the South. The war could of course go on. Lee rightly claimed that in the mountains of Virginia he could continue fighting for twenty years; but with the fall of Richmond there was nothing left to fight for. The *Richmond Examiner* took the only intelligent view of the situation when it said:

"Each contestant in the war had made Richmond the central object of all its plans and all its exertions. It has become the symbol of the Confederacy. Its loss would be material ruin to the cause, and, in a moral point of view,

absolutely destructive, crushing the heart and extinguishing the last hope of the country. Our armies would lose the incentive inspired by a great and worthy object of defence. Our military policy would be totally at sea; we should be without a hope or an object; without civil or military organization; without a treasury or a commissariat; without the means of keeping alive a wholesome and active public sentiment; without any of the appliances for supporting a cause depending upon a popular faith and enthusiasm; without the emblems or the semblance of nationality."

When this view of the matter came to be realized, the commanders of the South were wise and broad-minded enough to acquiesce in the cessation of hostilities for the sake of preventing further and unavailing bloodshed. It is true, Lee pushed up the Appomattox, which he crossed on the night of April 2. He desired to hold himself in such a position that he could take time for consideration of the outlook. Sheridan followed him, cutting off such troops as were delayed in getting away from Richmond. By the 5th of April Lee was at Amelia Court-House, thirty-six miles from Richmond. Meade was at his rear and also on his right flank. Sheridan was in front of him, and Ord to the south. The Army of Northern Virginia, what remained of it, was entirely surrounded. Lee's position made battle hopeless, the demoralization of his army made it impossible. The men were deserting in squads and the Confederate line of march was strewn with abandoned arms and equipment. The belief was prevalent in the army that the surrender was to be made. Grant wrote to Lee,

April 7, suggesting the good policy of giving up the struggle in order to prevent further and useless effusion of blood. Several letters passed between the commanders. Grant declined to meet Lee in conference except on the understanding that their coming together should be for the purpose of surrender. Nine letters in all were written on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of April. On the last-named date the two generals met in a house owned by Wilmer McLean at Appomattox, and with the least possible formality agreed on terms. It was a meeting between two brave, honest, sincere Americans, each respecting the other. The story that Lee tendered Grant his sword, which the latter declined to receive, is without foundation. No such offer was made. It is probable that Lee's army, as surrendered, did not consist of over ten thousand men, the rest having absented themselves without leave as soon as it became known that surrender was likely to occur. The soldiers were paroled, the officers were allowed to retain their side-arms, horses, and personal effects, but all other arms were to be handed over to the Federal government.

With the news that the articles of surrender had been signed, which meant that the war was over, the North went into a paroxysm of joy. Stanton uttered the prevalent sentiment when he telegraphed Grant: "Thanks be to Almighty God for the great victory with which He has this day crowned you and the gallant armies under

your command. The thanks of this Department, and of the government, and of the United States —their reverence and honor have been deserved —will be rendered to you and the brave and gallant officers and soldiers of your army for all time." A salute of two hundred guns was ordered fired from every arsenal and fort. The nation was mad for joy. In the South there was corresponding depression. The feelings there, indeed, were mingled. With the humiliation naturally consequent on defeat, the sorrow over a lost cause, doubt and fear as to the future, there was a sigh of relief in knowing that the strife was ended.

Lee's farewell address to his army is simple and characteristic of this taciturn man; and yet it shows between the lines a world of pathos. He wrote:

"General Order No. 9.

"Head-Quarters Army Northern Virginia,

"April 10, 1865.

"After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

"I need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them; but, feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.

"By the terms of agreement, officers and men can return to their homes and remain there until exchanged.

"You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed; and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you his blessing and protection.

"With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.

"R. E. Lee,
"General."

This is very different from the proclamation issued on the 5th of April by Jefferson Davis:

"Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which never yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia—noble State, whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious recent history; whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock of this war; whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so sublime as to render her illustrious in all time to come—that Virginia, with the help of the people and by the blessing of Providence, shall be held and defended, and no peace ever be made with the infamous invaders of her territory." ("Rise and Fall," vol. ii. p. 677.)

Davis was of the opinion that Johnston, who was in North Carolina closely watched by Sherman, needed not to have surrendered, even after Lee was compelled to do so. But as early as the 23d of February, when Johnston was reinstated in command of the Army of the Tennessee, the cause of the Confederacy appeared to him hopeless, and he saw no good in continuing the fight-

ing except for the sake of obtaining better terms of peace. He was directed by General Lee to drive back Sherman, an order admirable in its comprehensiveness, but sorely lacking in practicability owing to the small number and scattered condition of Johnston's available troops. After much marching and two or three unimportant engagements, the Army of the Tennessee was concentrated near Bentonville on the 18th of March. On the 19th, 20th, and 21st an engagement occurred at this place, in which the Confederates, though they had the advantage, were not able to prevent Sherman from uniting with Schofield. On the 22d Johnston moved towards Raleigh. April 11 he heard of the surrender of Lee, and immediately decided that further resistance on his part was useless. He met President Davis, by appointment, at Greensboro on the 12th. Mr. Davis argued for the continuance of the war, for he believed that a brave stand would recall the soldiers who had deserted and arouse the spirit of the country. Finding no support, he finally persuaded Johnston to send Sherman a letter asking for an armistice. The contents of this letter were as follows:

"The results of the recent campaigns in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am therefore induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the

armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies,—the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war."

General Sherman assented to a meeting, which took place on the following day at a house on the Raleigh road. The first thing Sherman did was to show Johnston a telegram announcing the assassination of President Lincoln. This elicited from the Confederate general the declaration that "the event was the greatest possible calamity to the South."

General Sherman stated that an armistice giving opportunity for the civil powers to negotiate terms of peace was out of the question; for Washington would never consent to the recognition of any civil capacity on the part of the leaders of the Confederacy. Johnston suggested that, as generals had been known to arrange the terms of a permanent peace, so they might. After considerable discussion, and much argument as to whether the Confederate President and his Cabinet should be included in the general amnesty, a Basis of Agreement was signed by both generals.

This was rejected by the government of the United States. Thereupon General Johnston asked for another meeting. An agreement of surrender was then made which was similar in effect to that between Grant and Lee.

The acceptation by the United States government of the first basis of agreement would have

produced instant peace throughout the country. But in signing it Sherman was going outside his authority; and as there was no mention of slavery or the recent legislation on slavery, its adoption might have resulted in hardly less confusion than that which in reality ensued.

The smaller armies of the Confederacy surrendered in due time,—that of Taylor, in Alabama, on May 8, and that of Kirby Smith, on May 26, at Baton Rouge. The ships of the South had, with the sole exception of the "Shenandoah," been swept from the seas, and she, after destroying the American whaling fleet and sundry craft captured on the Pacific Ocean, surrendered in August, 1865, a date whose delay can hardly be accounted for by the allegation of Waddell, her commander, that prior to it he had not received trustworthy information of the close of the war.

No better evidence of the good faith of the South could be furnished than the fact that after the surrender not a gun was fired against the supporters of the Federal government.

XVI

RECONSTRUCTION

THE assassination of President Lincoln was a greater calamity to the South than it was to the North. Jefferson Davis says he made a declaration to this effect immediately on hearing the news of that sad event, though he admits that the Confederates then standing around him cheered the announcement of the death of the man whom they regarded as their arch-enemy. Lincoln strained the Constitution beyond its limit to meet the emergencies occasioned by the Civil War; but his intention was ever to be governed by the strict letter of that instrument. His proclamation and message of December 8, 1863, which must be accepted as the plan of reconstruction to which he consistently adhered, promised all persons who took sides with the Confederacy, except certain described classes, amnesty and restoration of property upon their taking an oath of allegiance to the Union, provided they also agreed to support the slavery legislation enacted during the war, unless repealed by Congress or annulled by the Supreme Court. No mention was made of any purpose of conferring the suffrage upon emancipated slaves, though assurances of permanent freedom were given to them. It was the universal opinion during the

early period of the war that when it should cease the seceding States might resume their original status in the Union. Many, however, adhered to the view that as States they had committed suicide, and that they should be simply regarded as Territories. Stevens held that they should be regarded as conquered provinces.

The coming strife between the executive and legislative branches of the government over the relations of the confederated States to those of the Union had been foreshadowed during Lincoln's administration when he undertook to carry out his liberal policy of "restoration" as opposed to the fanatical "root and branch vagaries" of the majority in Congress. The latter, under the guidance of men like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, were bent on "reconstruction." The difficulties of the situation were increased, moreover, by several factions which forced on the government the problems never before thrust on a nation at the close of a mighty struggle. In the first place, unfortunately for both North and South, no treaty was possible at the close of hostilities. Then, again, the Federal character of the government increased rather than diminished the gravity of the situation. Both individuals and States had to be dealt with. To the large-minded Lincoln the solution was easy enough. While the State governments that had existed under the protection of the Confederacy had been destroyed, the States themselves survived, and needed merely to be restored to their former

position in the Union,—which was the view that in the end prevailed. If individuals were to be punished, well and good, but a State could not be blotted out.

Seward was heartily in favor of this plan. His doctrine was one of reconciliation, and to secure it he was willing, if necessary, to go to the extent of a declaration of war against France over the Mexican question, so as to get the veterans of both sides under a common banner again. Thirty-five years were to elapse before, in the Spanish-American War, Seward's hope was to be realized. Finally, there was presented to the government the negro problem. What was to be the status of those millions of blacks who had never enjoyed the rights of marriage, of holding property, making contracts, appearing in courts of justice, to say nothing of performing civic duties? Lincoln's overshadowing personality had warded off an open breach with Congress, and there was a disposition to allow him to try his magnanimous policy, but how was it to fare with his successor, who on April 15, 1865, came into the Presidency and for the next four years occupied the White House? All eyes were now turned on him, and committee after committee eagerly sought to obtain some indication of his policy.

Johnson was unable at first to give adequate expression to his utter detestation of all the leaders of the ill-starred Confederacy. "Treason must be made odious," was his favorite text.

POSTER ANNOUNCING THE REWARD FOR THE APPREHENSION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSIN

A " poor white" of the South, he had, by sheer force of his great natural abilities, risen to the highest office both in Tennessee and in the republic; but he had not forgotten many real as well as many imaginary injuries he had experienced at the hands of those who regarded themselves as his social superiors,—the defeated chieftains of the South. His language in reference to them was now coarse, harsh, and vindictive. Even the Northern radicals, in the intoxication of victory, felt some alarm, and counselled moderation. Soon, however, there was a complete change in the attitude of the President. What caused it? There were some who said that Seward, the diplomatic, sagacious Secretary of State, obtained the mastery and persuaded Johnson that Lincoln's policy was the only wise and safe one. Others maintained that Johnson was cajoled by the Southern leaders, whose blandishments were irresistible,—that he wished to gain their favor. Then again there were not a few who were inclined to see in his opposition to negro enfranchisement and reconstruction the hereditary views of a Southerner. Possibly there was truth in all these claims. But none of them does justice to Johnson's ability. He saw clearly in time the true state of things, and history has justified his course. To his credit be it said, he bravely adhered to it through every sort of persecution.

Andrew Johnson sought to give actuality to the policy of re-establishment held by his prede-

cessor. He agreed with Lincoln that as soon as "rebellion" ceased the insurgent States, under the Constitution, necessarily resumed their position, privileges, and responsibilities in the Union, that the amnesty reinstated the voters. But, unfortunately, Johnson had not Lincoln's *savoir faire*. He was a stubborn, aggressive, tactless man, absolutely incapable of accommodating himself in any way to those who differed with him. His sympathies were wholly with the South, except upon the one point of the Union. Being a Democrat, he was naturally an object of extreme jealousy on the part of Congress. It was predisposed to view his acts with suspicion. His manner and disposition did not in the least tend to alleviate this attitude.

On May 29, 1865, Johnson issued this proclamation:

"To the end, therefore, that the authority of the government of the United States may be restored, and that peace, order, and freedom may be re-established, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, do proclaim and declare that I hereby grant to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, amnesty and pardon, with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and except in cases where legal proceedings under the laws of the United States providing for the confiscation of property of persons engaged in the rebellion have been instituted; but on the condition, nevertheless, that every such person shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate; and which oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the tenor and effect following,—to wit:

"'I, ——— ———, do solemnly swear (or affirm), in

presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Union thereunder, and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves, so help me God.' "

In obedience to Johnson's proclamation and in conformity with Lincoln's policy of restoration, the properly qualified classes of white citizens met in conventions throughout the Southern States directly after the war and erected "provisional governments," composed for the most part of reputable citizens who had taken the oath of allegiance required by law. The single exception perhaps was Tennessee, whose "Lincoln government" was kept up. The continuation of these provisional governments depended on the temper of the North and the South. General Grant, who made a short visit to the Southern States soon after the war, made a most favorable report to the President regarding the condition of affairs there. Shortly afterwards, however, Carl Schurz, after a more protracted stay in the defeated section, gave a most discouraging account not only of the sentiments of the South towards the negro, but towards the Federal government itself. It was this report, more than anything else, that brought about the extreme measures of the reconstruction era which were in force until nullified by the political revolution of 1876.

On February 1, 1865, Congress had proposed

to the States the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting slavery. Under the Constitution the ratification of three-fourths of the States was necessary to render this valid. Delaware and Kentucky refused to ratify. Florida and Mississippi did not act upon the amendment at this time. Texas had not reorganized. The Amendment consequently was ratified by sixteen free and eleven formerly slave-holding States. Thus the Amendment was accepted by exactly the necessary three-fourths. A dilemma was here rendered unavoidable: either the former Confederate States were in possession of valid and legitimate governments, or the Amendment was not constitutionally ratified. The Southern States which voted had reorganized in accordance with the President's proclamation.

These Southern States had in all good faith accepted the conditions laid upon them by the results of the war. They also received Federal garrisons in all the large towns. They proceeded to legislate in regard to the emancipated negroes in a spirit which after events have since proved to have been wise and necessary to domestic well-being; but, however desirable the measures, they were ill-timed. The Southern Legislatures could not but view with the most serious apprehension the advent to unaccustomed and unrestrained freedom of the vast horde of negroes suddenly released from the patriarchal restraints customarily imposed on them. These people were without houses and without means of sub-

sistence except labor under entirely new conditions. Enactments which bore particularly upon the negroes were made in regard to labor contracts and vagrancy. Offences of a minor degree were made punishable by compulsory labor, to which the culprit was hired out by judicial process. In some States it was made requisite that the freedman should obtain written contracts or licenses to work. The man not able to show such a license was subject to arrest for vagrancy and to consequent compulsory labor. Minors were to serve an apprenticeship until they came to a certain age. It was indeed a system by which the negro would be gradually initiated into the full rights of his freedom, and the white population in the mean time safeguarded against the manifest dangers which the emancipation of the slaves entailed. But all this seemed to the people of the North like an attempt to evade the effects of abolition. It was another instance of setting an incontrovertible theory over against an irreconcilable condition.

Strenuous and successful effort was made by the Republican legislators to thwart and invalidate the process of reinstatement which was going on in the South under the proclamation of the President. An act had been passed in March, 1863, creating in the War Department a "Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands." This was to be the legal guardian of the negro.

The best friends of this institution admit that

it deteriorated into an abuse. Its real history is one of official corruption and tyranny the like of which can be paralleled in no other civilized country. It was made an engine by which Northern adventurers enriched themselves and Republican majorities were heaped up by enforced or cajoled negro votes. A faithful stirring of the history of the Freedmen's Bureau cannot fail to make manifest an exceedingly bad odor. It was the pet instrument of the detestable "carpet-bagger," a Northern adventurer, or the pliant tool of the "scalawag," a Southern renegade.

Congress was all the more disposed to arbitrary measures in relation to the defeated Southern States by reason of the fact that President Johnson had forestalled it by reinstating those Commonwealths. The North was determined to be governed in her action towards the prostrate South by a spirit which was denoted by the watchword "Thorough." It meant a thorough adjustment of the condition of the negro in accordance with a radical view of his rights; it had in view a complete subjugation of the recalcitrant States in order that the State rights theory should never again lift its head in opposition to the central government. Congress proceeded to legislate under the assumption that all Federal law had been suspended, by their act of rebellion, in the States which had participated in the Confederacy, and that such law could not be revived except by the declaration of Congress. Thus Congress assumed the right

to reconstruct the Southern States in any way it should see fit; for it was maintained that even the State governments themselves at the South, except those like the Pierpont machine in Virginia, and similar creatures of the Northern government in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, necessarily fell with the Confederacy.

In accordance with this view, when Congress reassembled in 1865 the seceding States were omitted from the roll-call. A resolution passed both houses to the effect that neither Senators nor Representatives should be received from the seceding States until Congress had readmitted those States to the Union, although, in accordance with the suggestions of the President, Southern Representatives, duly elected, were ready to take their seats. The troops were still in the South; it was martial law *de facto;* the transition to *de jure* was scarcely necessary.

Now began a strife between the President and Congress, which forms the least respectable phase of American history.

On March 2, 1867, radical measures were adopted in relation to the Southern States. The preamble of the first act, though it can scarcely be substantiated in fact, expressed the purpose of these measures.

"WHEREAS, No legal State governments, or adequate protection for life or property, now exist in the rebel States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas; and whereas, it is necessary that peace and good order should

be enforced in said States, until loyal and republican State governments can be legally established; therefore, be it enacted," etc.

The bill was passed over the President's veto. By it the South was divided into five military districts, each under a general officer of the Union army. The President, in his message vetoing the bill, said,—

"Thus, over all these ten States, this military government is now declared to have unlimited authority. It is no longer confined to the preservation of the public peace, the administration of criminal law, the registration of voters, and the superintendence of elections; but, 'in all respects,' is asserted to be paramount to the existing civil government. It is impossible to conceive any state of society more intolerable than this, and yet it is to this condition that twelve millions of American citizens are reduced by the Congress of the United States. Over every part of the immense territory occupied by these American citizens the Constitution of the United States is theoretically in full operation. It binds all the people, then, and should protect them; yet they are denied every one of its sacred guarantees. Of what avail will it be to any one of these Southern people, when seized by a file of soldiers, to ask for the cause of arrest, or for the production of the warrant? Of what avail to ask for the privilege of bail when in military custody, which knows no such thing as bail? Of what avail to demand a trial by jury, process for witnesses, a copy of the indictment, the privilege of counsel, or that greater privilege, the writ of habeas corpus?"

But the President's own reasoning was equally unavailing. An absolutely partisan Congress was perfectly able, and more than willing, to pass its measures over his veto.

In June, 1866, Congress proposed to the States the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-

GENERAL LEE ON "TRAVELLER"

stitution. The purpose of this was to incorporate the provisions of the above-mentioned bill in the fundamental law. It stated that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" should be acknowledged as citizens of the United States. By December, 1866, when the new Congress came together, many of the Southern States had rejected this Amendment. Thereupon measures were taken by which reconstruction along the lines laid down by the triumphant party might be enforced. Preparatory to this, universal suffrage was established in the District of Columbia and in the Territories in spite of a veto; General Grant was put in charge of the whole military arm of the government, and his position was rendered almost independent of the President; the Tenure of Office Act, an unwarranted measure, was passed, designedly to subject the President's appointments to and removals from office to the approval of the Senate. It was this last which ostensibly resulted in the impeachment of President Johnson. He demanded the resignation of Secretary Stanton; the latter, refusing to resign, was superseded by the President in accordance with the terms of the Act. Congress, on reassembling in December, 1867, refused to permit Stanton's removal. President Johnson determined to ignore the Tenure of Office Act, and again removed Stanton. Thereupon, in February, 1868, the House voted to impeach the President for high crimes and misdemeanors.

The Senate closed the trial on May 16, when the vote stood thirty-five for conviction and nineteen for acquittal; a two-thirds majority being required for conviction, the President was acquitted by one vote, and Stanton resigned his office.

It is said that a conviction of Johnson was never intended; that the Senate secretly decided to come within one vote of the fatal act. The whole trial was a farce from beginning to end. The President was impeached for one thing, but tried for another, and the decisions of the Chief Justice in matters of evidence were again and again overruled by the "rump" Congress. As was cleverly said at the time, Johnson was tried for declaring that the Southern States were in the Union, and at the same time Jefferson Davis was languishing in prison because he said they were not in the Union.

When Jefferson Davis fled from Richmond the Northern government offered a reward of one hundred thousand dollars for his arrest, and on May 10, 1865, he was captured in Georgia. The conduct of the Federal authorities towards the fallen chieftain was vulgar and inexcusable from beginning to end. First came the cowardly story that he was attired in woman's apparel when apprehended, which was proved to be a deliberate fabrication. Then came his imprisonment in Fortress Monroe, where he was treated with a cruelty and insolence that seem almost incredible. He was never brought to trial. There

was much cheap blustering about the necessity of executing him as well as other Southern leaders; but fortunately, Philip drunk was overruled by Philip sober, and the danger of outrage and death passed from the chiefs of the Lost Cause. The trial of Davis would have involved, as of course, the whole question of secession, a cause decided by the sword, with the bare possibility that the Supreme Court might have reversed the decision.

On March 2, 1867, Congress passed the "Reconstruction Act." An election was to be held in each State for delegates to a State Convention. The military commanders were to enroll in each State all legal voters, in accordance with the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. This enrolment included the negroes, and excluded the great majority of the intelligent Southern men who had taken part in the war, therefore the conventions were not difficult to handle. The conventions were instructed to frame constitutions in which the franchise was extended to all classes of citizens in accordance with the Amendment. To these same voters the constitutions were to be submitted and then sent to Congress. Each State was to be readmitted to representation as soon as the Legislature convened under these new constitutions should ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.

By means of this process, which can hardly be called popular, the two Carolinas, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas were

prepared for readmission by the end of June, 1868. Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas were delayed by the difficulty with which, through the manipulation of the voters, majorities could be obtained for the constitutions framed by the reconstructing conventions. Georgia was not readmitted until January 30, 1871, on account of the fact that her laws had declared negroes ineligible to hold office. Tennessee's old Union government was maintained, although it represented the Lincoln plan of restoration rather than the Congressional theory of reconstruction. For eight years the new governments, propped up by Federal bayonets, plundered the South and kept that section in a state of anarchy that beggars description. The rancor and bitterness that the South subsequently displayed, and in not a few instances yet holds, was not caused so much by the losses sustained during the Civil War as by the treatment she afterwards received at the hands of the North. The former were regarded as the inevitable incidents of war, and accepted as such; the latter was the outcome of the desire for revenge and plunder made possible by the illogical theories of incompetent Congressmen backed by demagogues and a rabidly sectional press. But, in spite of all adversities and opposition, the South has gained the confidence of the financial interests of the United States, and her material advancement, in which her own sons have taken the chief part, has been rapid and noteworthy. She has, too, by the

political revolution of 1876, begun the movement that has to-day given her the mastery of her own peculiar circumstances; and, withal, she has convinced the country that she is a loyal section of a Union of which she is justly proud.

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